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HEALTH CARE COST 
CONTAINMENT AND 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: 
A CRITIQUE OF WASTE 
·THEORY 
Maxwell J. Mehlman* 
The high cost of health care has led to proposals to reduce 
wasteful medical technology under Medicare and other payment 
systems. Professor Mehlman warns that achieving this objective, 
while laudable in theory, is problematic because of the difficulties 
of defining, detecting and eliminating technology waste. 
A particular danger is that, in an effort to reduce waste, pa-
tients will be denied not only technologies that are wasteful from 
the patient's own perspective but technologies that yield net patient 
benefit. This risk is exacerbated by the Medicare prospective pay-
ment system, which rewards hospitals financially in inverse propor-
tion to the amount of care they furnish patients. Professor 
Mehlman describes legal methods to reduce this risk, and recom-
mends significant changes in the Medicare administrative process. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE NEED TO control health care costs in the United State has 
been widely recognized. 1 Much of the blame for rising costs has 
been focused on health care technologies-in particular, expensive, 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Tlie Law-Medicine Center, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. B.A., Reed College (1970); Oxford University (1972); 
J.D., Yale Law School (1975). This work has been supported by a grant from the Health 
Systems Management Center, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve 
University, with funding provided by theW. M. Keck Foundation. The author is indebted to 
his research assistants, Michael Renne and Arthur Brown, to Janet Sawyer for her help in 
preparing the manuscript, and to the following for their comments: James Blumstein, Alex-
ander Capron, Ronald Coffey, Barbara DeCaesare, Ernest Gellhorn, Timothy Jost, Theodore 
Marmor, E. Haavi Morreim, Duncan Neuhauser, Seymour Perry, Gordon Schatz, and Ran-
dall Shorr. 
I. Expenditures for health care in the United States rose from $35.9 billion in 1965 
(comprising 3.9% of the gross national product) to $355.4 billion in 1983 (10.8% GNP). 
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Report and Recommendations to the Secre-
tary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,446, 24,457-58 (1985) 
[hereinafter cited as PROPAC 1985]. For a history of government efforts to control health 
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"big ticket" items and services.2 This Article explores the ways in 
which health care technology is affected by regulatory efforts to 
control health care costs, especially those programs adopted for the 
Medicare system. 3 The legal implications of these regulatory efforts 
will also be investigated. 
In this Article, the term "medical technology" will connote a 
drug, deviCe, or medical or surgical procedure used in medical 
care.4 This definition is admittedly broad, including all aspects of 
the detection, prevention and treatment of disease, but excluding 
health care delivery organizations.5 Focusing on technology6 per-
care costs, seeK. WARNER & B. LUCE, COST BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALY-
SIS IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POTENTIAL 28-32 (1982). 
2. See generally MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE 
COSTS (S. Altman & R. Blendon eds. 1979). "Big ticket" technologies are expensive on a per 
unit or per treatment basis. They may not, however, be solely responsible for the cost crisis. 
See Moloney & Rogers, Medical Technology--A Different View of the Contentious Debate 
Over Casts, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413 (1979) (blaming low unit-cost technologies such as 
laboratory tests for increased health care costs). Unfortunately; segregating technology-re-
lated cost increases from increases due to other factors is difficult. See generally OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND CoSTS OF THE MEDICARE PRO-
GRAM 45-61 (1984) [hereinafter cited as OTA MEDICARE]. Nevertheless, for purposes of this 
Article, it is assumed that technology has played a substantial role in the increase in hea.lth 
care costs over the last fifteen years. 
3. Medicare was established in 1965 (Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)) to provide 
medical care to the elderly without regard to their ability to pay. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th 
Cong., !st. Sess. 4, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 1945-46. Medi-
care currently accounts for approximately 35% of national health care expenditures, OTA 
MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 23, and for 40% of all hospital revenues. Medical Technology 
Assessmen~: Hearings an H.R. 5496 before the Subcommittee an Health and the Environment 
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1984) [hereinafter cited 
as Hearings on H.R. 5496] (statement of Raymond Dross, M.D., on behalf of Health Insur-
ance Association of America). Expenditures for Medicare increased from $7.1 billion in fiscal 
year 1970 to $65 billion in fiscal year 1984. PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,458. Medi-
care's impact extends beyond the program itself insofar as other institutional purchasers of 
health care, such as private insurers, typically follow Medicare's lead with regard to medical 
technology. See OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 23. 
4. This is the definition formerly used by the Congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIES FOR MEDICAL TECH-
NOLOGY AssESSMENT 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OTA STRATEGIES]. It resembles the one 
favored by economists. See Warner, Effects of Hospital Cost Containment on the Development 
and Use of Medical Technalagy, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 187, 191 (1978) (describ-
ing economists' general definition of technology as a "defined configuration of all inputs, both 
human and nonhuman, used in a specific production process"). Some commentators, includ-
ing Warner, exclude labor inputs from the meaning of the term, defining it primarily as medi-
cal hardware. See id. at 191. See also Fineberg, Technology Assessment: Motivation, 
Capability, and Future Directions, 23 MED. CARE 663, 663 (1985) (defining technology as 
"knowledge applied to a purpose"). 
5. Health care delivery organizations, such as hospitals, physicians, and health mainte-
nance organizations, are the entities that provide health care. The OT A has recently broad-
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mits discussion of relatively discrete drugs, devices, and surgical 
and medical procedures that can be evaluated and regulated, more 
or less, as units. 
Classic examples of discrete medical technologies include drugs, 
such as aspirin and penicillin, and medical devices, such as scalpels 
and respirators. Although both drugs and-medical devices are often 
used in conjunction with other medical inputs, they can to some 
extent be"treated as separate entities, and indeed are regulated 
largely as such by the federal government. 7 Surgical and medical 
technologies· are less often thought of as discrete entities, but are 
somewhat amenable to beiiig so treated. 8 Nevertheless, the utility 
of this heuristic approach must not be overestimated. As will be 
explained, 9 it is often extremely difficult to isolate a particular tech-
nology from the medical context in which it is used. 10 It is even 
more difficult to manipulate its development, diffusion and use. 
ened its definition of medical technology to include "the organizational and supportive 
systems within which [health] care is provided." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, 
QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY xi (1985). 
6. The term "technology" in this Article refers to medical technology unless otherwise 
indicated. 
7. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-379(a) (1982) and 
regulations thereunder, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-10.90 (1985). 
8. Surgical and medical procedures, however, are more difficult to deal with in this 
fashion than drugs and devices. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
10. Different medical technologies can be categorized in terms of their respective func-
tions. One taxonomy might distinguish between information-gathering technologies such as 
diagnostic tests and patient monitoring devices, information-processing technologies such as 
computerized diagnostics and computerized recordkeeping, and treatment technologies. See 
Anbar, Penetrating the Black Box: Physical Principles Behind Health Care Technology, in 
THE MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE: STRATEGIES FOR USING TECHNOLOGY IN PATIENT CARE 
23, 32 (S. Reiser & M. Anbar eds. 1984) [this collection of essays will hereinafter be cited as 
MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE]; see also Smits, The Clinical Context of Technology Assessment, 
J. HEALTH PoL, PoL'Y & L. 31, 35 (1984) (distinguishing between diagnostic and therapeu-
tic technologies, with preventive technologies as a subset of the latter). Another approach is 
to classify technologies according to usefulness. Technologies that provide new information 
or patient outcomes might be distinguished from technologies that yield marginally greater 
information or better outcomes. Technologies that produce the same information or outcome 
as another technology might be distinguished on the-basis of relative cost or ease of use. See 
id. at 35-37. 
A classic division within therapeutic technologies is Lewis Thomas' breakdown of "deci-
sive" and "half-way" technologies. The former, epitomized by antibiotics, are preventive or 
curative, and result from genuine understanding of disease mechanisms. Half-way technolo-
gies, ex\!mplified by kidney dialysis, "make up for" a disease or postpone disease-related 
death. L. THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 5-42 (1974). 
Smits, however, cautions against singling out half-way technologies for scrutiny and criti-
cism, pointing out that, although they are in need of eventual replacement with definitive 
technologies, they are not "half-way" in terms of current value. See Smits, supra, at 33-34. 
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Prior to the recent profound changes in the health care sys-
tem, 11 a particular set of perverse incentives affected medical tech-
nology. Medicare, for example, paid health care providers for each 
technology employed each time they employed it. Consequently, 
providers were motivated to apply as much technology as possible, 
regardless of cost. 12 
The providers' desire to do everything possible to help pa-
tients13, the attraction of using state-of-the-art techniques, 14 com-
bined with the aforementioned incentives, are said to have created a 
"technological imperative"15 that led to inappropriate and excessive 
development,_ acquisition, and use of technology. 16 In particular, 
11. See infra notes 260-67 and accompanying text. 
12. See generally OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 30-39. 
13. See Anderson & Steinberg, To Buy or Not to Buy: Technology Acquisition Under 
Prospective Payment, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 182, 183 (1984). Hellerstein emphasizes the 
desire of physicians to appear able to benefit their patients even when they may not be able to 
do so. Technology, he states, serves to distract providers from the "woeful inadequacy" of 
medicine. Hellerstein, Overdosing on Medical Technology, 86 TECH. REV. 13, 15 (1983). In-
deed, "[t]echnology often serves the purposes that religious ritual once did. Better than 
prayers or candles, technology brings hope." Id. Warner agrees that "technological sophisti-
cation is viewed by many-patients, physicians, and administrators-as a surrogate for high 
quality care." Warner, supra note 4,-at 193. 
14. The replacement of the scalpel by the laser in surgery is one example of the switch to 
state-of-the-art technology. See Anbar, supra note 10, at 32. 
15. A classic example of the operation of this imperative is the development of the inten-
sive care unit (ICU). The ICU first appeared during World War II as a recovery area for 
post-operative patients. See L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL AD-
VANCES AND THEIR DIFFUSION 41 (1979). By the mid-1950's, "mixed" ICU's were devel-
oped in which both post-operative and critically-ill patients were treated. Id. at 42-43. This 
led to specialized ICU's such as coronary care units, neonatal intensive care units, and burn 
units. Id at 43. This proliferation occurred despite data indicating that ICU benefits were 
marginal. Id. at 70. Hellerstein comments that " '[i]ntensive care' sounds like love, so the 
dying patient is surrounded by monitors and catheters and respirators." Hellerstein, supra 
note 13, at 15. Another example of the technological imperative is the CT scanner. See 
Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of Medical Technology: Future Policy Directions, 55 
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 25, 30-35 (1977). 
16. Besides the desire to help patients and to use the newest and best techniques, the 
technological imperative is fueled by a number of other factors, including: (1) increased spe-
cialization by physicians, see Banta, Embracing or Rejecting Innovations: Clinical Diffusion of 
Health Care Technology, in MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE, supra note 10, at 82; Schroeder, 
Curbing the High Costs of Medical Advances, 1 Bus. & HEALTH 7, 10 (1984) (noting the 
higher incomes of high-technology specialists); (2) increased numbers of doctors competing 
with one another for patients, relying on more intensive use of expensive technology to make 
up for fewer patient visits, see id. at 9-10 (noting predictions of a surplus of 70,000 doctors by 
1990 and 150,000 by the year 2000); (3) the increase in patients whose care is paid for by 
third parties, see Banta, supra, at 83; Schroeder, supra, at 9; (4) increases in malpractice 
liability and insurance costs, see Banta, supra, at 82; Schroeder, supra, at 9; (5) competition 
among hospitals for patients and referring physicians, see Health Services Research and 
Health Statistics Amendments of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 4869, 10839, 11762, and 12166 
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and 
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the old system is said to have permitted, indeed fostered, "waste" in 
technology. By elimii1ati11g this waste through cost-containment ef-
forts, the quality of care could arguably be maintained and even 
enhanced while costs could be stabilized or reduced. 
The leading exponent of this viewpoint is Dr. Arnold S. 
Reiman, editor of the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, 
who states: "The cost culprit is not technology per se, but only tech-
nology that is ineffective, superfluous, or unsafe.'m Echoing 
F_elman are the nev; Prospective Payment CorruTtission (PJR.OPAC), 
the group of experts charged with overseeing and guiding Medicare 
cost control programs, 18 and the Healih Care Finance Administra-
tion (HCF A), the agency within the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) charged with administering 
Medicare. 19 
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 88-89 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR. 
4869] (testimony of Dr. Steven A. Schroeder); and (6) the lack of adequate incentive to be 
first to abandon, as apposed to adopt, a new technology, see Hawkins, Evaluating the Benefit 
of Clinical Trials to Future Patients, 5 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 13, 14 (1984). 
i7. Reiman, An Institute for Health Care Evaluation, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669 
( 1982). Additional proponents of the need to eliminate waste include Morreim, The 11-fD and 
the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 30, 31; Smits, supra note 10, at 32; and 
Braun, Need for Timely Information Justifies HCHCT, 15 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 302 
(1981). See also H.R. REP. No. 818, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984). 
18. PROPAC states that "[i]ncreases in payments for hospital care can be limited while 
maintaining a high level of quality when productivity is improved. Productivity is improved 
when fewer or less costly resources are used to yield a product of given quality .... " 
PROPAC 1985, supra note I, at 24,464. PROPAC was established by the Social Security 
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. As amended by the Medicare and 
Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1061, 
this legislation authorizes the Director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
to appoint a 15-member commission to collect and assess information on health care, particu-
larly on the need to make adjustments in the prospective payment system, and to make rec-
ommendations to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
Congress. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 ww(d)-(e) (Supp. 1984). PROPAC is specifically author-
ized to assess the safety, efficacy and cost effectiveness of care. See id. at§ 1395ww(e)(6)(E) 
(Supp. 1984). PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, issued in June, 1985, was its first report. 
19. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION, 
FUNCTIONS, AND DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,247-49 (1984). HCFA 
states that "[b]y reallocating inputs and outputs toward more cost-effective practice patterns, 
cost per discharge can decrease in real terms, while quality of care can be potentially im-
proved." 50 Fed. Reg. 24,443 (1985). See also Relman, Assessment of Medical Practices: A 
Simple Proposal, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 153 (1980). Bunker argues that eliminating waste is 
necessary to provide effective care, stating that "[p ]urchase of care that is ineffective or of 
undocumented efficacy for some patients will almost certainly result in a failure to provide 
effective care to other patients." Bunker, Evaluation of A1edical-Technology Strategies: Propo-
sal for an Institute for Health-Care Evaluation, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 687, 691 (1982). Yet, 
he does not explain why he conceives of health care decisionmaking as such a zero-sum 
proposition. The purchase of wasteful technology need not preclude proper care for others, 
although it may prevent the purchase of other non-health care goods, or increase the national 
1986] MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 783 
Eliminating wasteful technology appears a desirable and simply 
attainable objective for cost containment: merely identify and elimi-
nate wasteful technologies or uses of technology. This will save 
money without compromising the quality of care. Indeed, it may 
save enough money so that more extreme cost controls, such as 
technology rationing20 or preventing the development or use of 
nonwasteful technologies,2 I would be unnecessary. 
Unfortunately these directives are extremely difficult to achieve. 
First, the definition of "wasteful" technology is by no means clear. 
A technology may be wasteful in one sense but not in another. For 
instance, a technology may not provide a great deal of health care 
compared to its cost, but may provide more benefit than any alter-
native technology. Moreover, a technology that is wasteful when 
viewed from one perspective- say, that of a group insurance plan 
concerned with holding down its premiums-may not be wasteful 
when viewed from another perspective-such as that of an individ-
ual beneficiary who wants the best technology and is relatively in-
different to the effect of its cost on premium levels. The first task, 
then, is to define what is meant by "waste," and to decide the per-
spective from which technology should be evaluated, since this will 
debt. See Moore, Surgical Streams in the Flow of Health Core Financing: The Role of Surgery 
in National Expenditures: What Costs are Controllable?, 201 ANNALS ON SURGERY 132 
(1985) ("The United States' expenditure for medical care is not a 'budget' voted by any re-
sponsible body or enacted by some state health system. It is instead a flow of funds from 
many sources, expended for various aspects of the health care system."). 
20. Technology rationing refers to the denial of technology to some needy patients due 
to the high cost of providing the technology to all. See generally H. AARON & W. 
SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONlNG HOSPITAL CARE (1984); EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., RATIONING HIGH-COST HEALTH CARE: THE CASE OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTS (Issue Brief #31, 1984); Platt, Sounding Board: Cost Containment- Another 
View, 309 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 726, 729 (1983); INST. OF MED., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, DISEASE BY DISEASE TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE? (1973). An-
other type of rationing is denying certain population segments, such as the poor, adequate 
health care. See, e.g., Blendon & Altman, The Hidden Cost of ''Little Ticket" Advances, I 
Bus. & HEALTH 12; 16 (1984). 
21. Some commentators argue that elimination of wasteful technology will be insuffi-
cient to curb health care costs. Schwartz and Jaskow, for example, state that attributing the 
health care cost problem to "unnecessary" technologies or to those provided at "avoidably 
.high cost"-arguably examples of waste-is an oversimplification, since they count at most 
for only a small fraction of rising health care costs. Schwartz & Jaskow, Medical Efficacy 
Versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1464 (1978). 
To the extent that wasteful technology is interpreted as technology that does not confer any 
benefit on patients, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment agrees, stating: "Un-
forlunately, the rapid rate of growth of Medicare expenditures cannot be stemmed simply by 
eliminating technologies that do not provide any benefit, because most technologies do pro-
vide some benefit, however small or costly the benefit may be." OTA MEDICARE, supra note 
2, at 4. 
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determine which technologies are targeted in the cost-containment 
effort. 
Assuming agreement can be reached on how waste should be 
defined, however, major obstacles confront attempts to identify spe-
cific wasteful technologies (or their wasteful use). Costs, risks and 
benefits must be compared, often involving complicated measure-
ments and valuations. These assessments are particularly difficult 
when a comparison must be made between different intangible bene-
fits, such as additional years of life o.r relief from pain. 
Finally, once "waste" is defined and wasteful technologies are 
identified, their elimination may be problematic. Deciding what ac-
tion to take against wasteful technologies raises profound issues 
concerni.11g the proper relationship betweeen government and the 
private health care sector. Moreover, there is a serious :risk, espe-
cially within the Medicare system, that cost control incentives may 
deny access to nonwasteful as well as to wasteful technologies. The 
absence of an adequate statutory or regulatory statement of the 
technologies to which beneficiaries are entitled will further exacer-
bate efforts to implement a sound anti-waste policy for Medicare. 
X. WHAT !S WASTE? 
'Nhile there may be general agreement that eliminating waste is 
desirable, there is little consensus on how the term should be de-
fined. 22 Nevertheless, an attempt to define waste might yield the 
following general categories, which wi11 be discussed in turn: (1) un-
safe and or ineffective technologies (or their unsafe or ineffective 
use), (2) non-cost-effective technologies (or their non-cost-effective 
use), and (3) technologies that do not yield adequate net benefits. 
22. Commentators have described wasteful technology as: (I) ineffective technology, see 
Bunker, supra note 19, at 691 (1982); Reiman, supra note 17, at 669 (1982); (2) care of un-
documented efficacy, see Bunker, supra note 19, at 691; (3) useless technology, see H.R. REP. 
No. 818, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984); (4) redundant technology, see id.; (5) unsafe ur danger-
ous technology, see Reiman, supra note 17, at 669 (1982); Morreim, supra note 17, at 31 
(defining wasteful technology as interventions leading directly or indirectly to iatrogenic in-
jury -that is, injury inadvertently caused by the physician or other health care provider); 
H.R. REP. No. 818, supra, at 4; (6) superfluous technology, see Reiman, supra note 17, at 
669; (7) use of more or more costly resources than necessary to yield a given product, see 
PROPAC 1985, supra note I, at 24642; (8) unnecessary technology, see Moore, supra note 
19, at 135 (discussing unnecessary surgery); (9) poor quality technology, see id. (discussing 
incapable surgeons); (10) technology that is marginally beneficial at best, see Lack of Data 
Causes Medical Procedure Waste, 58 Hosr. 28 (1984); and (J J) technology that inflates costs 
without significantly increasing the quality of care, see Smits, supra note 10, at 32). 
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A. Unsafe and or Ineffective Technologies 
A technology or its particular use is considered unsafe, and 
therefore perhaps wasteful, when its risks exceed the benefits to the 
patient.23 Risk of harm is defined in terms of the probability and 
severity of hann.24 Therefore; if the probability and the severity of 
harm from a technology are greater than the probability and the 
magnitude of the benefits it purports to provide, the technology is 
rinsafe.25 A surgical procedure would clearly be unsafe, for exam-
ple, if it had a 50% probability of killing the patient but only a 10% 
chance of correcting a condition that created a 25% probability of 
the patient's death. 26 ' 
Safety is a relative concept. A safe technology has a low risk 
(probability times severity of harm) compared with its potential 
benefits (probability times magnitude). As a result, the greater the 
potential benefits of a technology, the greater the risk that might be 
acceptable for the technology to be deemed safe. 27 
A technology is ineffective if it produces no discernible benefit to 
the patient.28 For example, a technology that either produces no 
positive change in a patient's condition, or that produces a positive 
23. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment defines "safety" as a "judgment 
of the acceptability of risk (i.e., the probability and severity of an adverse effect) associated 
with the use of a technology." OTA STRATAGIES, supra note 4, at 23. 
24. See id.; H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, TOWARD RATIONAL TECHNOL-
OGY AND MEDICINE 98 (1981) (defining "risk of harm" as "the probabilityof an adverse or 
untoward .outcome's occurring and the severity of the resultant harm to health of individuals 
in a defined population, associated with use of a medical technology, applied for a given 
medical problem under specified conditions of use"). This definition is reminiscent of 
Learned Hand's classic expression of the basic standard for determining if an actor exercised 
reasonable care so as not to have acted negligently: "[I]f the probability be called P; the 
injury, L; and th~ -burden [of adequate precautions], B; liability depends upon whether B is 
less than L multiplied by P .... "United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d 
Cir. 1947). 
25. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1979). 
26. The issue becomes more complicated if the harm and the benefit are different health 
outcomes. For example, suppose a surgical procedure had a 50% probability Of killing the 
patient, but if it did not cause this outcome it had a I 00% probability of eliminating severe 
pain that the patient would otherwise experience for the rest of his life. In this case, it would 
be necessary to compare the risk of death with the potential relief from pain; the technology 
would only be unsafe if the former could be said to outweigh the latter. This conclusion might 
vary, furthermore, from patient to patient and from time to time. 
27. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 23. 
28. Banta defines "effectiveness" as "[t]he probability of benefit to individuals in a de-
fined population from medical technology applied for a given medical problem under average 
conditions of use." H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 98. It is 
important to distinguish "effectiveness" from "efficacy." The latter refers to the probability 
of benefit under ideal rather than average conditions. See id.; OT A STRATEGIES, supra note 4, 
at 10, 23. Ideal conditions include those that obtain in a carefully conducted clinical test. 
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change no more frequently or of no greater magnitude than would 
occur without applying the tech11.ology,29 would be i.1effective. Ar-
guably, providing this technology to patients would be wasteful. 
Medical history reveals a number of technologies that flourished 
for a time but that were eventually determined to be ineffective. 
One example was the tying off of an artery in the chest in order to 
treat angina pectoris, a painful symptom of coronary artery dis-
ease. 
30 This technology was discarded after several studies in the 
late 1950's failed to show that the technology produced any positive 
results. 31 An example of an ineffective diagnostic technology is the 
Wasserman test for syphillis, which was used for forty years before 
it was discovered to identify uninfected people as carriers fifty per-
cent of the time. 32 Ineffective technologies are by no means rare; 
expert panels established by the U.S. Food and Drug Administra- . 
tion (FDA) concluded that approximately one-third of the dmgs 
marketed in 1962 lacked sufficient evidence of efficacy to justify 
their use. 33 
29. This distinction is necessary because a technology may appear to produce a positive 
change in some patients, but the same changes may appear with the same frequency as a 
matter of chance in a group of patients with the same disease who are not given the technol-
ogy. For example, administration of a drug may be associated with the alleviation of disease 
symptoms in 20% of a group of patients, and the drug therefore might be thought effective. 
However, the symptoms might disappear in 20% of another, equivalent group of patients 
who are merely left alone. The comparison of a group of patients receiving a technology with 
an equivalent group that does not receive it is known as a "controlled" experiment, and is 
discussed infra at notes 192-202 and accompanying text. 
30. This technique is called internal mammary artery ligation. See Fineberg & Hiatt, 
Evaluation ofiliedical Practices: The Case for TechnologyAssessmenl, 301 NEW ENG. J. IviED 
1086, 1088 (1979); Evans, Health Care Technology and the Ine1•itability of Resource Alloca-
tion and Rationing Decisions (pt 1), 249 J. A.M.A. 2047, 2049 (1983). 
31. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1088. 
32. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, supra note 24, at 121. In contrast to 
the Wasserman test's 50% false positive rate, the ELISA test for detecting the presence in 
blood of the antibody to LAY /HTLV-III, the virus associated with acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome (AIDS), and thus whether the person has been infected with the virus, is 
reported to have a false-postive rate of 1. 7%. See McDougal, Screening Tesrs for Blood Do-
nors Presumed to Have Transmitted the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 65 BLOOD 
772, 772-74 (1985). One commentator lists as ineffective technologies, along with internal 
mammary ligation, colectomy (removal of the colon) for treatment of epilepsy, hypogastric 
artery ligation (tying off the hypogastric artery) to treat pelvic hemorrhage, sympathectomy 
(surgical removal of nerves) for treatment of asthma, adrenalectomy (removal of the adrenal 
glands) to treat essential hypertension and "wiring" to treat aortic aneurysm, or a bulge in 
the wall of the aorta. See Evans, supra note 30, at 2049. 
33. See Moses & Brown, Experiences with EJ•aluating !he Sofery and Efficacy a/Medical 
Technologies, 5 ANN. REV. PuB. HEALTH 267,288 (1984). These panels were known as the 
Drug Efficacy Study Implementation, or "DESI," panels. They reviewed the efficacy of vir-
tually all drugs on the market in I 962 which, by virtue of the 1962 New Drug Amendments 
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), were 
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Some wasteful technologies are both unsafe and ineffective, pos-
ing risks but no benefits to patients. A classic example of such a 
technology is gastric freezing, which was developed in the mid-
1950's to treat peptic ulcers. 34 The technique involved swallowing a 
balloon connected to a nasogastric tube through which alcohol 
cooled to minus 15 degrees Centigrade was circulated for one 
hour. 35 Initial reports in 1962 of results in dogs and in twelve 
human patients were said to show relief from ulcer symptoms, heal-
ing and no serious side effects. 36 By the end of 1963, over 15,000 
gastric_freezing procedures had been performed, and over 1000 ma-
chines to chill and pump the alcohol had been sold.37 In 1964, how-
ever, published reports of experiments with the technology revealed 
that it had no real effectiveness but that it did create a risk of serious 
side effects.38 By 1966, use of the technology was rare.39 
Even if they produced no direct adverse effects on patients, inef-
fective technologies might be deemed to be prima facie unsafe since 
they might cause patients to forego treatment with effective alterna-
tives. This was part of the Supreme Court's rationale in upholding 
the FDA's prohibition on terminal cancer patients obtaining 
laetrile. 40 
Another type of wasteful technology might be one that was less 
safe or less effective than another technology.41 The FDA, which 
required for the first time to be efficacious as well as safe in order lawfully to be marketed in 
interstate commerce. 
34. Gastric freezing was developed by Owen Wangensteen, a well-known surgeon at the 
University of Minnesota Medical School, in conjunction with a small, private refrigeration 
company, Swenko. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4; Id., at 167 app. E; Banta & 
Behney, Efficacy, Safety, and Health Care Policy, 44 CoNN. MED. 377, 377-88 (1980). 
35. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4; Miao, Gastric Freezing: An Example of the 
Evaluation of Medical Therapy by Randomized Clinical Trials, in CosTS, RISKS, AND BENE-
FlTS OF SURGERY 198 (J. Bunker, B. Barnes & F. Mosteller eds. 1977) [this collection herein-
after cited as COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFJTS OF SURGERY]. 
36. These reported results included a reduction in stomach acid, immediate relief of 
ulcer pain, and x-ray evidence of ulcer healing. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4. 
37. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4. The technology was sufficiently accepted 
that Blue Cross reimbursed providers for performing it on Blue Cross subscribers. See Moses 
& Brown, supra note 33, at 270. 
38. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 4. 
39. See id. See generally Greer, Medical Technology: Assessment, Adoption, and Utiliza-
tion, 5 1. MED. SYSTEMS 129, 139-40 (1981) (describing the gastric freezing episode as a 
"medical and financial fiasco"). Greer notes that, in 1963, the technology was evaluated and 
condemned by the American Gastroenterological Association, and laments that no regula-
tory restraints were placed on the procedure on the basis of this evaluation. I d. at 140. 
40. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1979). 
41. More precisely, relatively unsafe and/or ineffective technologies are those that are 
less safe than other technologies expected to produce the same benefit; or less effective than 
other technologies available to treat or to diagnose the same condition, and that present the 
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must approve the safety and efficacy of drugs42 and medical de-
vices43 before they may be marketed lawfully in interstate com-
merce,44 has occassionally, albeit rarely, denied approval to market -
a drug on the basis that it was less safe or less effective than an 
alternative already on the market. 45 
B. Non-Cost-Effective Technologies 
Thus far, the effort to de:flne waste has not considered cost. 46 
same risks; or that are more effective but so much less safe than other technologies available 
to treat or to diagnose the same condition, or that are safer but so much less effective than 
alternate technologies, that, on balance, they could be regarded as providing fewer net bene-
fits (benefits minus risks) than the alternatives. 
42. The term "drug" is defined in Fed~ral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as any article 
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man 
or other animals, or any article (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body, or any article intended for use as a component of such an article. 21 
u.s.c. § 32l(g) (1982). 
43. The term "device" is defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to mean 
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or 
· other similar or related article which has the same intended uses as a drug but which does not 
achieve any of its principal intended purposes through chemical action within the body. 21 
U.S.C. § 32I(h) (1982). The category of devices is broad, ranging "from surgeon's gloves to 
jelly-filled teething rings, cardiac pacemakers, hypodermic needles, oxygen units, kidney dial-
ysis machines, surgical sponges, prophylactics, air purifiers, crutches, and tongue depres-
sors." Iglehart, supra note 15, at 43-44 (1977). 
44. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-60 (1982), the 
FDA regulates the introduction of "new" drugs and medical devices into interstate com-
merce. "New" denotes not only technologies being introduced for the first time but also 
technologies that, on the basis of scientific evidence, are not generally recognized as safe and 
effective by medical experts. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (definition of "new drug"). The Act 
does not explicitly refer to "new'.' devices, but employs a combined classification and 
premarket approval grandfathering system to distinguish between "old" and "new" devices. 
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)-(e). Under the Act, the FDA must approve the new drug or device 
before it may be marketed in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 33l(d), 351(f), 
355. For a general description of the drug and device provisions of the Act, see OTA STRAT-
EGIES, supra note 4, at 159-60 app. D; Cole, History of Premarket Approval Provisions of the 
Device Amendments, 35 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 568 (1980); Sauberman, Impact of FDA 
Regulations on the Cochlear Implant Field, 405 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 451, 451-52 (1983). 
For a history of the medicitl device provisions, see Iglehart, supra note 15 at 43-47. 
45. Conversation with William Vodra, former Associate Chief Counsel for Drugs, Food 
and Drug Administration (Sept. 16, 1985). The FDA has denied approval of the less effective 
drug on the basis that it was unsafe, since it would yield less benefit to the patient but with the 
same degree of risk. Id. It is questionable that the agency has the statutory authority to 
refuse to approve the marketing of a drug or a device on the basis that it is less effective than 
an existing alternative. 
46. "Cost" refers to the opportunity cost of the technology, i.e., the value of foregone 
benefits and additional risks associated with a particular technology. Thus, the discussion of 
waste in terms of unsafe and ineffective technologies might be regarded in part as a discussion 
of cost. However, to simplify the analysis, the term cost will be used in its narrow, monetary 
sense unless otherwise indicated. 
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An unsafe or ineffective technology would be regarded as wasteful 
even if, so to speak, it grew on . trees. Merely determining that a 
technology is safe, effective, or relatively safe and effective, however, 
does not establish that technology as a wise use of resources. A 
technology might also be regarded as wasteful if it is expected to 
yield the same net benefit as another technology but at a greater 
cost-that is, if it is not the most efficient,47 cost-effective technol-
ogy to treat or to diagnose the patient's condition.48 
This point is illustrated by comparing several technologies capa-
ble of preventing death from end-stage renal disease (ESRD),49 in-
cluding kidney transplantation, dialysis at home, dialysis in a 
special dialysis center, arid a technique called continuous ambula-
tory peritoneal dialysis. 50 The analysis of the relative cost-effective-
ness of each technology requires selection of a health outcome as a 
benefit endpoint. 5 1 Examples of benefit endpoints include years of 
47. See Weinstein, Economic Assessments of Medical Practices and Technologies, I MED. 
DECISION MAKING 309,310 {1981) (purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis is" ... to assess the 
efficiency with which limited resources are being allocated to achieve the desired benefits"); 
K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 59 (goal of cost-effectiveness analysis is "efficiency," 
defined as the "attainment of the greatest social good [however defined] permitted by the 
limits on resources") (bracketed material in original). Warner and Luce's approach ass~mes 
an identifiable limit on resources, which may be problematic. A variant on the "efficiency" 
objective of cost-effectiveness analysis is a "business" orientation. See Kristein, Using Cost-
Effectiveness and Cost/Benefit Analysis for Health Care Policy Making, ADv. HEALTH EcoN. 
HEALTH SERVICES REsEARCH 199, 211 (1983) ("One may regard the application of [cost-
effectiveness analysis] as an attempt to introduce in the nonbusiness sector the point of view 
of the business sector"). 
48. A technology also might be regarded as wasteful if it yielded less net benefit at the 
same cost as another technology, but this more properly might be deemed a case of relative 
ineffectiveness. Note that the issue of the cost of a technology-in terms of its opportunity 
cost__:::.arises only in comparison with the cost of other goods, such as alternate technologies 
to treat or to diagnose the same condition. Absent other uses for these resources there would 
be no issue of cost. It is therefore incorrect to ask "how cost-effective is technology X?" The 
correct question is "how much more cost-effective is technology X than technology Y?" See 
K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 43-44. In this Article, however, "non-cost-effec-
tive" denotes a technology that is not the most cost-effective alternative available. 
49. End-stage renal disease results in the inability to remove impurities from the blood. 
Toxic substances build up and eventually cause death. The blood of victims of this disease 
can be artificially cleansed by means of a technique called dialysis, and in some cases a donor 
kidney can be successfully transplanted. See Delmez, Pathophysiological Principles in Treat-
ment of Patients with Renal Failure, in THE KIDNEY AND BODY FLUIDS IN HEALTH AND 
DISEASE 492-93, 499 (S. Klahr ed. 1983). 
50. See Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and 
Rationing Decisions (pt. 2), 249 J. A.M.A. 2208, 2209 (1983). As other examples of cost-
effectiveness technology comparisons, Evans cites a comparison between transplantation and 
traditional medical and surgical management for end-stage cardiac disease as well as a com-
parison between coronary artery bypass surgery and percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty as treatments for atherosclerosis. Id. 
51. A "unifactorial" analysis employs only one health outcome as the benefit endpoint. 
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life saved by the technology, days without pain, the patient's ability 
to resume his or her career, or a combination of these. Once the 
benefit endpoint is identified, the relative ability of each technology 
to achieve the greatest amount of the endpoint52 is measured. The 
technology that achieves the greatest amount of the benefit for the 
lowest cost is deemed the most cost-effective. 53 Al11ess cost-effec-
tive technologies would be regarded as wasteful. 
In practice, cost-effectiveness analysis is much more compli-
cated. P.Jtemate technologies are likely to yield varying degrees of 
different benefits accompanied by different types and amounts of 
risk. For instance, dialysis and transplantation may yield the same 
number of additional years of life to a patient with end-stage renal 
disease. However, while transplantation may afford a better quality 
of life, dialysis may have a greater likelihood of producing its admit-
tedly more limited benefit, since transplants have a higher rate of 
failure. In order to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, these vari-
ables must ali be reduced to a net benefit expressed in terms of the 
same health outcomes. 54 
The cost of a technology only becomes a factor in defining waste 
in the case of a safe and effective technology. Only if the benefits of 
If more than one outcome is used, the analysis is called "multifactorial." See Butt & 
Neuhauser, The Machine and the fl,Jarketplace: Economic Considerations in Applying Health 
Care Technology, in MACHINE AT THE BEDSJDE, supra note 4, 140. 
52. This would be a function of the probability that the technology would achieve the 
endpoint. 
53. See Kristein, supra note 47, at 204 (1982); Klarman, Application of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis To Health Systems Technology, in TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN 
THE 1980's 227 (1972). 
54. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. Weinstein offers another approach to 
defining waste in cost-effectiveness terms. Three categories of technologies are distinguished: 
those that produce a positive expected net health benefit (net referring to benefits minus risks) 
and a negative expected net cost (net referring to costs minus savings, such as savings from 
avoidance of future illness); those that produce a negative expected net benefit (i.e., unsafe, 
ineffective or both); and those that produce positive expected net benefits and positive ex-
pected net costs. 
By virtue of reducing costs as well as providing benefits, the first category of technolo-
gies-called cost-saving technologies-should be fostered in an effort to combat waste. The 
second category would be attacked as clear cases of waste. The third category-comprised of 
cost-increasing technologies that confer net benefits-could be ranked in order of the increas-
ing ratio of costs to benefits. If there were a fixed budget for how much could be spent on 
technology, cost-increasing technologies could be considered non-wasteful descending from 
the top of the list until the budget limit were reached. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 311. 
Alternatively, technologies on the list could be considered wasteful if their cost of achieving a 
health outcome exceeded a preset amount. See Neuhauser, Cost-Effective Clinical Decision-
JI;faking: implications for t!ze Delive1y of Healt/z Services, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF 
SURGERY, supra note 35, 30-34. For example, technologies that cost more than $X per addi-
tional year of life might be regarded as wasteful. 
1986] MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 791 
the technology exceed its risks- i.e., if it is expected to yield net 
benefit to the patient-does the question of whether the technology 
yields the most net benefit given its relative cost arise. This suggests 
that, in principle, the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a tech-
nology in order to determine if it is wasteful should be performed 
only after the technology is demonstrated to be safe and effective. 55 
C. Technologies That Yield Inadequate Net Benefits 
In comparing technologies to determine which yields the great-
est net benefit for the lowest cost, benefit has been considered in 
terms of health outcomes, such as additional years of life or days 
without pain. While this facilitates comparing technologies that are 
expected to yield the same health outcomes, it does not allow a very 
precise comparison of technologies that are expected to yield differ-
ent health outcomes, or different mixes of health outcomes. How is 
a treatment that is expected to provide a patient with additional 
years of life, for example, to be compared to a technology that only 
reduces pain? Or how should a technology that is expected to yield 
five additional years of life and increased mobility, but with little 
pain relief, be compared with a technology that is expected to yield 
only three additional years of life, no increased mobility, but sub-
stantial pain reduction? 
One approach is simply to delineate these different benefits, 
along with the costs of each technology, and to allow the decision-
maker-the patient, for example-to select the technology that of-
fers what seems like the best benefit package for the money. This 
entails an assessment of the relative utility of the various expected 
benefits, which will be contingent on each individual deci-
sionmaker's benefit preferences. 
An alternative approach to the problem of different expected 
benefits is to convert the benefits into common units. This is often 
referred to as "cost-benefit analysis," in contrast to cost-effective-
ness analysis, described above. 56 One such common unit is a "qual-
ity-adjusted life year" or QAL Y. 57 To compare technologies in this 
55. See Ball, Prospective Payment: Implications for Medical Technology, 100 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 606, 606-07 (1984) (cost-effectiveness analysis is complementary to safety 
and effectiveness evaluation of technologies). 
56. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
57. The term was coined by Bush, Chen & Patrick, Health Status Index in Cost Effec-
tiveness: Analysis of PKU Screening Program, in HEALTH STATUS INDEXES: PROCEEDINGS 
OF A CONFERENCE (R. Berg ed. 1973). See also K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note!, at 
148. 
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manner, all health benefits are converted into additional years of 
life, adjusted for non-life benefits such as days without pain or in-
creased mobility. 58 Theoretically, once their benefits are converted 
to common terms, technologies can be compared, and those that 
yield fewer QAJL Y's at the same cost, or the same QAJL Y's at 
greater cost, can be deemed wasteful. 
Technology benefits :rrllght also be converted into a common de-
nominator of dollars and compared in terms of how many dollars of , 
benefit result from a given dollar cost. Technologies that are ex-
pected to yield fewer dollars of benefit per dollar of cost than other 
technologies can be regarded as wasteful. For example, if the value 
of an additional year of life is $100,000, a technology that was ex-
pected to yield an additional year of life to a patient at a cost of 
$75,000, or a net benefit of $25,000, would be preferable to a tech-
nology that was also expected to yield an additional year of life to 
the patient, but at a cost of $85,000. Providing the latter rather 
than the former would be regarded as wasteful. If various health 
benefits ca:n be assigned dollar values, technologies that produce dif-
ferent benefits can be compared directly. 59 
In the discussion so far, converting benefits to dollars would ful-
fill the same function as convetiing benefits to QAJL Y's; the only 
difference is the common unit employed. One advantage of con-
verting benefits to dollars, however, is that technologies can be eval-
uated in terms of whether or not they provide a net benefit in 
58. See Hellinger, Controlling Costs by Adjusting Payment for Medical Technologies, 19 
INQUIRY 34, 40 (1982). 
59. "Cost effectiveness analysis" is often used to refer to evaluations that compare tech-
nologies according to how much they cost to yield a unit of the same health outcome, such as 
additional years of life. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4 7, at 310-11. In contrast, evalua-
tions that compare technologies that produce different health outcomes are often referred to 
as "cost-benefit" analyses. See Fuchs, What is CBA/CEA, and Why are They Doing This To 
Us?, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 937, 937-938 (1980). In this sense, a comparison of technolo-
gies on the basis of QAL Y's might be regarded as cost-benefit rather than cost-effectiveness 
analysis. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 40; K. WARNEH & B. LucE, supra note l, at 48-49. 
Another distinction that is often made between cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analy-
sis, however, is that only the latter typically measures benefits as well as costs in dollars. See, 
e.g., Butt & Neuhauser, supra note 51, at 139-40. According to this distinction, QALY com-
parisons would constitute cost-effectiveness rather than cost-benefit analyses. Nevertheless, 
cost-effectiveness analysis can be performed so long as benefit is measmed in common units 
for all technologies under consideration, and this can be in dollars. See Weinstein, supra note 
47, at 311. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis need not measure benefits in monetary terms. See 
id. at 312. 
In this Article, cost-effectiveness analysis will refer to evaluations and comparisons aimed 
at determining which technology produces the greatest amount of a given health outcome at 
the least cost. Cost-benefit analysis will refer to evaluations and comparisons of technologies 
where the benefits are converted into common units, such as QAL Y's or dollars. 
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dollars. 60 For example, if an additional year of life were valued at 
$50,000, a technology that was expected to yield one additional year 
of life at a cost of $100,000 would be wasteful. 
This in tum compels an evaluation of whether a cost-effective 
technology to achieve a given health outcome is worth it. Cost-
effectiveness analysis merely aims at pinpointing which technology 
is the cheapest to achfeve a given health outcome; cost-benefit anal-
ysis aims to determine if achieving the health outcome in the most 
cost-effective fashion is desirable or if it is an efficient use of 
resources. 
To illustrate, cost-effectiveness analysis may disclose that tech-
nology A can save a patient one year of life for $100,000 while tech-
nology B could save a year of life for only $90,000; this presumably 
would lead to a preference for technology B, and under these cir-
cumstances technology A might be regarded as wasteful. But no 
inforniation has been provided on whether a year of life is worth 
$90,000-that is, whether technology B is also wasteful. Nor can 
cost-effectiveness analysis determine if technology C, which relieves 
a patient's pain for one week for $9,000, is preferable to technology 
D, which relieves the pain for two weeks for $15,000.61 Even 
QAL Y-based cost-benefit analysis cannot answer these questions; it 
can reveal which technology alternative is expected to yield the 
greatest amount of QAL Y's per unit of cost, but not whether the 
purchase of this quantity of health outcome is a wise use of re-
sources. 62 Converting benefits into dollars, however, in theory per-
mits these comparisons to be made. 63 If a pain-free week is valued 
at $25,000, then technology C is cost-beneficial and not wasteful; if 
each additional week is also worth $25,000, then technology D is 
preferable to technology C. 64 
60. Unless benefits are converted to units such as dollars, assessing net benefit must be 
restricted to the non-cost-related question of whether the benefits from the technology are 
greater than the risks. See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text. 
61. See Butt & Neuhauser, supra note 51, at 140. 
62. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 311-12 ("Because it avoids the problem of assigning 
economic value to health benefits, [non-monetary] cost-effectiveness analysis does not provide 
an unambiguous basis for concluding that a technology is or is not 'cost-effective.' Such a 
determination would have to depend on the judgment as to whether the calculated cost-
effectiveness ratio exceeds an appropriate cut-off level."). 
63. This approach is fraught with practical difficulties, however. See infra notes 213-29 
and accompanying text. 
64. It would be incorrect to describe technology D as "cost-beneficial" compared to 
technology C. Instead, technology D yields a greater expected net benefit than C. See K. 
WARNER & B. LucE, supra note 1, at 106-07. It is also preferable to express cost-benefit 
comparisons between technologies in terms of relative net benefit rather than ratios of costs to 
benefits. Cost-benefit ratios are sensitive to whether a positive technology effect is considered 
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Once benefits are converted into dollars, health care tedmo1o-
gies can be compared to non-health care technologies and to other 
competing potential purchases. For example, if the net benefit of a 
life-extending technology were $100,000 per patient and the net 
benefit of providing adequate housing were $200,000 per person, the 
former could be regarded as a less efficient use of resources-waste-
ful, perhaps-in comparison with the latter. 65 
D. T.he Problem of Perspective 
The three approaches to defining waste described above differ 
according to the parameters they evaluate: risk versus benefit for 
safety and effectiveness assessment, cost versus health outcome for 
cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost versus benefit for cost-benefit 
analysis. These are not merely alternate ways of saying that a par-
ticular technology is wasteful. The technologies that would be re-
garded as wasteful change depending on the definition that is 
adopted. A technology that is safe and effective, and therefore not 
wasteful on that account, nevertheless might be wasteful by virtue 
of not being cost-effective, and a cost-effective technology might be 
wasteful by virtue of providing inadequate net benefit. 66 
Different technologies may be classified as wasteful not only be-
cause different definitions of waste may be employed, but also by 
virtue of the choice of perspective, the standpoint from which the 
risks, costs, and benefits of technology are assessed. A number of 
perspectives are possible, reflecting the fact that evaluation of tech-
nologies occurs at a number of levels in the health care system. At 
the microlevel, there is first the perspective of the individual patient. 
This in turn can differ depending on the patient's circumstances. 
For example, a patient in need of a technology, insured either by a 
government program such as l\1edicare or by private health insur-
ance, would be likely to have a different perspective than a patient 
who is not insured and who therefore must pay directly for the tech-
nology. 67 Furthermore, a patient in need of a technology in order 
to be a benefit or a negative cost factor, although such a distinction actually should be incon-
sequential. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. These three principle parameters can be grouped in order of priority. Generally 
speaking, a technology that would be deemed wasteful because it is unsafe would not need to 
be evaluated for cost-effectiveness, and a technology that is not cost-effective would not need 
to be assessed for its net benefits. 
67. Some commentators believe that waste can best be curbed by making health care 
consumers (i.e., patients) and payors the same. This view has led to proposals to increase the 
degree to which patients resemble consumers in a market-proposals characterized both by 
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to save his life might have a different reaction to the risks, benefits, 
and costs of a technology than a potential patient contemplating 
what type of health insurance package to purchase. 68 
Similarly, a potential patient deciding which health insurance to 
buy views his need for health care from a different perspective than 
the insurance company itself. The insurance company is presuma-
bly interested in maximizing its net income, the combined premi-
ums of all of its policyholders less administrative costs and the 
payments the insurance company must make for their health care. 
The potential patient, in contrast, presumably is interested in maxi-
mizing his own individual utility, which would be affected by the 
total group of policyholders only to the extent that fluctuations in 
their premiums or in the company's payments for their care affected 
his premiums or the type of care for which the company would re-
imburse. 69 The perspective of a government third-party payment 
program, such as Medicare, also differs from that of a private in-
surer; the objective of the government program is unlikely to be the 
maximization of net revenue, but instead the achievement of social 
or political goals. 
making patients pay for care and by making the health care system as much of a free market 
system as possible. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOL-
OGY UNDER PROPOSALS TO INCREASE COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 58 (1982) [herein-
after cited as OTA CoMPETITION] ("Procompetitive proposals attempt to aline (sic) 
individual preferences and costs more closely with social preferences and costs. Almost by 
definition, such convergence is professed to assure and improve quality."). A key feature of 
this approach is prepaid health care. Its proponents recognize that "the sick or worried 
patient is in a poor position to make an economic ·analysis of treatment alternatives." A. 
ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF 
MEDICAL CARE (1980), quoted in OTA COMPETITION, supra. 
The viability of this "consumer-competitive" approach is questionable; because they lack 
knowledge and expertise, patients are unlikely to behave like rational consumers in a true 
market. See infra notes 257, 386-87 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it cannot be de-
nied that the third-party payment system, by divorcing the purchaser of health care from the 
beneficiary, creates incentives for waste. See supra notes I 2-16 and accompanying text. 
68. One commentator advocates the insurance purchaser viewpoint as the appropriate 
one from which to determine how to maximize utility, considering that the cost of a technol-
ogy will be borne largely by those who never use it. Goddeeris, Medical Insurance, Techno-
logical Change, and Welfare, 22 EcoN. INQUIRY 56, 58 (1984). Goddeeris does not, however, 
consider the impact of intangible costs and benefits in his utility assessment. See infra notes 
213-29 and accompanying text. Moreover, Goddeeris ignores the distinctly different risk 
aversiveness-hence different willingness to pay-of a sick patient contemplating a health 
insurance purchase, on the one hand, and a well patient, on the other. See infra note 229 and 
accompanying text. 
69. The divergent points of view of insurers and insureds have been the subject of much 
litigation and commentary, especially in tort law. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 
2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) (insurance company liable in tort for rejecting 
reasonable settlement offer); Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure to 
Settle: A Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 901. 
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Health care providers, mmeover, possess perspectives that may 
differ greatly from those of patients and third-party payors. 'Jhe 
perspective of the physician caring for the patient differs from those 
of his professional colleagues, and their perspective in tum differs 
from that of hospitals and other health care provider 
organizations. 70 
Finally, there is the somewhat elusive perspective often referred 
to as that of "society."71 'Jhis perspective is most often contrasted 
with that of the individual patient. 72 The clearest illustration of the 
divergence between the perspective of an individual patient and that 
of society arises in a choice between a preventive and a therapeutic 
technology for the same disease. From a societal standpoint, the 
net benefit to be expected from the preventive technology may be 
greater than the net benefit from the therapeutic technology, since 
preventing the disease may avoid substantial future health care ex-
penditures. From the standpoint of a patient with the disease, how-
ever, the preventive technology would offex virtually no benefit at 
all. 73 
70. Smits discusses how the various perspectives affect the selection of diagnostic tech-
nologies. The physician's perspective focuses on which test provides the best infonnation 
about the patient. The insurer does not care which test is used so long as it does not cost 
more than the alternatives and so long as only one test is used. The hospital administrator is 
most concerned about expensive tests that disproportionately affect his budget. Finally, the 
manager of a hospital floor views diagnostic technologies in terms of the "relative value of 
items that have low unit costs but are used frequently." Smits, supra note 10, at 32-33. 
71. "Society" presumably refers to the United States, not the entire world. 
72. See, e.g., Weinstein, Pliskin & Stason, Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery: Decision and 
Policy Analysis, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY, supra note 35, at 363 ("What 
is optimal medical care for the individual patient may not be optimal where we, as society 
collectively, consider what it is costing us."). The paper discusses a study of coronary bypass 
surgery in which the authors conclude that the operation is more effective than nonsurgical 
treatments for most patients, but that it is more expensive than nonsurgical treatments in 
terms of the cost per additional QA.LY. (quality-adjusted life year). /d. QAL Y's are discussed 
supra at notes 57-58 and accompanying text. In other words, from an individual patient's 
standpoint, bypass surgery yields a greater net benefit than alternative treatments, while from 
a broader, societal perspective aimed at obtaining the most additional QAL Y's at the least 
cost, the technology is not the most cost-effective. Other commentators distinguish between 
the perspectives of providers, consumers and society, see OTA CoMPETlTION, supra note 67, 
and between the perspectives of physicians, patients and society. See Tancredi, Social and 
Ethical implications in Technology Assessment, in CRJTICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL TECHNOL-
OGY 93-99 (B. McNeil & E. Cravalho eds. 1982) [this collection hereinafter cited as CRJTICAL 
iSSUES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY). 
73. The divergence between societal and patient perspective is widely recognized. See 
Dunlop, Our Emerging Technology--How Much is Enough?, 28 Mo. STATE MED. J 42, 42-44 
(1979) (statement of the past president of the American College of Surgeons that "[w)hat is 
the optimal medical care for the individual patient may not be optimal when society collec-
tively considers what it is costing"). Often the dichotomy is portrayed from the standpoint of 
the patient's physician versus society. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1090 (physi-
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Differences in perspective are reflected in the different ap-
proaches to defining wasteful technology. Safety and effectiveness, 
cians' aim "to mobilize all resources that might help the patient" conflicts with "the social 
objective of obtaining the greatest possible benefit to all from available resources"); OFFICE 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE IMPLICATIONS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OTA IMPLICATIONS] ("If a patient is 
not harmed economically by performance of a certain procedure, even though only a small 
medical benefit might be expected, what are the ethics of the individual physician's denying 
or recommending against the procedure in order to represent society's cost and benefit priori-
ties?"); Cahill & Beljan, Technology Assessment: Differing Perspectives, 252 J. A.M.A. 3294 
(1984) ("Where the generally accepted medical credo strives for the greatest good for the 
individual, the new economic imperative calls for 'the greatest good for the greatest number,' 
within clearly defined limits on available resources."). 
Due to current and future potential financial pressures on physicians to lower the costs of 
health care, however, it may not be correct to consider the interests of physicians and patients 
as completely alligned. See supra notes 302-09 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, by 
virtue both of proximity to actual patients and professional training, the physician may be 
incapable of taking a societal perspective on the risks, costs and benefits of a technology. See 
Dunlop, supra, at 44. As one physician points out, "[m]ore than others, doctors live their 
lives close to the unlimited health care demand of a public seeking immortality." Fisher, 
Impact of Financing on Medical Technology, 86 PENN. MED. 32, 33 (1983). This may in part 
account for the fact that, in 1982 for example, 20% of Medicare expenditures were spent on 
the last six months of patients' lives. See Debakey & Debakey, The Ethics and Economics of 
High-Technology Medicine, 9 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 6, 8 (1983). Veatch presumably 
addresses the difference in patient and societal perspective in stating: "I am strongly inclined 
toward promoting justice, even if that means lower aggregate indicators of utility." Veatch, 
Justice and Valuing Lives, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 156 (S. Rhoads ed. 
1980). 
Among the most vehement critics of the societal perspective is the American Medical 
Association, which has consistently testified against efforts to establish new federal programs 
to evaluate technology on the ground that they would take a societal perspective which would 
be at odds with the physician's responsibility to his patients. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 
4869, supra note 16, at 384 (testimony of William C. Felch, M.D., American Medical Associ-
ation) (criticizing efforts to establish such a program as leading to the overemphasis of cost-
effectiveness analysis to the detriment of the "true purpose of medical treatment and techno-
logical development-the saving of lives, the alleviation of pain and suffering, and the rehabil-
itation of those who are ill"); Health Care Technology Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 
2562 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (198 I) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2562] 
(testimony of Dr. Joseph Boyle, American Medical Association) ("The advantage the indi-
vidual physician has over any national center or advisory council is that he or she is dealing 
with individuals in need of medical care, not hypothetical cases. The consequences of every 
medical decision are real and immediate, not conjectural."). Without expressly saying so and 
perhaps without recognizing it, the AMA has put its finger on a major problem in attempting 
to value health benefits: By taking a nonpatient perspective on the costs and benefits of treat-
ment, there is a tendency to underestimate the value of a technology to a patient. 
This type of criticism led the director of the National Center for Health Care Technology 
(NCHCT), one of the principal federal agencies assessing medical technology at the time, to 
declare that the NCHCT "needs and solicits the active participation of ... the patient receiv-
ing the benefits a new technology offers." Acosta, Health Care Technology: Studying It at The 
National Center, 4 FORUM 30, 32 (1980) (remarks attributed to Seymour Perry). For a dis-
cussion of the NCHCT, see infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. As a practical matter, 
however, patients played virtually no direct role in the agency's activities. 
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fm example, are ij[j)variably assessed from a patient perspective; a 
technology that is unsafe for a patient or that has no demonstrable 
therapeutic effect cannot be safe or effective in any other sense. 74 
Cost-effectiveness assessments, however, may be made from a 
number of perspectives. For example, a technology may be evalu-
ated in terms of whether or not it is the most cost-effective niethod: 
(1) of achieving a desired health outcome in a particular individual 
(patient perspective); (2) of maximizing a desired health outcome in 
a group such as a pool of insureds (insurance perspective); or (3) of 
maximizing total utility in an economic sense (societal 
perspective).75 
The choice of perspective will dictate which technologies are 
wasteful by virtue of not being cost-effective. A technology might 
be the cheapest way of prolongij[j)g a particular patiej[j)t's life, but 
may not be the cheapest way of prolonging lives generally. For ex-
ample, a vaccine may save lives far more cheaply than heart trans-
plants. From the lifesaving perspective of society, therefore, heart 
transplants may seem wasteful because they are not as cost-effective 
a means of achieving the desired health effect of saving lives as the 
vaccine. However, the transplant may well be cost-effective from 
the point of view of the patient. Furthermore, different perspectives 
yield different waste targets when techj[j)ology is evaluated by cost-
benefit analysis. 76 
In short, the definition of waste in technology is dependent not 
only on which criteria of waste are adopted but also on the perspec-
tive from which the technology is assessed. A waste control pro-
gram must make a choice between the foregoing alternatives, if only 
to say that waste according to any perspective is a legitimate cost 
control target Before discussing which definition and perspective 
74. Conceivably in an experiment, a patient might be exposed to risks or denied benefits 
from a technology in order to generate information that might lead to benefits for others. 
Although the technology might be deemed unsafe or ineffective from that patient's stand-
point, it would not be considered wasteful from a broader societal perspective .. Such an ex-
periment, however, raises serious ethical and legal objections. See infi"a notes I 96-98 and 
accompanying text. 
75. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 310 (cost-effectiveness analysis is only appropriate, 
even from the patient's viewpoint, when it is conducted "in the context of explicitly limited 
resources"); K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 43, 60 ("[ w ]e assume a societal perspec-
tive on costs and benefits, the traditional perspective of CBA-CEA [cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis]."). 
76. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 310; Kristein, supra note 47, at 222; Schwartz & 
Jaskow, supra note 21, at 1462. Kristein defines "uneconomical spending" for health care as 
an instance "where (a) the marginal cost to the individual is less than the marginal cost to 
society. and (b) where the marginal benefit to the individual is greater than the marginal 
benefit to society."' Kristein, supra note 47, at 220. 
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should be selected, however, the problems in attempting to identify 
specific wasteful technologies will be explored. 
II. PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFICATION 
Once wasteful technology is properly defined, the next step is to 
identify specific technologies that fall within the definition. The 
process of defining and identifying wasteful technologies is known 
as "technology assessment." The· Congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment defines technology assessment as "[a] comprehen-
sive form of policy research that examines the technical, economic, 
and social consequences of technological applications."77 As for-
mally defined, technology assessment is a comprehensive process 
that produces the information that should form the basis of health 
care decisionmaking by physicians, patients, hospitals, health plan-
ners, insurers, and public program managers.78 These decision-
makers must make choices between alternate technologies on the 
best available information, which is often far from ideal in quality 
and quantity.79 A less rigorous process of evaluation also occurs as 
a form of technology assessment, and will be included within the 
meaning of the term in the following discussion. 
The task of identifying wasteful technologies raises difficulties 
apart from those encountered in the effort to define the term waste. 
Some of these problems are inherent in any effort to assess technol-
ogy, while others arise in the context of specific technologies being 
assessed or specific assessment methods being employed. 
A. General Problems of Waste Identification 
1. Selection of Technologies for Assessment 
The process of selecting technologies to be assessed raises an ini-
tial set of problems, particularly when undertaking the more com-
prehensive form of technology assessment envisioned by the Office 
of Technology Assessment. 80 A technology assessment system 
designed to control costs should focus on costly technologies, in-
77. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 201-02. 
78. See Banta & Behney, Policy Formulation and Technology Assessment, 59 MILBANK 
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 445, 448 (1981) ("Technology assessment is seen as a comprehensive 
form of policy research that examines short- and long-term social consequences (e.g. societal, 
economic, ethical, legal) of the application of technology."). 
79. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. In contrast, when informal technology 
assessment is undertaken for practical, day-to-day health care decisionmaking, the choice of 
technologies is likely to be dictated largely by patient management considerations. 
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eluding both those with high per-unit costs and high aggregate costs 
due to the volume of use. 81 Conceivably the most expensive tech-
nologies would be assessed first, followed by less expensive ones, 
until assessment resources had been exhausted. 
Assessment priorities might be further established on the basis 
of the expected magnitude of net benefit, its probability of occur-
rence, and the size of the treatment population. This would lead to 
the following breakdown: 
'JI' AlB JLJE Jl 
Net Patient 
Technology Benefit Probability Population Unit Cost 
A small low large large 
B small low large small 
c small low smaH large 
D large low sma11 large 
E large low large large 
F large low large small 
G small high large large 
.!H. small high large small 
I small high small large 
J large high small large 
K large high large large 
L large high large small 
At one extreme, technologies A and lB are most likely to be re-
garded as potentially wasteful, and therefore in need of assessment. 
Their small benefit, coupled with the low probability of its occur-
rence, will produce valid negative results with relatively small pa-
tient populations in clinical trials. At the other extreme, 
technologies J, K, and L, which offer the most favorable benefit-
probability ratios, are also likely to be easily and cheaply evaluated 
in small studies. The remaining technologies, on the other hand, 
offer only marginal net benefit (benefit minus risk), either because 
the benefit is smaH, or because the probability of its achievement is 
jow, or both. Moreover, these are likely to be the most expensive 
and most difficult technologies to assess, with large populations re-
quired to generate statistically significiant results. They are less 
81. An assessment system not designed primarily to control costly technology would 
presumably make an initial selection of which technologies to assess on some other basis. 
Presently, technologies are chosen for assessment either because they are new drugs or medi-
cal devices, see infra note 82 and accompanying text, or because they are existing technologies 
that compete with new technologies. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 98; Arnstein, 
Strategy for Health Technology, !3 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 14, 15 (1979) (existing technol-
ogies assessed primarily by serving as controls in studies of new technologies). 
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likely than the other four technologies to be extremely wasteful or 
useful, however, and therefore their continuing spread and use or 
lack thereof is arguably of less immediate concern. Their assess-
ment priority accordingly should be lower. 82 
82. This system of priorities assumes that the net benefit, probability of its occurrence, 
size of the patient population and unit cost are known or can be accurately estimated. This is 
less likely to be true of new than of existing technologies with which there has been some 
experience, and is one of the reasons that technology assessment might focus on the latter 
rather than on the former. Another reason for focusing on existing technologies is that many 
may be obsolete. The Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA), a trade associa-
tion of manufacturers of medical devices, has advocated concentrating technology assess-
ment on "relatively old" technologies since many are mere "historical carryovers" in need of 
assessment. Health Care Research and Research Training Amendments of 1981: Hearings 011 
S. 800 Before the Senate Comm 011 Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 800] (testimony of Dimitri V. d'Arbeloff oh behalf 
of HIMA). Furthermore, singling out new technologies for assessment might hinder their 
development, and this might prevent or unduly postpone the availability of important medi-
cal advances. See Health Care Technology Assessment: Hearings 011 S. 2504 Before the Senate 
Comm. 011 Labor a11d Huma11 Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings 011 S. 2504] (testimony of Frank E. Samuel, Jr., President of HIMA); Heari11gs on 
H.R. 4869, supra note 16, at 381-82 (testimony of the American Medical Association). A 
negative impact on technological innovation is premised on the belief that unrecoverable as-
sessment costs will be borne by the innovator and that the increased cost of capital necessary 
to compensate for the increased project risk will exceed the expected return on investment. 
On the other hand, it might seem wise to concentrate on new technologies since, due to 
the lack of experience with them, less may be known about them than about existing technol-
ogies, and therefore it may be harder to identify those that are wasteful without some special 
effort. Furthermore, new technologies may be less entrenched than existing ones, and there-
fore wasteful new technologies may be easier to eliminate. See Schroeder, Medical Technol-
ogy and Academic Medicine: The Doctor-Producers' Dilemma, 56 J. MED. Eouc. 634, 635 
(1981). The process by which wasteful technologies might be eliminated is discussed infra at 
notes 245-95 and accompanying text. 
New technologies might be assessed routinely as they reached a particular stage of devel-
opment, thus avoiding the need to predict their net benefit, probability of the benefit occur-
ring, size of their future patient population, and unit cost. This is essentially the selection 
system imposed on the Food and Drug Administration by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 94. Even so, the FDA reviews technolo-
gies according to a priority system. New chemical entities believed to offer significant benefits 
over existing products are required to undergo a rigorous assessment process, but the agency 
gives them review priority over other products. On the other hand, products that are merely 
minor modifications of existing products, such as drugs that differ in dosage strength from 
those on the market, are put through a less rigorous approval process but at a slower pace. 
In lieu of the priority system suggested in the text, another system that has been suggested 
is to select for assessment first those technologies that are believed to provide some benefit but 
that are suspected of being capable of providing more under different patterns of use, fol-
lowed by technologies suspected of being dangerous or useless, followed in turn by technolo-
gies that are widespread or expensive. See Banta, Behney & Andrulis, Assessing Medical 
Tech11ologies, 54 BuLL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 113, 118 (1978). The authors do not explain why 
technologies with greater potential benefit deserve to be assessed ahead of those that pose 
risks. 
Due in part to objections that assessment stifles new technologies, a major federal technol-
ogy assessment agency, the National Center for Health Care Technology (NCHCT), formed 
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2. Timing 
Related to the issue of which technologies to assess is the deter-
ruination of when to conduct the assessment. Timing is likely to be 
a concern primarily with formal, programmatic technology assess-
ment, such as investigations of the safety and efficacy of new tech-
nologies conducted for the FDA. 83 Because informal, day-to-day 
technology assessment usually occurs at the time the technology is 
identified as a patient management option, timing is not an issue in 
that context. 
Technology develops in stages: basic research and development, 
applied research, introduction in humans, diffusion, and eventually 
obsolesence. 84 Technology can be assessed at a number of these 
stages. The later the assessment, the less its result can influence the 
developmental process. To facilitate identifying wasteful technolo-
gies before they become so widespread as to cause substantial harm 
or economic disutility, or become so entrenched that curbing their 
during the Carter administration, was subsequently denied funding by the Reagan adminis-
tration. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. In an effort to keep the agency alive 
in the face of criticism, its director, Seymour Perry, ackowledged that "emerging" technolo-
gies (which he defined as "actively evolving") should only be the subject of "full blown assess-
ment ... in unusual circumstances involving serious ethical or legal issues," and not merely 
because such technologies promised to be costly. Perry, The Brief Life of the National Center 
for Health Care Technology, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1095, 1099 (1982). 
83. See Greer, supra note 39, at 130. 
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act mandates the assessment of a technology under the agency's jurisdiction before it is mar-
keted. New products, such as new drugs and medical devices, must be assessed before they 
are allowed to be shipped in interstate commerce. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying 
text. Agency approval is conditioned upon a finding that a drug product has been shown, by 
substantial evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, to be safe for 
use under prescribed conditions, and to have the effect it is represented to have under those 
conditions. 21 U.S. C. § 355(d). Agency approval to ship a device must be based on a show-
ing of reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective under the conditions of use in 
its labelling. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d). 
FDA assessment and approval is required not only for commercial introduction, but for 
shipment for purposes of clinical assessment (the term "clinical" in connection with experi-
ments refers to experiments in human subjects); a manufacturer is prohibited from shipping a 
technology to a research establishment for testing in humans without obtaining prior FDA 
approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (providing procedure for obtaining FDA approval for shipping 
investigational drug); 21 U.S.C. 360j(g) (providing procedure for obtaining FDA approval for 
shipping new device). In determining whether or not to permit a drug or device to be shipped 
for purposes of conducting human experiments, the agency examines chemistry, laboratory, 
and animal data submitted by the sponsor of the study. In the case of a product that already 
has been approved, the FDA requires a separate approval before the manufacturer lawfully 
may promote the product for a new use. The FDA has no jurisdiction to require approval of 
a new use that the manufacturer does not promote, such as an unapproved new use by a 
physician on his patients. Nor does the agency have jurisdiction over medical and surgical 
technologies, except to the extent of their use of drugs and devices. 
.,..,. 
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use would encounter substantial public opposition, it is advisable to 
conduct technology assessment as early as possible. 85 
The basic research and development stage is generally conceded 
to be premature for assessment, since the resulting technology is as 
yet insufficiently defined for meaningful assessment. 86 The first as-
sessment opportunity, therefore, is at the applied research stage. 
However, early assessment risks stifling new technologies that 
might later prove non wasteful. 87 This stems from the fact that tech-
nologies and the contexts in which they are applied change over 
time. 88 Indeed, technologies may change during the assessment pe-
riod, 89 so that by the time the assessment data are available, the 
technology has evolved and the results no longer apply.90 More-
over, the risks, costs, and benefits of a technology at an early stage 
of development are hard to foresee, and the earlier the stage of de-
velopment of the technology, the less confident the projection. 
3. Shortage of Data 
Technology assessment is an analysis of information on a tech-
nology. Its quality and hence its usefulness are proportional to the 
quality and quantity of the data on which it is based. The lack of 
adequate assessment data creates a serious obstacle to identifying 
85. The developmental stages of medical technology have been likened to an S·curve, 
with the extent of human use plotted on the X axis and time plotted on the Y axis. The curve 
is flat along the time axis until the technology is first introduced in humans; it then ascends 
fairly steeply before levelling off at the point of maximum acceptance or saturation. Eventu-
ally it may fall back as the technology becomes obsolete. See Banta, supra note 16, at 65; 
Greer, supra note 39, at 134. 
86. See Banta & Behney, Medical Technology: Policies and Problems, 5 HEALTH CARE 
MANAGEMENT REV. 45, 50 (1980). 
87. See Schroeder, supra note 82, at 635; Hearings on H.R. 4869, supra note 16, at 381-
82 (testimony of the American Medical Association). 
88. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087; Banta, Behney & Andrulis, supra note 
82, at 118. 
89. This period may be protracted. See infra note 90. See Derzon, Influences of Reim-
bursemelll Policies on Technology, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN MEDJCAL TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 72, at 149 (third-party payors "cannot wait the desired length of time needed to assess 
many technologies" before deciding whether or not to pay for them). 
90. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087-88. This problem, known as latency, 
arises when the rate of change in a technology exceeds the rate at which it can be assessed. 
See Eddy, Measuring the Effectiveness of Therapeutic Surgical Procedures: A Master Plan, in 
NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, MEDJCAL TECHNOLOGY 40, 43 (1979) 
(hereinafter cited as MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY]. It is compounded by the length of time neces-
sary to measure certain health outcomes; cancer survival, for example, is typically measured 
in five- or ten-year units. I d. at 43-44. Moreover, some types of technology assessment, such 
as the randomized, controlled clinical trial, cannot easily be changed midstream to take ac-
count of a change in the technology under investigation. See id. at 44. 
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wasteful technologies.91 The shortage extends not only to eco-
nomic cost and benefit data required for cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit analyses, 92 but also to the data needed to conduct basic as-
sessments of safety and effectiveness. The Office of Technology As-
sessment has estimated that only between ten and twenty percent of 
all technologies used in medical practice have been shown to be effi-
caCious ill controlled clinical investigations.93 Safety and effective-
ness data are particularly,scap.t for technologies other than those 
drugs and devices that require FDA approval prior to being mar-
keted.94 Furthermore, the more novel the technology, and there-' 
fore arguably the greater the need to predict its future risks, costs 
and benefits, the less data that are likely to be available.95 While 
techniques have been developed to facilitate teclmology assessment 
in the absence of hard data,96 generating such data must remain a 
91. See Klarman, supra note 53, at 234 (noting especially the lack of longitudinal data); 
Weinstein, supra note 47, at 317-18 (noting the "softness" of data to establish probabilities for 
predicting future costs and benefits). 
92. See infra notes 211-29 and accompanying text. 
93. Controlled clinical trials are required to determine the safety and efficacy of technol-
ogies. See infra riotes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
94. See Banta & Behney, Policy Formulation and Technology Assessment, 59 MILBANK 
MEMORIAL FUND. Q. 445, 454 (1980). For a description of the FDA approval process, see 
supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
95. See Warner, Effects of Hospital Cost Containment on the Development of Medical 
Technology, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 187, 190 (1978). This perhaps puts nove) 
technologies at a relative disadvantage; the absence of available data and greater risk of 
safety, efficacy, or cost problems makes such technologies less likely to be adopted than tech-
nologies more similar to existing technologies. On the other hand, there might be a bias in 
favor of novel technologies, especially compared with existing technologies that have a 
known but somewhat disappointing track record. 
96. One such technique is sensitivity analysis. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 317; 
Hearings on HR. 2562, supra note 73, at 462-63 (testimony of the National Center for Health 
Care Technology); Klarman, supra note 53, at 236; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 67. 
Sensitivity analysis tests the sensitivity of the end result to variations in the uncertain vari-
ables. By testing across a complete range of possible values, sensitivity analysis determines 
whether or not that factor is significant. For example, in testing for net benefit, if even the 
worst-case value for one factor, say the discount rate, yielded a positive dollar figure, one 
would properly conclude that the assessment was not sensitive to the selection of the discount 
rate. On the other hand, if the outcome varied substantially depending on the discount rate, 
greater resources could be devoted to predicting the rate with accuracy, or the assessor could 
resign himself to a weak result produced by the uncertainty in the rate. See OTA STRATE-
GIES, supra note 4, at 67. 
Sensitivity analysis can also be used to calculate best- and worst-case estimates for spe-
cific technologies. SeeK. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 101. One example is "mini-
analysis," as urged by Kristein; in which, to determine if a technology is cost-beneficial, bene-
fit is calculated using for uncertain variables the highest values within the range, while cost is 
calculated using the lowest. If the result does not reveal a net benefit for the technology 
under these "best-case" conditions, then the technology is not likely to be cost-beneficial in 
reality. See Kristein, supra note 47, at 215. The process of mini-analysis resembles the use of 
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high priority in attempting to control health care costs by identify-
ing wasteful technologies. 97 
o 4. Isolating Effects 
Technologies are employed within a health care context that 
may include prior or subsequent use of other technologies, all of 
which may affect patient outcome,98 costs, and other trade-off's. 
Consequently, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the particular 
technology being assessed.99 This problem is exacerbated in assess-
ing diagnostic technologies that may have multiple applications (for 
example, a multichannel blood analyzer that can diagnose a large 
variety of abnormal conditions), or that may lead to different fur-
ther interventions, such as further diagnostic tests or different 
treatments. 100 
worst-case analysis to deal with uncertainty in projecting the environmental impact of a fed-
eral project under the National Environmental Policy Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (re-
quiring worst case analysis where essential information is either unknown or too costly to 
obtain); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal agencies must prepare 
environmental impact statements detailing environmental effects when action is proposed 
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."). It should be noted that 
sensitivity analysis is only possible when a range of values for an uncertain variable can be 
estimated. 
97. See Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzeck, supra note 19, at 688 (primary objective of pro-
posed quasi-public Institute for Health Care Evaluation is establishing a uniform patient data 
base to facilitate technology assessment). For a listing of data bases currently available for 
technology assessment, see OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 113-26 app. A, B. 
98. Decision analysts term this the problem of "downstream decision nodes." See 
Weinstein, supra note 47, at 316-17. 
99. See Greer, supra note 39, at 130. 
100. See id. at 131; infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text. An additional problem 
with technology assessment is its susceptibility to biases. Entities with a proprietary interest 
in the technology or with a financial stake in producing results beneficial to the sponsor (such 
as a contract laboratory assessing a technology on behalf of a manufacturer) may knowingly 
or unknowingly color the findings. See Ezekowitz, The Uncontrolled Proliferation of Tech-
nology, 81 CHEST 140 (1982). There may always be negatively biased assessments, for in-
stance where the manufacturer of a competing technology sponsors an assessment of the rival 
technology with the intention of producing negative results. See id. Another source of bias is 
the preference of scientific journals for publishing positive results. See id. 
Technology assessment may also create a problem of information overload. While tech-
nology assessment is needed to provide better data for health care decisionmaking, there is a 
limit to how much data can be useful. See Perry, The Assessment of Technology in Medical 
Care: Recent Developments, I TRANSACTIONS AND STUDIES OF THE COLLEGE OF PHYSI-
CIANS OF PHILADELPHIA 99 (1979). The National Library of Medicine may index as many 
as 260,000 new articles. In 1971-72 alone, for example, it indexed 372 articles just on breast 
cancer. Jd. It is difficult to imagine a practicing oncologist having time to read and digest 
such a volume of literature on only one of the many cancers with which he must deal. This 
suggests the importance of synthesizing raw assessment literature into more a manageable 
form for practitioners. 
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5. Cost of Assessment 
Forma] techJwlogy assessment is extremely costly to conduct. 
Clinical testing to establish the safety and efficacy of drugs often 
costs millions ofdollars per drug. 101 Even an analysis of preexisting 
data to determine the costs and benefits of a technology can run into 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. 102 One commentator recom-
mends a national technology assessment effort with a budget of 
$200 to $300 u1illi0i1. 103 
This raises the question whether comprehensive technology as-
sessment is itself cost-beneficial. Under certain conditions, for ex-
ample, where costs of assessment exceed the cost of the technology, 
assessment is wasteful. 104 However, it is not always possible to pro-
ject such conditions. 105 Nevertheless, an effort must be made to 
identify prior to assessment those technologies that are only mar-
ginally wasteful and yet would be costly to assess. The breakdown 
of technologies in Table 1 may provide a starting point for this 
analysis. 
A related issue is who should bear the cost of technology assess-
ment. For new drugs and medical devices, the burden of paying for 
technology assessment falls substantially on the manufacturer, who 
must sponsor the safety and efficacy trials necessary to obtain FDA 
approval. 106 Insofar as technology assessment is aimed at identify-
10 I. For an attempt to estimate the costs and benefits of a series of large, controlled 
clinical trials, see Hawkins, supra note 16, at 19-20. To the out-of-pocket expense of con-
ducting the tests must be added the costs of the delay in making the technology widely avail-
able while the testing is conducted. 
102. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 48. 
103. See Reiman, Assessment of Jlledicol Practices: A Simple Proposal, 303 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 153, 153-154 (1980). 
104. See Fuchs, supra note 59, at 938. 
105. While urging that cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses not be performed when 
doing so would not be cost-effective, Fuchs does not specify how this can be determined 
before the assessment is conducted. Jd. 
106. However, safety and efficacy studies on some products, such as certain cancer drugs, 
are sponsored in large part by the federal government. Furthermore, the Orphan Drug Act 
provides manufacturers with a tax credit of 50% of the costs of research and development, 
and a minimum of seven years of exclusive marketing, for drugs with such small patient 
populations that manufacturers would not otherwise expect sufficient return on investment to 
justify the costs of obtaining FDA approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982). 
An additional cost of technology assessment is the cost of the FDA's review. The agency's 
activities are funded by federal taxes. Recently, however, the agency proposed that manufac-
turers submitting data for review for purposes of obtaining permission to market new prod-
ucts be required to pay a "user fee." See 50 Fed. Reg. 31,726 (1985). The FDA did not 
propose to charge directly for the review of requests to ship products for clinical experiments. 
Instead, the agency proposed that one-half the cost of that review be added to the charge for 
reviewing a request for marketing approval. I d. at 31,728. In effect, then, only technologies 
1986] MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 807 
ing wasteful technologies, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies 
are needed in addition to the safety and efficacy data currently re-
quired from the sponsor, and the cost of these additional studies 
might be imposed on manufacturers seeking government approval 
of their products. 107 Manufacturers, in tum, fear that these extra 
costs will prevent the development of drugs for small markets108 
and will drive small manufacturers out of business. 109 
One alternative would be to spread assessment costs by charging 
ma11Ufacturers on some sort of pro rata basis, such as based on sales 
revenue. However, this ignores the fact that many technologies, in-
cluding most medical and surgical procedures, are not proprietary; 
they are not patented, or sold or licensed to other physicians or 
surgeons. 110 Thus, manufacturers would be forced to increase the 
price of their proprietary-i.e., non-medical and non-surgical-
products in order to recover the assessment costs of their nonpro-
that had progressed far enough with research-and-development to merit submitting data to 
obtain marketing approval would be charged for permission to conduct research at an earlier 
stage. This presumably reflects the FDA's recognition of the high relative cost of capital for 
conducting early research and development, and its desire to mitigate the effect of its user fee 
plan on innovation. 
107. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 184-85. 
108. See Health Statistics, Research, and Technology Assessmelll Reauthorization, 1984: 
Hearings on H.R. 5496 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Hause 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 536-37 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings on H.R. 5496] (testimony of Frank Samuel, President, Health Industry Manufactur-
ers Association). Presumably this is a concern to manufacturers despite passage of the Or-
phan Drug Act, described supra at note 106. 
109. See Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 536-37 (testimony of Frank Samuel, 
President, Health Industry Manufacturers Association). 
110. There does not appear to be any legal impediment to patenting new medical and 
surgical technologies that do not entail the invention of new drugs or devices. Presumably 
such technologies would be entitled to a process patent. See 35 U.S. C. 10 I (1982) (allowing 
patents for "any new and useful process"). "Process" is defined as a "process, art or method, 
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material." 35 U.S.C. § JOO(b). The fact that the innovator is likely to publish the new tech-
nique in a scientific journal will not preclude obtaining a patent so long as the patent applica-
tion is filed within one year of the publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Nevertheless, patents 
for such technologies are virtually unknown. Telephone interview with Michael Lechter, 
Esquire, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Dec. 12, 1985). This apparently results 
from the fact that surgeons and medical innovators are primarily interested in maximizing 
the spread of their innovations; licensing arrangements with other practitioners might ham-
per efforts to expand development and use of technological innovations. 
A further impediment to patenting such technologies might be the difficulty of detecting 
infringement, especially in cases of small changes in existing procedures or innovations with 
little public visibility. Conversely, the inventor of a new coronary artery bypass or human 
heart transplant procedure at one hospital can easily determine that another hospital has 
suddenly begun promoting the same procedure to the public. Proprietary claims on surgical 
and medical technologies might increase if cost control pressures intensify competition be-
tween providers or significantly reduce the incomes of innovating health professionals. 
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prietary products. 111 In a cost-sensitive market, this practice would 
discourage the use of proprietary technologies in favor of non-pro-
prietary ones. In the absence of evidence that proprietary technolo-
gies, on the whole, are more lilcely to be wasteful than non-
proprietary technologies, this result does not seem justified. 
Another alternative is to finance technology assessment with 
contributions, either mandatory or voluntary, by insurers. 112 How-
ever; as noted earlier, 113 and discussed more fully below, 114 insurers 
have a different perspective on vvaste than physicians, patients, or 
society. Insurers are therefore likely to sponsor technology assess-
ment that focuses only on those approaches that have the greatest 
potential for reducing their costs. While the resulting data would 
be useful as part of an overall assessment program, they are liable to 
divert technology development and use away from technologies that 
might be :nonwasteful when viewed from another perspective. 
H has also been suggested that technology assessment be funded 
by a combination of private contributions and government fund-
ing, 115 or that the government be the primary sponsor. The ques-
tion then arises whether the entity that pays, particularly if it is the 
government, should perform or control technology assessment, a 
question that is addressed in the followi.ng section. 
111. This confounds the suggestion of one commentator that the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982 & Supp. I 1983), be amended to authorize the 
FDA to approve medical and surgical technologies, and that physicians and hospitals pay for 
the technology assessment data that is required by the FDA for approval. See Note, Tlze 
Open-Ended Investigation: A Method for Regulation of New Medical Services, 91 YALE L.J. 
550, 560 n.53 (1982). For a discussion of other problems in regulating medical and surgical 
technologies, see discussion infra at notes 185-91 and accompanying text. 
112. See Willems & Banta, Improving the Use of JVJedica/ Technology, 1 HEALTH AFF., 
Fall1982, at 86, 91 (noting that insurance companies "have much to gain in both cost savings 
and improving the efficiency of the services that they support"). 
113. See supra noie 69 and accompanying text. 
114. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
115. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1090 ("Government, health-insurance com-
panies, corporations and foundations should provide the requisite financial resources."); 
Bunker, Fowles & Schaffarzeck, supra note 19, at 689 (advocating that technology assessment 
be paid for by third-party payors, including the government as the operator of Medicare and 
Medicaid). Congress recently adopted a joint private-public funding approach by creating a 
new Council on Health Care Technology. See Health Promotion and Disease Prevention 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551, § 309(a)(l), 98 Stat. 2820. The Council is funded 
in part by grants from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), but the law 
stipulates that DHHS grants can defray a maximum of two-thirds of the Council's start-up 
costs and only one-third of its operating funds. The remainder must come from non-federal 
sources. See id. § 309(a)(2)(A)-(B). The Council, established under the auspices of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the new National Center for Health Services Research and 
Health Care Technology Assessment created within the DHHS, replaces the National Center 
for Health Care Technology, discussed infra at notes 150-55 and accompanying text. 
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6. Who Performs Technology Assessment 
Historically, technology assessment has been performed by a va-
riety of government and private entities, depending on the type of 
technology (e.g., proprietary drugs, surgical procedures) and on the 
purpose of the assessment (e.g., safety and efficacy trials sponsored 
by a manufacturer seeking FDA marketing approval, cost-effective-
ness study by third-party payor). Private assessment entities in-
clude physicians, !16 patients, ll7 hospitals, ns third-party payors, 119 
manufacturers, 120 and medical professional orgamzations such as 
116. Physicians perform at least an informal technology assessment whenever they decide 
which technology alternative to provide their patients. Government physicians, such as those 
employed by the Veterans Administration, are considered private technology assessors for 
this discussion, insofar as their technology selection resembles that of private physicians. 
117. The role of patients in technology assessment has been significantly increased by the 
growth of the doctrine of informed consent. Under that doctrine, patients are entitled to a 
description-of alternative treatments, along with their risks and benefits, as part of the process 
of deciding which treatment they will be provided. See discussion infra notes 333-37 and 
accompanying text. 
118. Hospitals conduct a variety of types of technology assessments. For example, hospi-
tals must decide which technologies to acquire. This may entail a comprehensive evaluation 
of risks, costs and benefits, or a more limited inquiry to determine the most reliable manufac-
turer of a certain type of equipment. Massachusetts General Hospital, for instance, has estab· 
lished a Resource Allocation Board to evaluate requests for the acquisition of new 
technologies. See Sanders, Adoption of New Technologies in Hospitals, in CRITICAL IssuEs IN 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 72, at 34. Hospital managers are being urged to adopt 
technology evaluation and acquisition methods, or "TEAM," to evaluate new technologies in 
terms of need, safety, effectiveness, reliability, cost and impact on hospital structure and func-
tion. See AHA Offers "TEAM" Program for Evaluating Capital Requests, 55 HOSP. 75 {1981). 
A private, nonprofit organization· called ECRI (formerly the Emergency Care Research 
Institute) evaluales smaller medical devices and other hospital equipment and produces 
"Consumer Reports"-like information for subscribers, typically hospital administrators. See 
OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 78. In addition to assessing technology proposed for 
purchase, hospitals also engage in a form of assessment when they conduct experiments on 
human subjects. In this event, they are required by federal law to establish Institutional 
Review Boards (IRBs) to evaluate ethical implications of the proposed research in terms of 
the risks to subjects. This entails a review of the likely safety and efficacy of the experimental 
technology. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.110-.111 (FDA IRB regulations). 
119. See Greenberg & Derzon, Determining Health Insurance Coverage of Technology: 
Problems andOptions, 19 MED. CARE 967, 972-73 (1981). In 1977, the largest private third-
party payor; the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association, began a Medical Necessity Project in 
conjunction with the American College of Physicians, the American College of Surgeons and 
the American College of Radiology. See id.; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 38-39 (1982). Its 
purpose is to obtain information to facilitate curtailing payment for "outmoded, unproven or 
duplicative" technology. Greenberg & Derzon, supra, at 972. Since 1977, Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield has proposed to discontinue payment for 68 specific surgical and diagnostic proce-
dures. See id. These tend to be noncontroversial. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 38. In 
addition, a medical advisory committee, composed of the medical advisors of six affiliates, 
makes over 100 recommendations a year on reimbursement issues involving specific technolo· 
gies. See Greenberg & Derzon, supra, at 972. 
120. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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the American Medica] Association 121 and the fuuerican College of 
Physicians. 122 There are now at least forty-fi.ve groups i.n the pri-
vate sector engaged in some form of technology assessment, 123 lead-
ing the congressional Office of Technology Assessment to describe 
the present system as "pluralistic." 124 
Along with these private assessment efforts, the government has 
long been involved in various aspects of technology assessment. 
The Food and Drug Administration reviews safety and efficacy data 
submitted by manufacturers to determine whether or not to approve 
a drug or device for introduction into interstate commerce. 125 In 
1972, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established 
to advise Congress on the consequences of technological change. 126 
A spec:it4.c program to addre~s medical technology vvas L11itiated by 
the OTA in 1975. 127 JLike the FDA, the OTA does not generate 
substantial technology assessment of its own; instead, it reviews and 
synthesizes existing data and disseminates the results. 128 The Na-
tional Institute of Health generates a great deal of safety and effi-
cacy data, either directly or by sponsoring extramural research. It 
does not, however, evaluate the social and economic impact of the 
technologies it assesses. 129 The newly established Prospective Pay-
121. The American Medical Association conducts a Diagnostic and Therapeutic Tech-
nology Assessment Program. See Jones, The Americanli1edical Associations's Diagnostic and 
Theraputic Technology Assessment Program, 250 J. A.M.A. 387 (1983). 
122. This program, known as the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project, or CEAP, is de-
scribed in Schwartz, Ball & Moser, Safety, Efficacy, and Effectiveness of Clinical Practices: A 
New Initiative, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 246 (1982) ("The project's primary objective is 
to determine the medical merit of selected practices in internal medicine. At present, eco-
nomic, political, and other important factors are excluded from CEAP's analysis."). 
123. See Legislation Expands Federal Role in !11edical Technology Assessment, 252 J. 
A.M.A. 3235, 3236 (1984). 
124. OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 93. For a general description of current technol-
ogy assessment programs, see Moses & Brown, supra note 33, at 268-71. 
125. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. The FDA also generates some limited 
efficacy and safety data of its own, typically in order to confirm results submitted by product 
sponsors. 
126. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 47. 
127. See id. This is now part of the Health and Life Sciences Division of OTA. 
128. See Smith, The American Medical Association and Technology Assessment, 67 
RHODE ISLAND MED. J. 113, 114 ( 1984). 
129. See Blumenthal, Fedeml Policy Toward Health Care Technology: The Case of the 
National Center, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 584, 595 (1983). Through its Office of 
Medical Applications of Research (OMAR), the National Institute of Health also sponsors a 
type of technology assessment known as "consensus conferences." These are convocations of 
experts who review and synthesize the literature and other avaliable data on particular tech-
nologies. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. OMAR was created in 1977 to 
make NIH reserach more accessible and useful to practitioners. See Blumenthal, supra, at 
601. 
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ment Commission (PROPAC)130 is authorized by statute to com-
mission technology assessment. PROPAC has yet to exercise this 
mandate, and it is unclear how extensively it will do so in the 
future. 131 
The agency responsible for implementing the Medicare pro-
gram, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), also re-
views and commissions technology assessment. 132 This assessment 
function is known as HCFA's "coverage" program. HCFA as-
sesses technologies both on its own initiative, based on trends in 
technology development, as well as in response to specific coverage 
questionsY3 The responsive aspect of HCFA's coverage program 
is complicated by the relationship between the agency and its pro-
gram elements. Medicare is administered at the local level by a sys-
tem of contractors hired by HCFA to handle individual claimsY4 
One of the responsibilities of these contractors is to process claims 
for reimbursement received from individual providers, such as hos-
pitals or physicians, or directly from patients. In processing claims, 
the contractor will deny payment for technologies that it deems are 
not covered under the statutory scheme. 135 A coverage question 
that the contractor is unable or unwilling to resolve itself136 is 
refered to one of HCF A's regional offices which, in turn, can refer it 
to HCFA national headquarters. 137 
Technologies are first assessed in terms of whether they fall 
within the statutory provision prohibiting Medicare from reimburs-
130. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
131. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 598. 
132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
133. In 1981, 25% of the coverage issues handled by HCFA at the national level were 
presented by manufacturers of specific technologies seeking an HCFA ruling on whether or 
not Medicare would reimburse for their provision. See Ruby, Banta & Burns, Medicare Cov-
erage, Medicare Costs, and Medical Technology, 10 1. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 141, 146 
(1985). 
134. Under the portion of the Medicare program that covers hospitalization, known as 
"Part A" (after the part of the Social Security Act in which it is established) these contractors 
are called "fiscal intermediaries," Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 968, and are often 
local Blue Cross affiliates. In 1982, there were 77 fiscal intermediaries, each covering a differ-
ent geographic area. Hellinger, supra note 58, at 37. Under Part B of the Medicare program, 
which covers physician charges, the contractors are called "carriers." Greenberg & Derzon, 
supra, at 968. There were 43 carriers in 1982, often Blue Shield affiliates. Hellinger, supra, at 
37. 
135. Note that the contractor must ascertain that such a technology has in fact been 
provided before it can rule on whether or not it is covered. The claims system under Medi-
care makes this task rather difficult. See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
136. Contractors vary in the aggressiveness with which they pursue coverage issues. See 
Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 968. 
137. See id. at 969; Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 458. 
812 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:778 
ing for "items or services ... ·which are not reasonable and neces-
sary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or i.nju:ry or to improve 
tb.e functioning of a malformed body member." 138 This assessment 
differs in scope depending on whether it is being performed by 
HCJFA's national office or by one of the Medicare contractors. A 
contractor's assessment triggered by a claim for reimbursement will 
usually be limited to an evaluation of whether the technology was 
medically necessary in the particular case (a fairly straightforward 
determination of whether it is generally accepted medical-practice 
to provide the technology to a patient under the circumstances of 
the case) and whether or not it was provided in an appropriate set-
ting (for example, whether it could have been provided on an out-
rather than on an in-patient basis). 139 However, contractors may 
extend their evaluation to matteis such as whetl1er ihe technology is 
generally accepted by the medical community (a broader inquiry 
than whether it is appropriate for a particular patient), and whether 
development of the technology has progressed to the point appro-
priate for Medicare reimbursement. 140 
U the coverage question reaches HCJFA's national office, h is 
referred to the Office of Coverage Policy. 141 When medical advice 
is deemed necessary to decide the coverage question, a panel of 
medical experts on contract with the agency reviews the technology. 
This panel may decide the question itself or refer it to the Public 
Health Service, either as an informal inquiry or with a request for 
fuB-scale assessment. 142 Within the Public Health Service, the mat-
ter is referred to the :National Center for Health Services Research 
and Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCf A), 143 
where it is reviewed by the Office of Health Technology Assessment 
(OHTA). OHTA conducts a review of the literature on the tech-
nology, and, in the case of a full-scale assessment, issues a notice of 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395Y(a)(I)(A) (1982). 
139. See Ruby, Banta, & Bums, supra note 133, at 145, 146-47 (1985). 
140. See Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 458; Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 
968. 
141. See Ruby, Banta, & Bums, supra note 133, at 147. 
142. See Brandt, Technology Assessmellt, a Private-Public Partners/zip, 99 PuB. HEALTH 
REP. 329 (1984); Ruby, Banta & Bums, supra note 133, at 147. 
143. Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 147, n.31. The National Center for Health 
Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment was recently created by Con-
gress. See infra notes !60-62 and accompanying text. Formerly, the agency was called the 
National Center for Health Services Research, and contained a small Office of Health Tech-
nology Assessment to perform the agency's technology assessment function. While this office 
still exists, its importance has been upgraded, as reflected by the change in the agency's name. 
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its inquiry in the Federal Register, soliciting public input. 144 A spe-
cial consensus conference, 145 sometimes sponsored jointly by the 
Office of Medical Applications of Research in the National Insti-
tutes of Health, 146 may be held to permit experts to discuss and 
synthesize available assessment data. A draft assessment document 
is eventually prepared and circulated within the Public Health Ser-
vice, and a final coverage recommendation is sent to HCF A. 147 
HCF A then issues a coverage ruling, and publishes the ruling in 
manuals distributed to Medicare contractors. 148 
As this discussion reveals, federal technology assessment is frag-
mented among a number of agencies. After the failure of early ef-
forts to form a coordinating umbrella organization, 149 Congress 
established the National Center for Health Care Technology 
144. See Brandt, supra note 142, at 329. 
145. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
147. See Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 147. 
148. The rulings are also circulated to state Medicaid agencies, which tend to follow 
HCFA in making coverage decisions concerning Medicaid, to the American Hospital Associ-
ation, where the HCFA rulings are reported in the association's ANNUAL TECHNOLOGY 
GUIDE, and to insurance companies and other third-party payors. See Brandt, supra note 
142, at 329. 
149. In the early 1970's, Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) and Representative An-
drew Maguire (D. N.J.) attempted to establish within the Public Health Service a National 
Institute for Health Care Research, on a par with the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 
See Greenberg, Health-Care Technology: A Small Office vs. A Big Problem, 302 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 243 (1980). The new institute would have consisted of the existing National Center for 
Health Statistics and the National Center for Health Services Research, as well as a new 
National Center for the Evaluation of Medical Technologies. The concept was to create an 
agency at a sufficiently high level within the Department of Health and Human Services to 
provide department-wide coordination and leadership. ld. 
Kennedy and Maguire did not regard any of the existing administrative units as appropri-
ate to be given this role. The NIH excludes consideration of social and economic impact 
from its own research efforts. See supra notes 129 and accompanying text. Indeed, in the 
mid-to-late 1970's, the NIH did not employ a single professional economist. See Blumenthal, 
supra note 129, at 585. Kennedy and Maguire felt that the National Center for Health Serv-
ices Research lacked sufficient prestige, appearing to be on the decline, having suffered a 
budget reduction from $80 million in 1968 to $30 million in 1978. See Greenberg, supra, at 
243. Finally, the Health Care Finance Administration, which would make the most direct 
use of technology assessment in determining which technologies to reimburse for under 
Medicare, lacked the personnel and experience to conduct technology assessment on its own. 
See id. at 244. Kennedy and Maguire may also have been concerned that HCFA would be 
biased against technologies that did not reduce costs. 
The effort by Kennedy and Maguire encountered heavy opposition from technology man-
ufacturers, and was defeated. See Greenberg, supra, at 243. Joseph Califano, who was then 
secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, responded by establishing a new 
Office of Health Technology in the office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. This was 
eventually absorbed by the National Center for Health Care Technology, discussed infra at 
notes 150-55 and accompanying text. 
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(NCHCT) in 1978. 150 The NCHCT coordinated federal technology 
assessment by assembling a list of emerging technologies and identi-
fying those particularly in need of assessment, sponsoring actual as-
sessments, including tlne generation of assessment data, 151 and 
disseminating the results both to HCFA 152 and to the public. 153 
Nevertheless, the NCHCT met stiff opposition from a number of 
directions. 154 Following the Reagan administration's refusal to seek 
150. Pub. L. No. 95-623, § 309, 92 Stat. 3447. The NCHCT was placed under the con-
trol of the Assistant Secretary for Health in the Department of Health and Human Services, 
and was on the same level as the National Center for Health Services Research and the 
National Center for Health Statistics. The agency replaced and absorbed the Office of Health 
Technology in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. See infra notes 156-157. 
Under an earlier proposal, the agency was to be amalgamated with the National Center for 
Health Services Research and the ]\Jational Center for Health Statistics. See id. 1'-lo doubt to 
avoid opposition from those bureaucracies, Congress instead retained them alongside the new 
agency. 
For a description of NHCHT's activities, see Perry & Eliastam, The National Center for 
Health Care Technology, 245 J. A.M.A. 2510, 2511 (1981); Perry, supra note 82, at 1096-97. 
The NCHCT was directed by Seymour Perry, M.D., who had been the first director of the 
Office of Medical Applications of Research (OMAR) when it was established within the Na-
tional Institutes of Health in 1977. See Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 49-50. For a 
discussion of OMAR, see supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
151. The NCHCT sponsored two sorts of technology assessments: reimbursement-mi-
ented assessments, a limited effort usually conducted in-house to guide HCFA's administra-
tion of the Medicare program; and multifaceted assessments on major new technologies like 
coronary artery bypass surgery, usually performed by outside contractors. See Perry & Elias-
tam, supra note 150, at 251 1. 
152. The NCHCT responded to over 70 requests from HCFA for assistance in making 
coverage determinations under Medicare and Medicaid, and HCFA almost invariably fol-
lowed the center's recommendations. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 604. Blumenthal 
notes that HCFA benefitted from the arrangement by being able to attribute politically sensi-
tive coverage restrictions to the center's scientific assessments. I d. at 605. By identifying and 
assessing emerging technologies, the NCHCT also would enable HCFA to anticipate contro-
versial coverage decisions in advance. See Hearings Oil H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 538 
(testimony of Dr. Helen Smits). 
153. Private heallh insurers 1.Vere especially interested in the center's assessments. See 
Perry, supra note 82, at 1098. The NCHCT sent its findings, for example, to the American 
Council of Life Insurance for distribution to other commercial companies. See id. 
154. The NCHCT incited a turf battle within the Department of Health and Human 
Services with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Center for Health Serv-
ices Research (NCHSR) and the Office of Research and Demonstrations within the Health 
Care Finance Administration, entities that aiso had jurisdiction over technology assessment. 
See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 595. As Blumenthal observes, "[t]he Center's research 
mission embroiled it in the politics of health care research, an arena in which the warfare is 
no less intense for the fact that the gladiators sometimes don white coats." !d. at 599. Of 
these opponents, the most powerful was the NIH, which viewed the NCHCT as a direct 
competitor for congressional appropriations. See id. at 596. 
Another source of opposition to the NCHCT were those who objected to what they 
viewed as excessive government regulation of the health care system and the technology in-
dustry. See id. at 606. David Stockman, then Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, referred to the center and its supporters as "latter-day Luddites." !d. The center was 
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funding for fiscal year 1982, the Center ceased to exist in October of 
1981.155 
For two years after the NCHCT's demise, its functions were 
taken over by the small, understaffed Office of Health Technology 
(OHT) in the National Center for Health Services Research. 156 De-
spite responsibility for coordinating all technology assessment activ-
ity within the Department of Health and Human Services, 
including advising the HCF A on coverage policy, OHT employed 
only four professionals-two registered nurses and two health serv-
ices researchers. 157 
The inadequacy of this effort prompted the powerful Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences to call for the estab-
attacked by such powerful lobbies as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the 
Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA), a trade association comprising over 
450 manufacturers of medical devices. I d. at 600-01. The AMA was particularly concerned 
about a provision in the NCHCT's enabling legislation that authorized it to establish norms 
and criteria for technology use. While none were ever proposed, the AMA argued that this 
provision authorized the center to interfere with the physician's patient treatment preroga-
tives. See id. HIMA particularly opposed the NCHCT's authority to establish a list of 
emerging technologies, fearing that the mere appearance of a technology on the list, possibly 
targeting it for technology assessment at an early stage of development, would discourage 
innovation. See id. at 601; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 85; Hearings on S. 800, supra 
note 82, at 27 (testimony of HIMA). 
In response to these criticisms, the center and its supporters argued that the center was 
not a regulatory agency, and that its critics, therefore, had nothing to fear in terms of its 
impact upon their activities. See Perry, supra note 82, at 1099. Nevertheless, its director 
admitted that the Center's activity was bound "to constrain industry's freedom in the market-
place," id., and amid objections that its. regulatory disclaimer was disingenuous (see Hearing 
on H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 578 (testimony of Dr. Joseph Boyle, AMA), the chairman of 
the Center's national advisory committee acknowledged that it was at least a "quasi-regula-
tory" body. Hearing on S. 800, supra note 82, at 35 (testimony of Dr. Charles A. Sanders). 
In a last-ditch survival effort, the NCHCT shifted its focus from new technologies to those 
already in existence, but to no avail. See Perry, supra note 82, at 1100. 
The NCHCT was also hampered by a lack of support from an identifiable constituency, 
beyond the relatively small and powerless assessment contractors it directly funded. The 
NIH, on the other hand, could mobilize the numerous beneficiaries of its biomedical research 
program. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 594. 
155. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 593. The Senate had voted in 1981 to dismantle 
the NCHCT, but the House of Representatives reauthorized it after Congressman Henry 
Waxman (D. Cal.) tacked the measure onto a Medicaid bill that had strong backing from state 
governors. The House prevailed in conference. Jd. at 592-93. The NCHCT's enabling legis-
lation authorized a three-year appropriation of $73 million, but in 1981 Congress reduced the 
budget authorization for the following three years to $12 million. Only $7.8 million had 
actually been appropriated by the time the center ceased to exist in 1981. Jd. At the time of 
its demise, the center was funding approximately 20 technology assessment projects. It had 
an official staff of 20, but actually employed 39. ld. at 592-93. 
156. See Iglehart, Another Chance for Technology Assessment, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
509, 510 (1983). 
157. See id. 
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lishment of a quasi-public consortium to assess technology. 158 This 
development, in turn, led to the enactment of the Health Promotion 
and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984159 and to Congress's 
creation of the National Center for Health Services Research and 
Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCTA). 160 This ex-
pansion of the former National Center for Health Services Research 
encompassed an additional responsibility of advising the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services on specific technologies and reim-
bursement by federally financed health programs/61 while taking 
into account the "safety, efficacy, and effectiveness, and, as appro-
priate, the cost-effectiveness and appropriate uses of the technol-
ogy."162 In addition, the law established a non-profit, quasi-public 
Council on Health Care Technology in conjunction with the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to promote, coordinate and sponsor 
technology assessment. 163 
158. See id. at 511. 
159. Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815 (1984). 
160. See id. § 5. 
161. See id. § 5(a)(3). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. § 8. Public Law 98-551 also established a National Advisory Council on Health 
Care Technology Assessment to advise the National Center for Health Services Research and 
Health Care Technology Assessment (NCHSRHCT A) on criteria and methods to be used in 
making coverage recommendations. I d. § 5(a). A number of factors may have been respon-
sible for Congress's reinstatement of federal technology activities resembling those of the 
NCHCT so soon after its demise in 1981. First, it may have become clear that technology 
assessment was necessary to control health care costs, and that the Office of Health Technol-
ogy in the National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR), which had inherited the 
tasks of the NCHCT, did not have the resources to handle the responsibility. This view was 
reflected in the strong support for the bill to create the new agency by the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons, the Health Industry Association of America, the Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association, the American Association of Medical Colleges, and the American 
College of Physicians, but most of all, by the Reagan administration. See Hearings on HR. 
5496, supra note 108. Assistant Secretary for Health Brandt represented the administration 
during hearings on H.R. 5496, the bill introduced by Congresman Henry Waxman (D.Cal.) 
that eventually became Public Law 98-551, and endorsed the key features of the proposal-
the creation of a public/private partnership to undertake technology assessment, with the 
public function to reside in the NCHSR. Id. at 469-71 (testimony of Assistant Secretary 
Brandt). 
Second, the new entity's location within the NCHSR probably defused a considerable 
amount of opposition within existing units of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
since the bill avoided the creation of a new, high-level agency with sole responsibility for 
technology assessment. Furthermore, the concept of a quasi-public technology assessment 
council, including representatives from technology manufacturers, health professionals, hos-
pitals, insurers, employers and consumers, and with only three members appointed by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, may have satisfied those who opposed federal domi-
nance of the technology assessment field. Nevertheless, both the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) and the Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA) opposed the 
measure. The AMA reiterated its long-stated resistance to a government role in technology 
1986] MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 817 
Although it is too soon to evaluate the performance of either the 
NCHSRHCTA or the Council on Health Care Technology, their 
creation has revived the issue of government's proper role in tech-
nology assessment. Some favor leaving technology assessment 
largely to the private sector. 164 Strong arguments can be advanced 
in support of this view: government often has its own agenda, in-
cluding bureaucratic self-preservation, which may not be consistent 
with appropriate technology 'assessment; government may lack the 
necessary technical expertise and personnel, which may be attracted 
to the private sector by better ·salaries and opportunities for ad-
vancement; bureaucrats tend to be removed from the real world of 
medicine, and their judgments, therefore, may be erroneous and 
meddlesome; and finally, bureaucracy is costly and inefficient. 
On the other hand, several factors militate against a purely pri-
vate approach. As the country's single largest purchaser of health 
care-providing care directly to the military and to veterans, and 
indirectly to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries165-government 
has a vested interest in ensuring efficient operation of the health 
care system. Moreover, technology assessment data resemble a 
public good, insofar as it is difficult and contrary to public policy to 
allow them to remain the private property of a private sponsor. 166 
Private sponsorship of technology assessment thus gives rise to a 
free-rider problem, since those who do not pay for the assessment 
can nonetheless appropriate it for their own use. 167 This might lead 
assessment, and questioned whether the new NCHSRHCT A would adequately consider 
quality of patient care and social, ethical and economic factors in addition to cost in its 
evaluations of technologies. See id. at 513. HIMA did not oppose the creation of the new 
federal entities, but argued that, in light of other government cost-cutting measures, the as-
sessments should be confined to Medicare coverage questions, encourage technological inno-
vation, and pay only limited attention to considerations of cost. See id. at 518-42. 
164. The AMA has consistently opposed federal technology assessment, at least beyond 
that performed by the Food and Drug Administration. See supra note 154 and accompany-
ing text. See also Blendon & Altman, supra note 20, at 15. 
165. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 157 app. B. Medicare alone accounts for 
40% of all community hospital inpatient revenue. DHHS, HCFA, Medicare Program: 
Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1987 Pro-
posed Rates; Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,970, 20,017 {1986). 
166. See Bunker, supra note 19, at 689; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 5-6. Safety 
and efficacy data submitted by drug and device manufacturers to the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, the details of which are kept secret due to the free-rider problem discussed infra at 
notes 167-68 and accompanying text, provide an exception to this view. Public policy would 
seem to favor widespread dissemination of technology assessments to achieve better patient 
management decisions as well as to curb waste. At the same time, it is difficult to keep the 
results secret because of the impetus to publish them in the scientific literature, if only to 
communicate positive results to prospective purchasers and users. 
167. See Bunker, supra note 19, at 689. 
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to less than optimal amounts of technology assessment. 168 The free-
rider problem is normally alleviated by collective purchase of the 
goods. Technology assessment by public, governmental institutions 
would, therefore, address the free-rider problem. For these reasons, 
it seems appropriate for the government to play at least some role in 
the production of technology assessment. 
The extent of governmental involvement in technology assess-
ment, assuming it should have at least some role, is open to ques-
tion. One possibility is direct sponsorship of assessment as \Vell as 
selection of the technologies to be assessed, as was the case with the 
NCHCT and is somewhat the system adopted for the new 
NCHSRHCTA and Council on Technology Assessment. 169 Alter-
natively, government could underwrite teclLnology assessment per-
formed by private entities. 170 Another approach would require 
private sponsors to submit technology assessments to the govern-
ment i..a"J. order to market technologies, 171 or in order to qualify for 
reimbursement under government-operated third-party health 
programs. 172 
All of these alternatives have serious drawbacks. Government 
assessment, whether direct or subsidized raises the objections of bu-
168. Less than optimal amounts of technology assessment might result because the 
nonexclusivity of the assessment would diminish its value to any potential private purchaser. 
This nonexclusivity would lead to the purchase of less assessment than if the purchaser based 
his decision of how much assessment to purchase on the total value of the assessment mea-
sured across all who might benefit. 
169. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
170. See Hearings on H.R. 2562, supra note 73, at 542 (testimony of Dr. Peter Bunker). 
Bunker advocates that the government rather than private sponsors pay for all clinical trials 
on new technologies. A related alternative is for the government to subsidize private assess-
ments by providing interim Medicare reimbursement while assessments are undertaken. See 
Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 974-75. 
171. This is the policy embodied in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for new 
drugs and devices. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, however, 
the Act does not authorize the Food and Drug Administration to compare the costs and 
benefits of a technology, nor does the FDA regulate surgical and medical technologies, except 
insofar as they employ new drugs and devices. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
172. Former Secretary of Health and Human Servi1ces, Patricia Harris, announced in 
1980 that new technologies such as the artificial heart should be evaluated on the basis of 
their "social consequences" as well as their safety and efficacy before the Health Care Finance 
Administration financed widespread use. See Evans, supra note 30, at 2050. Banta recom-
mends technology assessment prior to reimbursement rather than a prohibition on dissemi-
nating a technology without such assessment. See Banta, supra note 16, at 82-84. See also 
OT A MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 25; Russell, supra note 15, at 4! -42. France has adopted a 
policy that the government will not pay for new drugs under that country's national health 
system unless the drug has been shown to be either more efficacious or cheaper than existing 
alternatives. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & 1. WILLEI\JS, supra note 24, at 177. 
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reaucratic political agendas mentioned earlier. 173 While restricting 
either dissemination or reimbursement pending assessment could 
deter unwarranted diffusion of untested technologies, focusing on 
reimbursement alone could cause disproportionate burdens to fall 
on those patients who cannot afford a new technology absent third-
party payment. 174 
B. Specific Problems in Assessing Specific Technologies 
In addition to the general issues and problems connected with 
technology assessment, three specific types of technologies create 
particular obstacles for assessment. 
1. Diagnostic Technologies 
Diagnostic technologies are particularly difficult to assess be-
cause of the difficulty in associating a specific diagnostic technology 
with a specific patient outcome, and hence with a specific set of 
risks, costs and benefits. 175 A range of medical interventions are 
likely to occur after the use of the diagnostic technology. 176 A 
treatment decision may be the product of a number of diagnostic 
inputs and prior treatments, making it hard to isolate the role of a 
particular diagnostic technology in the treatment decision, let alone 
in the resulting outcome. 177 Complicating matters further, a diag-
nostic technology may be used to detect a number of different 
conditions. 178 
The costs of a diagnostic technology may also be difficult to 
gauge, thereby impairing cost-based technology assessments. The 
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
174. On the other hand, a system in which wealthy patients financed technology assess· 
ment in return for access to speculative technologies might be desirable. The additional price 
the wealthy would pay for the assessment on top of the other costs of the technology would 
be offset by giving them the first access to new, potentially beneficial technologies. The poor 
would not have this opportunity, but would also not bear the risk of exposure to potentially 
unsafe or ineffective technologies. In addition, a "market" in unproven technologies would 
be established that might help in valuing health benefits by assigning prices to them on the 
basis of expected or hoped-for results. Finally, a market for technology assessment would be 
created, which might help in determining its cost-effectiveness. 
175. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 24; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 41; Rock, 
Technology Assessment in Laboratory Medicine: Rationalizing or Rationing, I CLINICS LABO-
RATORY MED. 3, 13-14 (1981). 
176. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 24. 
177. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 41. 
178. For example, an automated multichannel chemical analyzer is used not only for 
diagnosing patients but for screening them and monitoring their progress. It provides data 
enabling the detection of a host of abnormal values indicative of a large number of diseases. 
It is therefore difficult to assess the device as a whole. See Rock, supra note 175, at 13-14. 
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hospital or laboratory charge for a diagnostic test is often an unreli-
able cost indicator because it may be inflated to cover the expenses 
of other services. 179 Furthermore, providers tend to employ old and 
new diagnostic technologies in tandem until adequate experience 
has been gained with the new technology to permit confidence in its 
use. Thus the initial cost of a new diagnostic technology may be 
high, but may decline with time. 180 Initial cost-benefit ratios there-
fore may be unduly pessimistic predictors of future cost-benefit 
relationships. 181 
The benefits of diagnostic technologies also present assessment 
problems. Based on the results of initial assessments, diagnostic 
technologies may appear to present greater benefit than they will 
actually produce in later, full-scale use. 182 Many diagnostic tech-
nologies· are first evaluated at large hospitals where the target dis-
ease is more prevalent. 183 As a result, a diagnostic technology may 
appear to be more efficacious (i.e., better able correctly to diagnose 
the disease) than when employed among populations with a lower 
prevalence of the disease in question. 184 
2. Surgical and Medical Technologies 
Although surgical procedures account for approximately thirty 
percent of the total U.S. expenditures for health care, 185 they are 
largely unregulated and unassessed. The practice of surgery is regu-
lated primarily by state licensing laws which address practitioners' 
qualifications. 186 The Food and Drug Administration regulates sur-
179. See id. 
180. See Schroeder, supra note 81, at 635. 
181. Initial costs, however, may be an overly optimistic indicator of future cost per case. 
Since the cost of a diagnostic procedure is a function of the prevalence of the target disease, 
the cost per newly detected case rises as the number of undetected cases declines. The more 
successful the technology is in detecting a disease, the more it will reduce the number of 
remaining undetected cases, further increasing its cost. See Steinwachs, Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis: Role in Evaluation of Alternatives for Improving High Blood Pressure Control, 33 
MD. STATE MED. J. 225, 226 (1984). 
182. See Rock, supra note 175, at 11. 
183. See id. Testing sites for diagnostic and indeed for all technologies are selected in 
part to maximize the size and severity of illness of the target patient population to ensure 
enough subjects to produce statistically significant positive results. See id. For a discussion 
of statistical significance, see infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
184. See id. The accuracy of a diagnostic technology assessment could be increased by 
employing the technology in a variety of settings, but this would significantly increase assess-
ment costs. See id. 
185. See Moore, supra note 19, at 134 (1985). In 1981, this amounted to about $90 bil-
lion. Id. 
186. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 160 app. D. 
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gery indirectly through its regulation of surgical drugs and devices. 
As a result, some surgical technologies, such as transplants of artifi-
cial hearts, are subject to pervasive FDA controls while other surgi-
cal technologies intended to achieve similar patient outcomes, such 
as human heart transplants (or even transplants of xenografts, i.e;, 
organs from nonhuman species), go largely unregulated due to the 
fortuity that there is no device central to the procedure. The same 
is largely true of medical technologies that do not employ drugs or 
devices. 187 The lack of oversight of surgical and medical technolo-
gies is especially striking when contrasted with government regula-
tion of drugs and devices. 188 The Office of Technology Assessment 
regards the lack of assessment of surgical and medical technologies 
as the "overriding weakness" of this country's technology assess-
ment program. 189 
The lack of medical and surgical assessment is explained partly 
by the difficulty of detecting new surgical or medical procedures or 
changes in existing ones. 190 Due to the complexity of some surgical 
procedures, it is difficult to detect a subtle change in the way they 
are conducted. 191 Over time, however, numerous incremental 
changes in a complex procedure will yield a different procedure, 
with different risks, costs and benefits than the original technology. 
The difficulty of assessing medical and surgical technologies sug-
gests that surgical and medical waste is more likely to go undetected 
than other types of wasteful health care practices. · 
187. See id.; Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 454. For a discussion of medical proce-
dures, see supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
188. See Banta & Behney, supra note 78, at 454. However, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration does not regulate the prescribing behavior of physicians. Physicians therefore are free 
to prescribe a drug for uses the agency has not approved. Insofar as surgery and medical 
treatment that does not employ drugs or devices are applications of techniques by a health 
professional, they may be deemed comparable to physician prescribing, and their nonregula-
tion by the FDA may therefore be unremarkable. 
189. OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 99. 
190. The long-standing opposition of powerful physician groups like the American Medi-
cal Association no doubt is also a significant factor. 
191. See Greenberg & Derzon, supra note 119, at 970. Another factor complicating the 
assessment of surgical technologies is the ethical constraints on conducting controlled surgi-
cal research. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 130 app. C. This results from the risks 
associated with the typical invasive surgical procedure. It would be highly unethical, for 
example, to evaluate a new coronary repair procedure by opening up every subject's chest but 
only performing the repair on the group of subjects designated as experimental. Without this 
type of placebo control, however, it may be difficult to isolate the effects of the surgical tech-
nology from the effects of havings one's chest opened. 
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C. Problems Associated with Particular Types of Assessment 
Beyond the issues raised in connection with technology assess-
ment generally and in connection with assessment of diagnostic, 
surgical and medical technologies in particular, a number of con-
cerns relate to specific assessment techniques. 
1. Safety and Efficacy Assessments 
The basic tool for safety and efficacy assessment 192 is the con-
trolled clinical investigation. 193 To understand the value of the con-
trolled clinical investigation, consider the alternative case report or 
anecdotal method which involves administering a technology to pa-
tients in an uncontrolled fashion and simply observing and report-
ing the results. With the exception of technologies that treat 
previously incurable conditions, so that any improvement is per se a 
demonstration of net benefit, 194 uncontrolled trial and error is of 
Ettie true assessment value. Without a group of control subjects, 
there is no \Vay to tell if the patient outcomes are the result of the 
technology or of chance or some peculiar characteristic of the pa-
tients being tested. Assessment conclusions based on case report 
data are therefore unreliable. Nevertheless, because they are rela-
tively simple and inexpensive, case report data probably provide the 
basis for an overwhelming majority of treatment decisions. 
The controlled clinical investigation, in contrast to the case re-
port, is a powerful assessment tool. Xn theory, it can identify tech-
nologies that are unsafe or inefficacious. By adding multiple control 
groups exposed to alternative technologies, technologies that are 
unsafe or inefficacious on a relative basis can also be identified. Un-
192. Formal safety and efficacy assessment dates back at least to John Lind's scurvy ex-
periments 200 years ago. See Fineberg, supra note 4, at 663. 
193. For a general description, see Moses & Brown, supra note 33, at 271. Controlled 
clinical investigations can either be experimental or observational. In the former case the 
investigator controls who gets what technology, while in the latter case the investigator ob-
serves the results in subjects whose exposure to the technology has been independent of the 
investigator. See, e.g., OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 34-39. The standard experimental 
study is a randomized, contro!led trial. See id. at 34. A common observational study is an 
historically controlled im>estigation, in which the control population has been treated prior to 
the development of the technology being assessed, and can therefore serve as a group that has 
not been exposed to the technology for purposes of comparison with the group that has been 
exposed. See id. at 134 app. C. For a discussion of historically controlled studies, see Moses 
& Brown, supra note 33, at 274-76. 
194. In this case, the experiment more nearly resembles an historically controlled study 
than an uncontrolled experiment, since patients treated unsuccessfully prior to the advent of 
the experimental technology in effect serve as controls. 
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fortunately, its theoretical value is compromised by several 
shortcomings. 
The use of controlled clinical trials is significantly limited by 
their cost and their ethical problems. Because of the large popula-
tions that must be studied to yield statistically significant results, 
controlled trials are very expensive to conduct. 195 Ethical problems 
arise because of the need to compare the experimental technology to 
a placebo or alternate technology. 196 Withholding a known effec-
tive technology from a patient is unethical, even if doing so facili-
tates the evaluation of a potentially superior technology. 197 
Randomized, controlled trials. therefore can be employed ethically 
only in two cases: (1) if there is no technology known to be safe and 
effective for the condition in question; or (2) if the risks and benefits 
of the experimental technology are truly uncertain. In these cases, a 
positive control, in the form of another technology that may not 
prove to be as safe or effective when the experiment is completed, 
may be used clinically as the standard of comparison. 198 
A more serious drawback is the limited ability of controlled 
clinical trials to identify wasteful technology due to the fact that 
195. Large study populations reduce the risk of erroneous negative conclusions (known 
as "false negatives" or beta type II error) that can result from small sample-sizes. See Rus-
sell, The Role of Technology Assessment in Cost Control, in CRITICAL IssuES IN MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 72, 133-34. For example, many new technologies represent only 
modest improvements in patient outcomes. A large test group is needed to detect the positive 
effect of these technologies and to establish that the effect observed is not due to chance. See 
Moses and Brown, supra note 33, at 275. A survey of 71 investigations reporting negative 
results, for example, revealed that the negative results were due primarily to the small size of 
the study populations. See Freiman, Chalmers, Smith & Kuebler, The Importance of Beta, 
The Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of the Randomized, 
Controlled Trial: Survey of 71 'Negative' Trials, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 690 (1978). In 67 of 
these studies, there was a greater than 10% chance of missing a true 25% therapeutic im-
provement, and 50 of the studies had a greater than 10% chance of missing a true 50% 
improvement. See id. Avoiding such error, however, requires large populations, which 
drives up the cost of the study, since cost is primarily a function of the number of subjects. 
See Hawkins, supra note 16, at 13-14. Moreover, the high cost of avoiding beta type II error, 
and thus the costs of controlled trials, increases as the marginal expected health benefit from 
the experimental technology decreases. See H.D. BANTA, C. BEHNEY & J. WILLEMS, supra 
note 24, at 117. 
196. See Butt & Neuhauser, supra note 51, at 142; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 93; 
Eddy, supra note 90, at 44; Moses, Statistical Concepts Fundamental to Investigations, 312 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 896 (1985) ("there may be ethical obstacles; if a patient can defi-
nitely be expected to benefit more from Treatment I than from Treatment II, that should 
preclude his being assigned to Treatment II"). 
197. See Eddy, supra note 90, at 44; Moses, supra note 196, at 896. 
198. See Moses, supra note 196, at 896; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 93 ("How-
ever, when a technology is in widespread use, risks and benefits are either already known or 
are widely believed to exist, and randomization may be neither possible nor appropriate"); 
Eddy, supra note 90, at 44. 
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they tend to assess erncacy but not effectiveness. 199 Deliberately 
conducted in a carefu11y contrived and controlled setting, such as a 
prestigious medical research center, with highly trained investiga-
tors following a detailed protocol or set of instructions, the results 
of these studies are unlikely to reflect the risks, costs and benefits of 
the technology in actual clinical use. 200 This does not present a 
problem if the results of the study are negative; a technology that is 
unsafe or inefficacious in a carefully controlled experiment is not 
1ike1y to be safer or more effective in actual use. 201 Risk, benefit and 
cost projections based on positive results from a controlled trial, 
however, may be highly overoptimistic.202 
199. This distinction is discussed supra at note 28. 
200. See Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1087 ("The results of technology assessment 
in one setting may not apply to others ... The performance of a medical technology depends 
on the particular circumstances in use"); Hellinger, supra note 58, at 35. Hellinger cites the 
example of human heart transplants, which achieved a much higher rate of success when 
initially performed at Stanford University than after the technology spread to other medical 
centers. Factors that tend to limit the applicability of the results of controlled, clinical inves-
tigations to other settings include differences in skill between researchers and practitioners 
(see Note, supra note Ill, at 552) and greater patient compliance with the treatment regimen 
under experimental conditions. Cf Hawkins, supra note 16, at 16. Particularly in the case of 
drugs, patient compliance may reflect cost considerations. Since even insured patients often 
must pay for their own drugs, there is a tendency to reduce dosage and frequency of adminis-
tration to save money, thereby reducing drug effectiveness. In clinical studies, however, the 
subjects typically do not pay for the experimental technology. Cf id. at 19. 
201. The same may not be true for an assessment of cost. Administrative costs are likely 
to be higher under controlled study conditions than under nonnal conditions of use, and 
economies of scale may be realized as the technology is diffused. On the other hand, in the 
case of proprietary technologies such as drugs and devices, the price of the technology at the 
experimental stage may be less than after it is introduced commercially because the manufac-
turer may not be able to charge a profitable price or perhaps any price for a technology under 
investigation. Food and Drug Administration regulations, for example, prohibit a sponsor of 
an experimental device from charging more than the reasonable costs of manufacture, re-
search and development. 2! C.P.R. § 812.7 ("A sponsor, investigator, or any person acting 
for or on behalf of a sponsor or investigator shall not ... commercialize an investigational 
device by charging the subjects or investigators for a device a price larger than that necessary 
to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and handling."). While there is no 
comparable prohibition on commercializing experimental drugs, investigators and subjects 
typically are not charged for these technologies in controlled clinical experiments. 
202. Randomized, controlled trials on chemonucleo!ysis, a ne\v technology to treat 
slipped discs involving the injection of an enzyme called chymopapain into the disc, showed 
that the technology was extremely safe as well as effective, and much less costly that the 
traditional surgical treatment (laminectomy). In actual use, however, adverse reactions be-
gan to occur at much higher rates, perhaps because the injections were performed by less 
well-trained personnel than in the clinical experiments. Drug for Slipped Disks is Linked to 5 
Deaths, 28 Serious Disorders, Wall St. J., June 7, 1984, at 7, col. I. 
A number of technical difficulties also arise in attempting to assess technologies for safety 
and efficacy, but in contrast to the problems of cost, ethical constraints and projection to 
actual use, they are somewhat amenable to technical solutions. Defining the end-point of a 
clinical trial is often difficult. In the case of coronary artery bypass graft surgery, for exam-
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2. Consensus Conferences 
Another assessment method that presents special problems is 
the consensus conference. This widely-used technique consists of a 
group of experts reviewing the available data on a technology and 
reaching an accord on its risks, costs, or benefits.Z03 The major 
drawback of this technique is that it does not generate data but only 
reviews, synthesizes and disseminates existing data.204 Consensus 
conferences therefore may be prone to conclusions based on inade-
quate data or bias on the part of the conferees.205 Nevertheless, the 
consensus method is a relatively inexpensive means of obtaining at 
least some expert assessment of a tecbnology.206 To the extent that 
pie, should benefit be measured in terms of relief from the pain of angina pectoris, or increase 
in lifespan, or both? If both, should the technology still be deemed to be efficacious if it only 
reduces pain? This example is presented in Banta &Behney, supra note 34, at 378. 
Ensuring the validity of study results is a further problem. Results must prove attributa-
ble to the technology being tested rather than to chance or to some other variable (internal 
validity), and must be generalizable to populations other than the one being studied (external 
validity). See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 33-34; Moses, supra note 196, at 890-91. 
Statistical methods are used to determine if study results are due to chance rather than to the 
effects of the experimental technology. See generally Moses, supra. The risk that the results 
are attributable to factors other than the technology being tested can be reduced by "blind-
ing" the investigators and, if possible, the subjects-that is, preventing them from being 
aware which subjects are being exposed to the experimental technology. This avoids the 
possibility of deliberate or unconscious bias in the observation and reporting of the results. 
See id. 
203. The use of consensus conferences as a methodology for assessing health care tech-
nologies began within the National Institute of Health (NIH). The first consensus conference 
was held in 1977 to assess screening methods for detecting breast cancer. See Perry, supra 
note 100, at 97-98; see also Iglehart, supra note 15, at 50-55. The NIH brings together a panel 
of experts to listen to presentations over a two day period. On the eve of the second day, the 
panelists draft a "consensus statement," which they read to the audience for their reaction. 
This is followed by a press conference to announce the tentative results of the conference. 
The panel then disperses, and the statement is circulated to them for finalization. See OT A 
STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 63. 
204. See L. RussELL, supra note 15, at 134 (consensus approach "assumes, of course, 
that whatever steps the profession has taken to learn about the benefits of various technolo-
gies are sufficient to support the judgments that are made"): 
205. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 94 ("Many syntheses are informal, overly 
subjective, group-generated norms and are not based on a rigorous assessment of the scientific 
evidence"); Hearings on S. 2504, supra note 82, at 120 ("The consensus method is vulnerable 
to oversimplification, errors in reasoning, and obvious biases, such as financial and profes-
sional biases.") 
The risk of bias influencing an assessment may be reduced by selecting neutral panelists. 
However, it is unlikely that any expert panelist would lack a personal or professional view-
point on the technology being assessed. An approach that can reduce the potential for bias is 
the Delphi technique, which feeds panelists' views back to one another anonymously. SeeK. 
WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 99; OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 62. However, 
Delphi sacrifices face-to-face group interaction. 
206. See Hearings on S. 800, supra note 82, at 25 (Testimony of the Health Industry 
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they reflect the shared views of leading experts in the fie1d, more-
over, consensus conclusions tend to be less controversial than those 
reached by more independent or objective methods. At the price of 
rigor, therefore, consensus assessment may be more politically ac-
ceptable than other appmaches.Z07 
3. Cost-Sensitive Analyses 
Special problems arise with cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit 
analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis aims at identifying technologies 
that are not the most cost-effective methods of achieving a desired 
health outcome.208 The analysis entails a number of steps. First, 
the health problem and the desired objective must be identified (for 
example, for patients with coronary heart disease, the objective 
might be to ameliorate the symptoms of angina pectoris); next, vari-
ous technologies for achieving the objective must be considered (for 
example, the desired goal could be reached by use of drug therapy, a 
combination of therapy and lifestyle changes, or through coronary 
artery bypass graft surgery); finally, the costs and benefits of each 
technology must be calculated and compared to determine which 
provides the greatest net benefit at the least cost. 209 Many of these 
steps are technically troublesome. Cost-effectiveness analysts often 
fail to consider all of the available alternate technologies,210 and 
Manufacturers Association). There are no data avaiiable on the percentage of consensus con-
clusions later proven erroneous by more rigorous assessment. 
207. Arguably, consensus findings are more likely to be accurate for technologies thai, by 
virt,ue of being toward the extreme ends of the risk, cost and benefit continua, present the 
clearest cases of waste, than for those that are merely marginally wasteful or nonwasteful. 
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Consequently, the primary risk is that a mar-
ginal technology might be erroneously praised or condemned. This risk may well be out-
weighed by the advantages of a relatively simple, inexpensive assessment method like 
consensus. 
208. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. Selma Mushkin introduced cost-ef-
fectiveness analysis into the health care field in 1958. See Mushkin, Toward a Definition of 
Health Economics, 73 Pun. HEALTH REPTS. 785-93 (1980); See also Klarman, Tlze Road to 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 585 (1982). 
209. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note ], at 59-113. 
210. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 313. This results in part from the analyst's bias. 
For example, a surgeon tends to compare alternate surgical procedures but to ignore non-
surgical alternatives such as drug therapy; from the surgeon's standpoint, what is relevant is 
which of lzis tools is the most cost-effective. In addition, comparisons among technologies are 
often difficult to make because of varying quality and quantity of data. Unless the analyst 
goes to the trouble and expense of conducting his own clinical trials, the data relied upon to 
establish the values for one technology may not be comparable to those for another; for in-
stance, there may be a great deal of data of questionable quality for an old technology, and 
only a small amount of high quality data for a newer one. Furthermore, as noted supra at 
notes 88-90 and accompanying text, technologies change over time, which may render data 
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often encounter serious difficulties m identifying, measuring and 
valuing costs211 and benefits. 212 
on one version of a technology inapplicable to current or future experience. See Neuhauser, 
supra note 54 at 33. 
211. Measurement determines the quantity of inputs required to achieve the health objec-
tive, such as the number of physician hours, scalpels and drug tablets, while valuation assigns 
the inputs a dollar value. See K. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 79-80. For purposes 
of cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost of a technology is assessed by the technology's marginal 
opportunity cost (measured by the value of the resource in its next best use) rather than the 
technology's average cost or market price. See OTA STRATEGJES, supra note 4, at 39-40; K. 
WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 108-09. To illustrate the distinction between marginal 
and average costs, Neuhauser calculates the cost per additional case of colon cancer detected 
by repeated stool guaiac tests to increase from approximately $1200 for the first test to $47 
million for the sixth. See Neuhauser & Lewicki, What Do We Gain from the Sixth Stool 
Guiac?, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226, 228 (1975). Using average rather than marginal cost 
would submerge the tremendous increase in cost per detected case. 
Marginal cost, however, is not easy to calculate. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 320. 
Both measurement and valuation problems arise. See Klarman, supra note 53, at 226. How 
should costs be measured when a technology is used for many purposes, or is employed in a 
treatment program along with a number of other technologies? See OT A STRATEGJES, supra 
note 4, at 40; Klarman, supra note 53, at 230; K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 74. 
How should overhead be treated? Should only the marginal increase in overhead resulting 
from the technology be measured, or a proportion of fixed costs? See OT A STRATEGIES, 
supra note 4, at 40. Should research-and-development expenses be included? See K. 
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 78. 
Once the inputs are identified and measured, they must be valued. Inputs or goods traded 
in the marketplace may have a market price, but that price may not accurately reflect true 
cost. See Klarman, supra note 53, at 226. For example, some hospitals charge more for some 
goods and services, such as laboratory tests, pharmaceuticals and radiological services, than 
their true marginal costs, a practice known as "cost-shifting." OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 
4, at 40; Conn, Aller & Lundberg, Identifying Costs of Medical Care, an Essential Step in 
Allocating Resources, 253 J. A.M.A. !586, 1587 (1985); K. WARNER&. B. LucE, supra note 
I, at 142-43. Other valuation problems arise because of the difficulty of predicting future uses 
of a technology, hence future economies of scale, See HeiJinger, supra note 58, at 35, 41; 
Greer, supra note 39, at 132 (1981). Choosing the rate at which to discount future costs to 
present value can also be problematic. See OTA STRATEGJES, supra note 4, at 41; K. 
WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 93-95; Pliskin & Taylor, General Principles: Cost-
Benefit and Decision Analysis, in COSTS, RISKS, AND BENEFITS OF SURGERY, supra note 35, 
at 8-9; Klarman, supra note 53, at 227-28. A high discount rate favors technologies with 
present benefits and with costs accruing in the distant future, while a lower rate favors tech-
nologies, such as preventive vaccination programs, that have present costs but future benefits. 
SeeK. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note 1, at 154; Klarman, supra note 53, at 227-28; OTA 
STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 41; Kristein, supra note 47, at 215. To some extent, these 
valuation problems are amenable to conventions, such as assuming a particular interest rate 
for purposes of discounting; as long as they are applied consistently, such practices permit 
comparisons between multiple technologies. This assumes, however, that the data for each 
technology will be comparable in quality and quantity; if this is not true, both the reliability 
and the validity of the assessment results may be compromised. 
212. The benefits of a technology include direct benefits, which are tangible costs that the 
technology averts (for example, the costs of future hospitalization that will not be necessary); 
indirect benefits (for example, future earnings made possible by restored health); and intangi-
ble benefits or nontransferable satisfactions (for example, additional years oflife or days with-
out pain). See Klarman, supra note 53, at 229-33. Both measurement and valuations 
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Cosi-benefit analysis213 includes all of the steps involved in cost-
effectiveness analysis, and thus is faced with many si1nilar 
prob]ems.214 However, cost-benefit analysis also requires that the 
value of all benefits-direct, indirect and intangible-be converted 
to common units, often expressed in monetary terms. 215 This cre-
ates particularly difficult problems in the valuation of intangible 
benefits.216 
Intangible benefits must be included in the cost-benefit calcula-
tion, for in their absence, the assessment is more likely to conclude, 
incorrectly, that a technology is wasteful. However, it is difficult, if 
not impossible/ 17 to value intangible benefits in a manner that al-
lows various health care benefits and alternate expenditures to be 
compared. 218 
problems arise when comparing the benefits from different types of technologies (diagnostic, 
preventive, palliative, curative). See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 35. The most intractable of 
these problems, however, is the valuation of intangible benefits. See infra notes 216-229 and 
accompanying text. 
213. Cost-benefit analysis, in the simplest sense in wPJch some effort is made to associate 
costs with benefits, has been conducted for many years. It was employed by Richard Petty, a 
well-known English physician, in the 17th century, seeK. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, 
at 50, and in France in the ! 9th century, when Dupuit analyzed the costs and benefits of 
alternate public works projects. See Dupuit, On the Measltrement of the Utility of Public 
Works, in 12 READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 255 (K. A.srow & T Scitovslcy, eds. 1969). 
In the United States, Shattuck argued that the monetary benefits of sanitary reforms in 19th 
century Boston outweighed their costs; and a provision requiring the Army Corps of Engi-
neers to employ cost-benefit analysis for proposed river projects was incorporated in the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1902. SeeK. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 50-51. 
214. Cf K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 59-113. 
215. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; Pliskin & Taylor, supra note 211, at 5. 
216. Intangible benefits include relief from pain, restored mobility and freedom from anx-
iety of disease. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 321; Hess, Cost/Benefit Analysis-Another 
Dimension, 16 MED. INSTRUMENTATION 76, 76 (1982). Hess would include anxiety from 
loss of income as we!! as legal, ethical, social and moral considerations among intangible 
benefits. In this discussion, the term "intangible benefits" is used to refer to the types of 
benefits enumerated above because that is the standard term in the health economics litera-
ture. From a legal standpoint, a more accurate term to describe these benefits is "nontrans-
ferable satisfactions," since the legal term "intangibles" refers to transferable items such as 
the goodwill of a business, while in cost-benefit analysis, the term is reserved for benefits such 
as years of life that cannot be hought or sold. My thanks to Ronald Coffey for pointing out 
this distinction. 
217. See Neuhauser, supra note 54, at 34 (life is not so much "priceless" as 
"unpriceable"). 
218. Contrary to Klarman ("[t)he dilemmas of valuation can be escaped by retreating 
from C-B [cost-benefit) analysis to C-E [cost-effectiveness) analysis"), supra note 53, at 227; 
Warner and Luce ("[t)he reason for a nonmonetary measure of program effectiveness is either 
the impossibility or undesireability of valuing important outcomes in dollars and cents"), 
supra note I, at 48; and Evans (in contrast to cost-effectiveness, which "preserves a sense" of 
intangible benefits, cost-benefit analysis "typically notes these but fails to assess them"), supra 
note 50, at 2209, the problem is not solved by only performing the type of cost-benefit analy-
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Proponents of cost-benefit analysis suggest several methods for 
valuing intangibles. The "human capital" approach measures intan-
gible benefit as the present value of the future income stream made 
possible by providing the technology.219 If a technology increased 
by ten years the lifespan of a patient who earns $50,000 a year, the 
value of the intangible benefit of the additional years of life would 
be $500,000 discounted to present value. The flaw in this approach 
is its basic assumption that the value of the intangible benefit is a 
function of wealth or increased earning capacity; that a young, 
white male, by virtue of having. the greatest expected future earn-
ings, would benefit more from an additional year of life than anyone 
else.220 
sis that converts different health benefits into common units other than dollars, such as 
QAL Y's. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Even under a QAL Y approach, the 
difficult problem of comparing the utility of different health outcomes, or of the same out-
come in different populations must still be addressed. Is a year of life worth the same as five 
years without pain? Is an extra year oflife for an 85-year-old worth the same as an extra year 
of life for a 25-year-old? Is the value of an average gain of an extra year of life worth the 
same if it is one year of life for an entire patient population, or five extra years of life for only 
20% of the patients? See Klarman, supra note 53, at 235. Cf. Veatch, supra note 73, at 149-
52 (objecting to the assumption that benefits can be summed over a number of individuals 
and then divided by their number). 
Further questions arise when patients must compete for the same scarce technology. As-
suming that the benefit from the technology is one additional year of life, and that the value 
of an additional year of life is the same for two patients-which may not be true because of 
differing interpersonal utilities, cf. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a 
Theory of Rational Choice: The Richard T. Ely Lecture, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 1, 7-8 (I 984)-
does the Joss of the extra year of life to one patient cancel out the benefit of the extra year to 
the other, so that the net benefit of the technology is zero and it is therefore wasteful? See 
also Green, Should Technology Assessment Guide Public Policy?, 69 A.B.A. J. 930 (I 983) (the 
benefit of a superhighway to the automobile owner may be the detriment of a spoiled view to 
the nature seeker). Cf Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (plaintiff in need of 
potentially lifesaving bone marrow transplant not entitled to breach confidential hospital-
patient relationship to have identity of unrelated potential donor revealed to court or counsel 
so that donor can be contacted with specifics of plaintiff's need when donor has indicated 
willingness to donate only to relatives). 
The problem of different interpersonal utilities would also affect allocation of scarce tech-
nologies based on safety and effectiveness. For example, if a technology were provided to 
patient A rather than to patient B, on the ground that patient A would gain five years of extra 
life while patient B would only gain one, an assumption is being made that five years of life to 
patient A is worth more than one year oflife to patient B. In view of the problem of verifying 
this assumption, a better result would be to provide technologies to all patients who would 
derive net benefit from them, but this may not be palatable in an era of cost containment and 
may not be possible in cases of absolute scarcity, where the availability of the technology is 
constrained by factors other than cost, such as technical obstacles to mass production. 
219. See Weinstein, supra note 47, at 321-22; Hellinger, supra note 58, at 208; K. 
WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note 1, at 88. This approach either treats intangible benefits the 
same as indirect benefits or counts indirect benefits twice, once to measure indirect benefits 
and a second time to measure intangible benefits. See supra note 212. 
220. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 88. The famous heart surgeon 
830 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:778 
Another method for valui.ng intangible benefits suggested by 
cost-benefit analysts, the "willingness-to-pay" approach, equates the 
value of the intangible benefit with the amount one would be willing 
to pay for it. For example, if a 30-year-old person were willing to 
pay $10,000 to avoid a heart attack at age 40, then the discounted 
present value of the intangible benefits to be expected at age 40 and 
beyond (additional years of life, mobility, avoidance of pain, etc.) 
would be $10,000. One method for determining this discounted 
present value is by survey; people simpiy are asked how much they 
would be willing to pay.221 This has certain advantages over at-
tempts to value intangible benefits to unidentified individuals by 
other means, such as by taking an average of jury awards in wrong-
ful death actions. 222 lBy asldng people directly how much they 
would pay for certain benefits, the problem of having to guess \Vhat 
they would pay-and the resulting risk that A's estimate of the 
value to B will be different than B's because of differences m 
interpersonal utility223 or differences in perspective224-can be 
Debalcey fell into this trap (or embraced the notion of equating wealth with entitlement to 
health care) in the following argument on behalf of expensive technologies: "If the cost of an 
operation is $15,000, and the patient resumes employment at $30,000 per year, in about six 
months he will have contributed the cost of his operation in social productivity, and thereaf-
ter he will continue to contribute other resources instead of withdrawing from them." 
Debakey, supra note 73, at 10 (1983). 
221. The originator of the survey approach, Acton, asked respondents hypothetically 
how much they would be willing to pay to avoid a specified risk of a future heart attack. See 
Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend To Save a Life, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY 
DILEMMAS 292 (S. Rhoads ed. 1980). 
222. The jury valuation method fails to consider interpersonal differences in utility. Fur-
thermore, awards may well reflect the jury's estimate of the value of the decedent's life to 
survivors rather than its value to the decedent himself. Moreover, the jury's award may not 
accurately reflect what the decedent or anyone else would in fact have paid in order to pre-
vent the death, which is arguably an element, if not the key element, of the intangible value of 
the decedent's life under a willingness-to-pay approach. 
223. See Schelling, supra note 21 S, at 7-8. 
224. The difference in interpersonal utility is only one type of difference in perspective. 
Perspective can refer not only to differences between individuals but to differences between 
groups of individuals and between individuals and organizations. See supra notes 69-70 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, while the difference in interpersonal utilities might be nar-
rowly interpreted to refer to the difference in the value to A of a benefit to A and the value to 
B of the same benefit to B, the difference in perspective also includes the difference between 
the value to A of the benefit to A and the value to B of the benefit to A. By obtaining values 
of benefits to individuals from those individuals, willingness-to-pay alleviates this perspective 
problem. The problem could also be alleviated by asking A how much B should pay to 
provide A with the additional years of life. If reciprocity is assumed (A must be willing to 
pay the same amount for additional years of life for B), this suggestion accords with the 
principal of universalization in moral philosophy. 
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avoided:Z25 
The survey approach is nevertheless prone to serious inaccura-
cies. Respondents tend not to take hypothetical questions seriously; 
are unable to discriminate between small differences in probabilities 
that often must be used in willingness-to-pay questions to make 
them realistic; and give answers that do not reveal their own minds 
so much as what they think will please the interviewer.226 Further-
more, since the wealthy can pay more for a benefit than the poor, 
the same problem arises as with the human capital approach:227 the 
wealthy would be likely to say they would be willing to pay more 
than the poor, and therefore would seem to place a greater value on 
intangible benefits than the poor. The result thus favors technolo-
gies for treating illnesses that disproportionately affect the 
wealthy.228 
One solution might be to set the value of a technology as the 
highest amount that anyone would be willing to pay for it and to 
compare that figure with costs in a cost-benefit analysis. But this is 
likely to generate a net benefit for almost any technology that is 
expected to yield any patient benefit. Another solution to at least 
some of the problems of asking hypothetical questions would be to 
calculate the value of intangible benefits from what people actually 
pay for technologies, but this too encounters problems of interper-
sonal differences in utility (How can the amount that one person 
pays be extrapolated to other individuals?) and in wealth (If a 
wealthy person pays twice as much as a poor person for the same 
benefit, does this mean the benefit is worth twice as much to the one 
than to the other?). Moreover, since health care for many individu-
als-including Medicare beneficiaries-is paid for in substantial 
part by third-party payors, how is the value of intangible benefits to 
these individuals to be calculated on the basis of what others (e.g., 
bureaucrats within the Health Care Finance Administration) are 
willing to pay? 
A further problem with the willingness-to-pay method of valu-
ing intangible benefits is that the value of these benefits for any indi-
vidual is likely to vary over time. 229 The value of an exira year of 
225. Inaccuracies resulting from differences in interpersonal utilities or perspective may 
recur, however, if the values derived from individual responses are averaged. 
226. See Fisher, Willingness to Pay for Probabilistic Improvements in Functional Health 
Status: A Psychological Perspective, in HEALTH: WHAT IS IT WORTH? 167, 185 (S. Mushkin 
& D. Dunlop eds. 1979); Hellinger, supra note 58, at 208. 
227. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
228. See K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 89-90. 
229. See Schelling, supra note 218. 
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life to one at age twenty five is likely to be different than to one at 
age eighty five. The value of a year without pain is likely to be 
different during the time one feels the pain than before or after. To 
be accurate, a willingness~to-pay system must somehow reflect these 
changing values, which entails both multiple (ideally constant) mea-
surement and a method of transforming the resulting value stream 
into a single value for the individual. 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING WASTE 
The foregoing problems with technology assessment are so for-
midable that its use seems fruitless_:_indeed wasteful-as a means to 
reduce technology waste and thereby control health care costs.230 
Nevertheless, some form of technology assessment is inevitable in 
health care decisionmaking. A physician's choice of a technology 
for a specific patient is based on at least an implid.t assessment of its 
relative safety and effectiveness compared to alternatives.Z31 Simi-
230. Green has stated that "[t]echnology assessment is a useful tool for public policy only 
if it is not taken too seriously." Green, supra note 219, at 933. Green argues that policy 
decisions should continue to be made by "ordinary political processes" which can better re· 
fleet what the public wants, rationally or irrationally. Id. Ruby, Banta and Burns concur 
that cost-effectiveness anaylsis in particular cannot in most cases be the dominant factor in 
decisionmaking because it ignores such nonquantifable factors as equity and ethics. See 
Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 150. Even the OTA admits that the value of cost· 
effectiveness analysis lies more in going through the exercise than in its numerical outcome. 
See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 60. The OT A's conception of the role of technology 
assessment resembles the function ·of an environmental impact statement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. I 1983). When 
required by that Act, a federal agency must prepare a public document identifying and evalu-
ating the environmental impacts of proposed action, and it must consider these impacts in 
determining whether or not to take the action. But it need not base its decision to go forward 
on the results of its analysis. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 
223 (1980). 
Necheles makes the important further observation that the utility of cost-benefit analysis 
is limited by its insensitivity: "[A]ny medical program that is ambiguous enough to require 
cost-benefit analysis is probably too ambiguous to be resolved by cost-benefit analysis." 
Necheles, Standards of Medical Care: How Does an Innovative Medical Procedure Become 
Accepted?, 10 LAW,MED. & HEALTH CARE 15, 17 (1982). 
231. The basis for the physicia.-1's assessment may be more the views of influential opinion 
leaders than a personal familiarity with the existing assessment data. See Greer, supra note 
39, at 134; Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1089. These opinion leaders may be resistant 
to new technologies, bringing them into conflict with ambitious innovators who see the new 
technologies as a means not only of improving patient outcomes but of furthering their own 
careers. See Greer, supra note 39, at 134; Fineberg and Hiatt Jist a number of factors that 
they regard as affecting the adoption of a new technology by practitioners, including the 
severity and urgency of the medical problem being addressed, whether any alternatives are 
available, financial advantages of employing the new technology, how compatible the new 
technology is with old technology, the prestige and visibility of its advocates, the manner in 
which information about the new technology is diffused, promotional efforts by manufactur-
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larly, patients presented with a set of alternative technologies as 
part of the informed consent process are required to assess the tech-
nologies in some sense as well. 232 A hospital's decision to purchase 
or to provide a new technology, a third-party payor's decision 
whether or not to reimburse for it, as well as a manufacturer's deci-
sion to develop it, are all based on some form of technology assess-
ment, however informal. In the words of one commentator, 
"[t]here is no question that we are doing and will continue to do 
technology assessments. The only question is how well. "233 
Nevertheless, not all types of technology assessment are equally 
worthwhile. Assessment is confounded by a number of difficult 
technical problems, such as how to select technologies for assess-
ment or how accurately to measure costs and benefits.234 Some of 
these problems are amenable to conventions or to techn.ical solu-
tions. For example, if the precise value of a cost variable is uncer-
tain, sensitivity analysis can reveal whether the range of results 
obtained from the range of likely values for the variable is too large 
to permit useful decisionmaking, in which case an increased effort 
can be made to derive a more precise value for the variable.235 Sim-
ers, legal forces, patient preferences, and the physician's attitude toward change. See 
Fineberg & Hiatt, supra note 30, at 1089. One point that is especially worth noting is that the 
scientific literature, where technology assessment results are published, is apparently not a 
very influential factor in physicians' decisions about new technologies. See Banta, supra note 
16, at 76-77; Greer, supra note 39, at 139. This results at least in part from the delay between 
the first dissemination of assessment results-usually through the press, trade journals or 
talks delivered at conferences-and formal publication. See Banta, supra, at 76-77. 
232. In the celebrated case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the 
court explained that a physician is bound to disclose to the patient "all risks potentially 
affecting the [patient's] decision ... 'whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.'" Jd. at 
787. Informed consent entails a presentation of the results of an assessment of the relative 
safety and effectiveness of the technology. Effectiveness enters into the court's discussion of 
"risks" because, in explaining the relative risks of alternatives to the patient, the physician 
must explain the risks of not undergoing the treatment, which include the potential lost bene-
fits from the technology. See id. at 788. 
233. Hearings on S. 2504, supra note 82, at 120 (testimony of David Eddy, M.D.). See 
also Eddy,. supra note 90, at 40. Fuchs especially disagrees with Green's position that tech-
nology assessment should defer to "soft" political decisionmaking: 
[E]very choice necessarily reflects a set of values. We do not, as the critics [of 
technology assessment] imply, have an option between evaluating and not evaluat-
ing. The only option is whether to evaluate explicitly, systematically, and openly, as 
CBA/CEA [cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis] forces us to do, or whether to 
evaluate implicitly, haphazardly, and secretly, as has been done so in the past. 
Fuchs, supra note 60, at 937. Accord K. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note I, at 61 (the 
alternative to attempting to quantify intangible costs and benefits is to have them valued 
"subjectively and implicitly"); Kristein, supra note 47, at 203-04 (advocating cost-benefit 
analysis as necessary where either no market exists or it produces undesirable results). 
234. See supra notes 80-82, 208-29, and accompanying text. 
235. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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ilarly, the choice of an appropriate discount rate might be settled by 
agreement. 236 
Beyond these kinds of problems, however, technology assess-
ment confronts two especially intractible perplexities: the problem 
of multiple perspectives in defining waste and the identification 
problem of valuing intangible benefits. 237 The problem of perspec-
tive cannot be solved by a technical improvement, at least not one 
that is presently foreseeable; instead, it remains a choice to be made 
between potentially inconsistent alternatives, such as the determina-
tion that a technology is wasteful despite its net patient benefit be-
cause it offers insufficient net benefit to a third-party payor, 
provider or society.238 Adopting a convention that technologies be 
assessed from a particular perspective would permit assessment out-
comes to be consistent with one another, but from other perspec-
tives perhaps consistently wrong. Similarly, the problem of valuing 
i..ntangibles239 may be resolved by some future technical break-
through, but it seems likely to remain a first order problem for some 
time. 
U there were types of technology assessment that offered the po-
tential of reducing waste without raising these t<.vin problems, it 
would seem advisable to predicate cost control efforts on these 
methods, presumably at the same time that the search continued for 
better solutions to the remaining assessment obstacles. Only if the 
savings resulting from the reduction in waste by these methods were 
insufficient would it be necessary to confront whether or not to take 
action against technologies that could be deemed wasteful on the 
basis of the less defensible types of assessments. 
Do any types of technology assessment minimize the problems 
of perspective and valuing intangibles, yet facilitate waste reduc-
236. See supra note 211. Since discount rates are presumed to fluctuate over time, the 
agreement would more properly be on a suitable reference point, such as the prime interest 
rate, rather than on an actual number. The choice of this reference point is not likely to be 
either obvious or without controversy, however. 
237. See supra notes 66-76, 216-29, and accompanying text. 
238. Here, too, a type of sensitivity analysis might be employed whereby the technology 
is assessed from different perspectives and the results compared to determine the marginal 
difference in net benefit. If the assessments show that the technology is likely to yield a large 
net benefit from the patient's perspective (such as five additional years of life), but from the 
perspective of a third-party payor such as Medicare, the cost is high compared to other tech-
nologies that produce the same health outcome, although perhaps in different patients, it 
might be possible to decide whether the marginal increase in value of the technology from the 
patient's perspective is or is not a wasteful result. 
239. See supra notes 216-29 and accompanying text. 
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tion? Suppose waste were defined as follows: a technology or the 
use of a technology 
(1) that does not provide net health benefit to the patient; 
(2) that provides less net health benefit another technology; 
(3) that produces no more net health benefit to the patient than 
another technology that costs less; or 
(4) that produces less net health benefit to the patient than an-
other technology at the same cost. 
Defined in this manner, wasteful technology could be identified by 
two types of technology assessment: safety and effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness assessment. 240 Safety and effectiveness assess-
ments would identify technologies that were wasteful under the first 
two criteria, while cost-effectiveness assessment would identify 
waste un.der the third and fourth. While economic cost would be a 
key factor in determining whether or not a technology is wasteful, 
the consideration of cost would be limited to whether the technol-
ogy affords the greatest amount of a given health benefit for the 
money. 
One advantage of this proposal is that a technology wasteful 
from a patient perspective would also be wasteful from any other 
standpoint.241 A technology unsafe from a patient standpoint, for 
example, is not safe from any other.242 Note that the reverse is not 
true for cost-effectiveness considerations. A technology that is not 
wasteful from a patient perspective nevertheless might be deemed 
wasteful from another perspective, such as that of a third-party 
payor; even though it was the most cost-effective method of achiev-
ing a desired health outcome for patients, it might not be the most 
cost-effective method of maximizing net revenue for the payor. 
Under the patient-oriented approach that is proposed, however, 
such a technology would not be regarded as wasteful. 
Another advantage of this approach is that there is no need to 
attempt objectively and quantitatively to value intangibles such as 
additional years of life or days without pain by converting them into 
common units; in each particular case, the health outcome from the 
patient perspective can be taken as the benefit endpoint. This is not 
to say that knotty valuation problems would be avoided under this 
limited concept of waste. For example, if there were two technolo-
240. See supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text. 
242. A technology that is unsafe for one patient might be safe for another. However, as 
between patients generally, as well as between other perspective levels within the health care 
system, an assessment of waste based on the suggested parameters would be consistent across 
all levels, and it is the conflict between levels that is at the heart of the perspective problem. 
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gies available to treat a disease, each providing different benefits and 
risks at different costs, it would be necessary to compare, hence 
value, different amounts of different "goods" and "bads." This is 
likely to be extremely complicated. However, it is not as compli-
cated as assessing technologies from different perspectives and at-
tempting to assign a value for intangible benefits. 243 
XV. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
Once waste is defined and wasteful technologies are identified, 
some method must be employed to eliminate them. A large part of 
this problem is outside the scope of t:l:lls discussion. The implemen-
tation of anti-waste policy is achieved by the health care delivery 
system, which is the one aspect of health care that is not encom-
passed within the tenn technology as it is being used herein. 244 But 
to understand the impact of the current prospective payment sys-
tem on technology, and the potential of this system for implement-
ing the approach to waste suggested in Section HI, it may be helpful 
to describe the main features of alternative 1nethods of controlling 
costs. 
A. Purely Private Decisiomnaking 
At one extreme, just as there are those who favor leaving the 
task of perforrnii!g technology assessment to the private sector, 245 
there might be those who favor no government role in effecting an 
anti-waste cost control policy. Instead, private decisionmakers, act-
ing rationally in the medical marketplace, would avoid wasteful 
243. The doctrine of informed consent suggests that the valuation of alternative technolo-
gies is to be made by the patient, whenever possible, and this valuation tends to take place in 
temporal proximity to when the technology is provided or withheld, thereby establishing the 
time as of which the patient's intrapersonal utility will be determined. See supra note 229 and 
accompanying text. This enables the patient in theory to select the technology that maxi-
mizes his or her own health outcome preferences by offering the best mix of goods and bads. 
For example, a patient can be offered a choice between a surgical treatment that promises to 
yield a certain number of additional years of life and days without pain, or a non-surgical 
treatment, such as diet and drug therapy, that offers fewer additional years of life or days 
without pain but with a lower risk of adverse effects. 
This theory is vulnerable to a number of objections, not the least of which is that patients 
cannot effectively exercise their freedom of choice because of a lack of knowledge and exper-
tise, and that they instead rely on physician's recommendations. But physicians' recommen-
dations and the decisions patients would make if they possessed adequate information and 
expertise are most likely to coincide if the perspective and valuation problems are approached 
as herein suggested. Note that these same issues of substitute decisionmaking arise in the case 
of incompetent patients. 
244. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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technology as part of their effort to maximize their own utility. A 
number of factors make this approach untenable, however. As 
noted above,246 government dominates the market for medical 
goods and services. Medicare accounts for forty percent of all hos-
pital revenues,247 while the largest single, private, third-party payor 
accounts only for between three and four percent.248 Unless gov-
ernment divested itself of its role as health care payor, which is un-
likely in view of its distributive function of insuring adequate health 
care for the poor and the elderly, it will continue to be a major 
factor in the market. It therefore bears repeating that the govern-
ment does not behave according to traditional, free-market 
principles. 249 
Even within the private segment of the health care market, clas-
sic market forces are likely to be inoperative. The effect of govern-
ment is powerful and pervasive even in areas it does not directly 
control; private third-party payors, for example, typically follow the 
government's lead in reimbursing for technology.250 Delivery of 
services is separated from payment, 251 and the payor is often not the 
recipient of the services.252 Prices often do not reflect true costs due 
to crdss-subsidization.253 Regulatory requirements create formida-
ble barriers to entry254 and there are widespread externalities; for 
the whole range of preventive technologies, for example, social util-
ity is arguably greater than utility to the individual patient.255 Serv-
ices are not fungible due to specialization among practitioners.256 
Perhaps most important, patients as consumers are ill-equipped to 
make rational choices because of their lack of skill and experi-
246. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
247. See Hearing On H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 4 (testimony of Health Insurance 
Association of America). 
248. See id. Antitrust Jaw prohibits private payors from combining their market power. 
In any event, it would take the combined market shares of all 325 members of the Health 
Insurers Association of America to match the market share of the federal government. See 
id. 
249. See id. 
250. See OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 9. 
251. See Weinstein, Economic Evaluation of .Medical Procedures and Technologies: Pro-
gress, Problems and Prospects, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 90, at 52. 
252. See OT A CoMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26. Not only is there a widespread sys-
tem of government and private health insurance so that patients do not pay the full cost of the 
services they receive, but physicians rather than the insurers still control 80% of the health 
dollars that are spent. See Sanders, supra note 118, at 27. 
253. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26. 
254. See id. 
255. See id. at 26-27. 
256. See Jd. 
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ence.257 In short, in a number of fundamental respects, there is no 
private medical market that alone can assume the task of control-
ling wasteful technology. zss 
B. Fostering Private Controls on Waste Through 
Government Programs 
Assuming some continued government role in health care, an 
effort might be made f(f create incentives within government pro-
grams for the operation of market forces to reduce wasteful technol-
ogy. This is arguably259 the principal path that is now being taken, 
spearheaded by the new Medicare prospective payment system.Z60 
Under this system, providers are paid a fixed amount per hospital 
admission, dependi.Iig on the patient's diagnosis. The diagnoses are 
classified according to a grouping system of 468 categories, known 
as diagnosis-related groups or "DRGs."261 The amount of reim-
bursement the hospital receives for a specific patient admission can 
be increased if the patient qualifies as either a day or cost "outlier." 
For day outliers the hospital will receive an amount greater than the 
basic reimbursement under the particular DRG if the patient stays 
in the hospital a prescribed number of days beyond the mean 
257. See Weinstein, supra note 251, at 52; OTA CoMPETITION, supra note 67, at 26-27. 
258. See Bunker, supra note 19, at 691; Goddeeris, supra note 68, at 57. Klarman argues 
that government involvement in health care is necessary not so much because there is no 
functioning market but because it functions in "undesireable ways," such as by producing 
unjust results. Klarman, supra note 54, at 225. 
259. The qualification is interposed because the current system creates incentives to re-
gard as wasteful technologies that fall outside the limits of waste as proposed in this Article. 
See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text. 
260. A number of other efforts have been made in this same direction, such as encourag-
ing Medicaid programs to enroll patients in capitated health plans such as health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) under 42 U.S.C. § I396b (1982), 48 Fed. Reg. 54,013 (1983), 
and relaxing federal requirements for qualifYing HMOs under the Health Maintenance Or-
ganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982), which requires certain employers to offer HMOs to 
employees as an option in employer-provided health care plans. 
261. These in turn are based on the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Edition, 
Clinical Modification, known as "ICD-9-CM." For a general description of the DRG sys-
tem, see Dolenc & Doherty, DRGs: The Counterrevolution and Financing Health Care, HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 19; PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 15-17. Medicare's 
prospective payment sytem operates in all but four states: New Jersey, Maryland, New York 
and Massachusetts. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,397 (1985). These states have been granted 
waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1886(c) to operate their own cost control systems for Medicare 
reimbursement. New Jersey has employed its own version of a DRG system since 1978. 
Maryland has employed a revenue control system in which hospitals are reimbursed on the 
basis of DRGs, but with the reimbursement level adjusted to reflect the hospital's annual 
deviation from a base year amount. See id. at 73; K. WARNER & B. LucE supra note I, at 33-
34. For a description of the Massachusetts system, see Kinzer, Massachusetts and Califor-
nia-Two Kinds of Hospital Cost Control, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 838 (1983). 
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length-of-stay for patients with the same diagnosis. 262 For cost out-
liers the hospital will be paid more than the basic DRG rate if the 
cost of caring for the patient exceeds a fixed dollar amount or a 
fixed multiple of the normal DRG rate for that patient.263 These 
provisions, however, offer only limited relief from the cost contain-
ment pressures of the prospective payment system. Not only is re-
imbursement lower than the extra costs hospitals incur for day or 
cost outliers, but the Medicare law itself sets a relatively low limit 
on the percentage of discharges that can qualify for outlier status 
within the entire system. 264 
The essential feature of the prospective payment system is that 
net revenue to providers is inversely proportional to the amount of 
262. For fiscal year 1986, in order to qualifY as a day outlier, the patient must remain in 
the hospital the lesser of 17 days or 1.94 standard deviations beyond the mean length-of-stay 
for the applicable DRG. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,709 (1985). A hospital is paid 60% of the 
average per diem payment under the applicable DRG for each day the patient stays in the 
hospital beyond a threshold number of days, which varies from one DRG to another. 42 
C.P.R. § 412.82 (1985). For example, a patient who is assigned to DRG 33 (concussion, age 
0-17), qualifies for day outlier status once he remains in the hospital 17 days beyond the mean 
length~of-stay for DRG 33, which is 1.6 days, if that is less than 1.94 standard deviations. 
See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,722 (1985). The hospital is then reimbursed an additional 
amount beyond the standard amount of reimbursement for DRG 33 to reflect the long stay. 
This additional amount is 60% of the average per diem payment under DRG 33, and it is 
paid for each day the patient is hospitalized beyond the specific threshold for DRG 33, which 
is 5 days. I d. Thus, in the case of a patient whose condition is diagnosed as DRG 33 and 
who stays in the hospital 20 days, the hospital is paid not only the basic amount of reimburse-
ment under DRG 33, but 60% of the average per diem amount of that reimbursement for 
days 6 through 20. Clearly the system is designed to discourage hospitals from retaining 
patients rather than discharging them; not only does the hospital typically have to absorb 
100% of the costs of care for the extra days of stay between the mean length-of-stay under the 
DRG and the DRG threshold (days 1.7 through 5 in the case of DRG 33), but it is only 
reimbursed 60% of the average per diem DRG rate for the additional qualifying days of stay. 
263. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a)(ii) (1985). For fiscal year 1986, the extra cost must ex-
ceed either $13,500 or 2.0 times the DRG rate to qualify as a cost outlier. See 50 Fed. Reg. 
35,646, 35,709 (J 985). If either of these thresholds is exceeded, the provider will be reim-
bursed an extra amount, but only 60% of the adjusted cost (72% of the billed charges) of the 
covered services it has provided beyond the base DRG amount. See 42 C.P.R. § 412.84 
(1985). Thus, as in the case of day outliers, supra note 263, the outlier system is designed to 
discourage provision of services the costs of which exceed the base rates. Note that a patient 
may qualify as a cost outlier if he does not qualify as a day outlier. Note further that addi-
tional payment for day outliers is mandated by the Medicare law, while extra reimbursement 
for cost outliers is up to the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Cam-
pare 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (1983 & Supp. I 1984) with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(ii), (iii). 
264. By statute, outliers may not account for less than 5% nor more than 6% of the total 
projected annual payments to providers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(iv) (1983 & Supp. 
I 1984). For fiscal year 1986, the limit is set at 5%. See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,709. In 
contrast, the New Jersey prospective payment system permits up to 30% of patients to qual-
ify for outlier status. See Dolenc & Dougherty, supra note 261, at 20. 
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resources expended per patient. J[n other words, except for the rela-
tively rare cases that qualify for outlier payments, 265 providers are 
reimbursed a set amount regardless of the cost of the care they pro-
vide. J[f they expend more per patient than they are reimbursed, 
they must absorb the difference as a loss. Conversely, if they ex-
pend less per patient than they are reimbursed, they retain the dif-
ference as net revenue or profit. The prospective payment system is 
thus the antithesis of the previous fee-for-service system under 
which providers were reimbursed in direct proportion to their 
charges per patient. 266 
The incentives created by the prospective payment system will 
affect not only provider behavior, but the behavior of manufacturers 
and others who develop new technologies. Providers will channel 
their technology acquisitions toward technologies that minimize 
costs; this in tum will encourage developers to concentrate their 
research and development on those types of technologies. 
On the other hand, the process of technology development to 
some extent is insulated from market pressures. Technological inno-
vation is a complex process, characterized by a number of stages: 
basic research, applied research, prototype development, product 
development, introduction, and diffusion. 267 tiasic research is 
largely independent of any specific technology objective, and there-
fore not heavily influenced by the economic and regulatory pres-
sures that may eventually affect the resulting technology.268 
Furthermore, innovators include entities that are relatively insensi-
tive to market forces, in particular academicians and health care 
professionals such as physicians and surgeons. 269 Even commercial 
manufacturers may develop technologies for prestige or to gain en-
try to a market rather than strictly in response to cost-control pres-
sures transmitted through their customers. Accordingly, the 
problem of wasteful technology is unlikely to be solved solely by the 
response of technology development to direct financial pressures on 
providers. 
265. See supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
267. See Eden, The Engineering-Industrial Accord: Inventing the Technology of Health 
Care, in MACHiNE AT THE BEDSIDE, supra note 10, at 58; see aiso supra note 84 and accom-
panying text. 
268. Cf supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
269. See OTA STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 152 app. D; Eden, supra note 267, at 57. 
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C. Coverage System 
The Medicare prospective payment system creates a certain set 
of financial incentives on providers. These incentives are intended to 
encourage providers to take a more cost-conscious attitude toward 
technology. An alternative to such an incentive system is a "cover-
age" system, in which the government or other third-party payor 
specifies w4ich technologies it will reimburse providers for. 270 
Under a pure prospective payment system, the provider is reim-
bursed up to a set amount regardless of the technologies it provides 
to a patient.271 The choice of which technologies to provide is not 
dictated by the third-party payor. Under a coverage system, the 
payor oruy pays for selected technologies. The provider is free to 
provide a noncovered technology to a beneficiary, but must either 
obtain pay:J;llent from the patient or some other source, or must ab-
sorb the cost itself. 272 
A prospective payment system might be combined with a cover-
age system. Providers and beneficiaries would be reimbursed a set 
amount under the DRG system, but only for certain technologies. 
This is nominally the case with Medicare; as mentioned earlier/73 
the government does impose a type of coverage system on providers 
under Part A of Medicare. 
Theoretically, however, the prospective payment system obvi-
ates the need for a coverage system, at least beyond one that merely 
provided assessment information to providers to aid them in identi-
270. Similarly, the government, and other third-party payors following suit, might reim-
burse providers in proportion to the net benefit provided by the technology furnished. See 
Banta & Behney, supra note 86, at 50; Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 504-05 
(testimony of the American Association of Retired Persons); Neuhauser, supra note 55, at 37. 
In other words, a provider would be paid more for employing a more cost-effective technol-
ogy than for a less cost-effective one. Implementing such a system would involve a complex 
set of rates, based on a sophisticated body of technology assessment data. 
271. The same is true under a capitated system such as a health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO), but an HMO has incentives to provide different technologies to patients than, 
for example, a non-HMO hospital. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. 
272. If the provider furnishes a Medicare beneficiary with a technology that the provider 
knows or has reason to know is not covered, the provider must absorb the cost, unless· the 
beneficiary also knew or should have known that the technology was not covered-such as if 
the provider informed the beneficiary that the technology was not a covered item according 
to Medicare coverage policy, or that the contractor has previously refused to pay for the same 
technology in similar circumstances-in which case the provider may charge the beneficiary 
for the noncovered care. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395pp(b)-(c). If neither the provider nor the 
beneficiary knew or had reason to know that the technology was not covered, Medicare will 
pay for the technology even though it is not covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a). Although it 
remains the law, such a technology-based payment system no longer seems highly relevant to 
the Medicare prospective payment system. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text. 
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fying waste.274 Since under prospective payment, providers have an 
economic incentive to withhold wasteful technologies from patients, 
it is unnecessary for the government to impose additional restric-
tions on which technologies will be reimbursed. To the extent that 
the government believes that providers are overspending on patients 
in a particular DRG, the government can simply lower the amount 
it pays for care within that DRG, leaving it up to providers to deter-
mine which technologies to eliminate. Thus, with the advent of the 
prospective payment system, the coverage system's role under 
Medicare Part A will likely diminish.275 
274. I am grateful to James Blumstein, Timothy Jost and Theodore Marmor for this 
observation. 
275. ·Through its Peer Review Organization procedures, see infra notes 375-84 and ac-
companying text, Medicare can refuse to pay for a specific portion of a DRG charge that is 
attributable to a technology not covered by Medicare. See HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMIN-
ISTRATION, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION MANUAL 59 (1985). Aside from the arguable 
redundance of this approach, given the cost-cutting incentives of the prospective payment 
system, surveillance of the specific technologies furnished patients by providers is hampered 
by the Medicare reporting system. Medicare claim forms require only limited information 
about the specific treatment provided to patients; the thrust of the form is to provide diagnos-
tic information for verification of the patient's DRG assignment. 
The principal and up to four secondary diagnoses are required to be disclosed on the 
claims form, along with the principal and two other "procedures." But the term "proce-
dures" is limited to surgical interventions, broadly defined to include "incision, excision, am-
putation, introduction, repair, destructions, endoscopy, suture, and manipulation." HEALTH 
CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE INTERMEDIARY MANUAL § 3670 (1985) 
Accordingly, information about nonsurgical and secondary surgical technologies would only 
appear on the patient's actual medical record, which is not routinely subnritted to contractors 
as part of the claims procedure. Interview with Barbara DeCaeser, R.N., Professional Rela-
tions, University Hospitals, Cleveland, Ohio; Ruby, Banta & Burns, supra note 133, at 145-
48; Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Finance Administration, Medi-
care Program: Chimges to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal 
Year 1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,369 (1985). 
The medical record is reviewed by the PRO in certain cases, such as in a random sample 
of a percentage of all claims, and in 50% of all claims for outlier payments. Requiring PRO's 
or contractors to review all medical records, or requiring a much greater amount of detail on 
claims forms, might facilitate a stronger coverage policy, but would substantially increase 
administrative burdens and costs. Indeed, HCFA seems to be moving in the opposite direc-
tion. It recently authorized PRO's to reduce the percentage of outlier cases reviewed from 
100% to 50%. See 50 Fed. Reg. 35,673 (1985). One method that Medicare uses to detect 
specific technologies under its combined coverage-prospective payment system is to assign 
specific DRGs for specific technologies; for example, DRG 355 is a non-radical hysterectomy 
(age less than 70). See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,414 (1985). Only some technologies are treated this 
way, since making reimbursement contingent on the technology provided to the beneficiary 
deviates from the general diagnosis-based approach of the DRG system. A payment system 
entirely based on technologies would resemble a rate-setting system rather than a prospective 
payment system. 
Coverage systems continue to be important for private third-party payors such as Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, see Hellinger, supra note 58, at 38, and commercial insurers, see, e.g., 
Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ga. 1983) that have not yet adopted a 
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D. Restrictions on Acquisition of Technology 
Reimbursement and coverage programs attempt to restrict 
waste by discouraging the use of certain technologies, either those 
that the provider chooses not to furnish patients under a reimburse-
ment system, or those that a third-party payor decides should not 
be reimbursed for as a matter of coverage policy. An alternative to 
restricting the use of technologies is· restricting their acquisition by 
providers. One approach is to require government approval before 
a technology can be purchased by a provider. This is generally the 
approach taken by certificate-of-need (CON) laws.276 While the 
CON program appears to have reduced the growth in the number 
of hospital beds, however, it does not appear substantially to have 
reduced the acquisition of new technology by providers.277 The in-
effectiveness of the CON program may be attributable to the tech-
nological imperative278 and to the fact that the program is run by 
those local interests most likely to benefit from the acquisition of 
new technology.279 
prospective payment or capitated reimbursement system. In the case of private third-party 
payors, the scope of coverage is defined by the contract of insurance between the payor and 
the beneficiary. Under Medicare, coverage is dictated by statute and administrative interpre-
tation. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text. In the past, competitive pressures 
have made commercial insurers reluctant to deny coverage unless the technology was explic-
itly excluded by the terms of the contract. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 37. Current cost 
control objectives may reverse this tendency. Medicare coverage policy also remains a criti-
cal cost containment tool under Part B of Medicare, since Medicare physician payments 
continue to be made under the old fee-for-service system. 
276. Pursuant to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 
42 U.S.C. 300(k)-(m), the Certificate-of-Need (CON) program is run by the states as a prereq-
uisite to receipt of federal health resource development funds. Although certain details vary 
from state to state, most purchases of major medical equipment or changes in the number of 
hospital beds must be approved by a state Health Planning and Development Agency, acting 
upon the recommendations of the local or area wide Health Systems Agency. 
277. Despite the decrease in the growth rate of hospital beds, there has been an increase 
in the ratio of capital equipment to beds. See Salkever & Bice, Hospital Cetrificate-of-Need 
Controls: Impact on Investment. Costs and Use (1979), cited inK. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra 
note I, at 41 n.lO. One example of the inability of the CON laws to curb technology is the 
acquisition ofCT scanners in Dade County, Florida. See Iglehart, supra note 15, at 32-33. In 
1974, the Health Systems Agency recommended a total of three CT scanners for the area. By 
1977, however, there were seven, including one in an ambulatory care center and one in a 
physician's office-both outside the jurisdiction of the CON laws. I d. For a general critique 
of the CON program, see OT A STRATAGIES, supra note 4, at 161; Maloney & Rogers, supra 
note 2, at 1415. 
278. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
279. See Cohen, Information Needs in the Public Sector, in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 90, at 19 (CON program fails because "[L]ocal people who get the benefit from 
any capital project, including new technology, decide whether they should have access to it. 
Their decision that they 'need' it triggers an unlimited flow of dollars into that area to pay for 
the costs .... We have a nonoperative constraint due to circularity."). 
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Another approach to restricting the acquisition, rather than the 
use, of technology is to limit the amount of capital expenditures by 
providers. Kn contrast to the CON program, a capital expenditure 
restraint limits how much providers may spend, but not what they 
may purchase. Capital expenditures can be limited either directly 
by the enactment of a legal ceiling, or indirectly through a reim-
bursement system. For example, Congress has mandated that be-
ginning in 1986, Medicare--which currently fully reimburses 
providers for capital expenditures on behalf of Medicare patients280 
-:-:-must instead restrict capital reimbursement to a percentage of ac-
tual provider expenditures.28 I If the reimbursement rate for capital 
expenditures is low enough and the proportion of Medicare bene1i-
ciaries out of a provider's total patient population remains high 
enough, this could be a significant deterrent to technology 
acquisition. 
However, it is not clear that the Medicare capita] expenditure 
limitation will operate to reduce costs at least not beyond the short 
run; such limits tend to discourage providers from acquiring tech-
nologies with high initial capital costs even though the technology 
would be likely to reduce future capital or operating costs. 282 
IV.iloreover, providers might purchase wasteful technologies with low 
initial acquisition costs even if the technology were not likely to be 
the most cost-effective technology later on. 
E. Di;fusion Controls 
A more direct method of implementing controls on waste is to 
prevent wasteful technology from being disseminated in the first 
place. Kn the case of drugs and medical devices, this is the system 
imposed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 283 
Before a new drug or device may be introduced! into interstate com-
merce, the manufacturer must persuade the Food and Drug Admin-
280. Providers are reimbursed for capital expenditures on what is called a straight pass-
through basis; reimbursement is determined by the proportion of the provider's capital ex-
penditures that corresponds to the proportion of their patients who are Medicare benefi-
ciaries. The same system operates under Medicaid. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL, Part l, § 2200.1 (1985); OTA 
MEDICARE, supra note 2, at 102-04 (1984). 
281. Capital expenditure restrictions have been advocated as a means of controlling 
health care costs. See Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 504 (testimony of American 
Association of Retired Persons); Whitted, Jlfedical Technology Diffusion and its Effect on the 
Modern Hospital, 6 HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV. 45, 52 (1981). 
282. See Whitted, supra note 281, at 52. 
283. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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istration (FDA) that it is safe and effective.284 But the system of 
controls on drugs and devices is incomplete. For example, the 
FDA cannot control the use of drugs and devices once they are 
approved.285 Furthermore, the FDA has generally interpreted its 
statutory mandate to preclude a comparison of the safety or effec-
tiveness of one product with another, 286 or any consideration of 
cost.287 Any attempt to expand the scope of the agency's authority 
ill these directions would probably encounter fatal opposition from 
drug and device manufacturers. 288 
. Furthermore, the FDA has no direct jurisdiction over surgical 
and_ medical technologies. 289 As mentioned above,290 there are diffi-
culties in identifying wasteful surgical and medical technologies, 
and even if they could be identified, it would be even more difficult 
to control their use. 291 This would entail a monitoring system that 
would detect 3.!1d penalize unapproved changes in non-marketed 
technologies that are provided in the relative privacy of the doctor's 
office or the operating room. The administrative costs of an effec-
tive SlJrveillance system, even if one could be designed, are likely to 
outweigh any reductions in waste that would be achieved. 
As an alternative to controlling the dissemination of new tech-
284. Far more new technologies would be diffused if the government were required to 
show that a new technology was not safe and effective in order to prevent its being marketed. 
Waste control, in the sense of protecting the public from unsafe and ineffective technologies, 
would thus be sacrificed in favor of promoting innovation. This is essentially the system that 
is imposed on food additives under the Act. Cf 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(S) (definition of food 
additive). 
285. See Hellinger, supra note 58, at 36. The FDA can only control the use of drugs and 
devices after they are approved for marketing through their labelling, which the agency re-
views and approves. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6). If a manufacturer wishes to promote an approved 
drug for a purpose not set forth in the approved labelling, it must obtain the FDA's approval 
for a change in the labelling. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3). While a physician is not liable under 
the Act for using or prescribing a drug or device in a manner not provided for in the labelling, 
doing so risks malpractice liability. See, e.g., Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 
181 N.W.2d 882 (1970). 
286. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
287. See Gewecke & Weisbrod, Clinical Evaluation vs. Economic Evaluation: The Case of 
a New Drug, 20 MEo. CARE 821 (1982); K. WARNER & B. LUCE, supra note I, at 198. 
288. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of the National 
Center for Health Care Technology). For a model and critique of such an expanded role for 
the FDA, see OTA lMPLICA TIONS, supra note 73, at 92-98. See also K. WARNER & B. LUCE, 
supra note I, at 200 (objecting to discouraging innovation by requiring manufacturers to 
submit expensive cost-effectiveness data to the FDA). 
289. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. 
291. For a proposal to do so, see Note, supra note Ill, at 560 n.53. Requiring prior 
approval of surgical and medical technologies involves such problems as distinguishing be-
tween old and new technologies to determine which require approval. See id. at 568, n.80. 
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nologies to reduce waste, the government might instead attempt to 
control their development. A system that precluded the develop-
ment of wasteful technologies would alleviate later battles over their 
dissemination, reimbursement, or provision to patients. It would 
also save sponsors some research and development expenses and, by 
reducing uncertainty as to which technologies the government 
would later approve, perhaps reduce the cost of research-and-devel-
opment capital. 
Controls on development to an extent are embodied in the pres-
ent system: the FDA must give prior approval before a new drug or 
device may be shipped in interstate commerce for purposes of being 
tested in humans.292 If the agency does not believe that the pro-
posed tests could show that the technology is safe and effective, it 
can delay or prohibit the testing, thus arresting the technology prior 
to the sponsor's request for FDA permission to disseminate it for 
commercial use. 293 Conceivably the government might broaden the 
current system to embrace medical and surgical technologies as well 
as drugs and devices, and it might even institute a monitoring sys-
tem that required it to be notified of and approve in advance any 
animal or even laboratory testing of technologies for human use, 
thus pushing the government's go/no-go decision even farther 
back.294 Aside from the overwhelming practical difficulties and cost 
of instituting and enforcing such a system, however, the intrusion of 
the government at such an early stage of development, where the 
future risks, costs and benefits of the technology are so unpredict-
able, is likely to result in highly arbitrary restrictions on technology 
development that preclude nonwasteful technologies before their 
benefits can be established. 
F. Direct Control of Health Care 
The most extreme form of government control of waste would 
be for some agency to mandate detailed rules of medical practice as 
a prerequisite for reimbursement under any government health care 
program. These rules would specify the technologies to be used and 
the circumstances and manner in which they would be employed. 
292. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i). 
293. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(d)(6) (FDA denial of permission for investigation that is not 
reasonable to establish safety and effectiveness). 
294. Due to fear of the unknown, such an early warning system was in fact imposed, 
largely on a voluntary basis, on research on recombitant DNA technology. See Department 
of Health & Human Services, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,266 (1984). 
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This "protocol" approach has been severely criticised by organized 
medicine and others.295 As with the approach of requiring prior 
approval of technologies, it raises insuperable political policing 
problems. 
G. Shortcomings of the Current Approach 
The present prospective payment system rewards providers who 
reduce their technology costs per patient admission. This can be 
done in a number of ways. Providers can eliminate unsafe or inef-
fective technologies and can substitute cheaper, more cost-effective 
technologies for more expensive, less cost-effective ones. Thus far, 
providers would remain within the boundaries of the controls on 
waste proposed in Section III. But the system also penalizes prov-
iders who furnish technologies that increase their costs per admis-
sion, even if the technologies are safer or more effective than a 
cheaper alternative.296 In short, prospective payment is not neutral 
with regard to technology. 297 It creates a distinct incentive in favor 
295. See, e.g., Moloney & Rogers, supra note 2, at 1415 (protocol approach inappropriate 
because clinical circumstances cannot be adequately foreseen). This resistance partially ex-
plains why a system of national health insurance, with an attendant risk that the government 
would attempt to dictate medical practices to providers, has not been adopted in the United 
States. Cf Altman & Blendon, supra note 20, at 15 (national health insurance not a viable 
U.S. option for controlling costs in the foreseeable future). 
296. The exception might be providers such as health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) that furnish hospitalization and primary care, as well as being insurers of their sub-
scribers. They might be willing to incur a higher cost for one admission to avoid the need for 
or to reduce the cost of future care, assuming that the discounted value of the savings were 
greater than the present value of the additional current expenditure. Providers that are not 
also insurers would have no comparable incentive under prospective payment to provide 
more expensive present care to avoid future expenditures, since they would not have the same 
expectation as an HMO that the patient would return to the same provider or that the savings 
in care would be in the form of reduced expenditures for a future admission rather than, say, 
in the form of better general health status or reduced physician office visits. In short, the 
utility of the more expensive care would be an externality for the non-HMO provider under 
the present system. 
The only situation in which the non-HMO provider has an incentive to furnish more 
expensive care to reduce future costs for the same patient is when, in the absence of the more 
expensive care, the patient will end up being readmitted to the same hospital within a pre-
scribed time for the same diagnosis. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 47. This is 
deemed a premature discharge and readmission, and Medicare regulations prevent the pro-
vider from being paid an additional fee for the readmission. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.48. 
297. A number of commentators recognize that prospective payment only encourages a 
free market approach toward wasteful technologies to the extent the payment system is neu-
tral, providing neither positive nor negative incentive. See Moloney & Rogers, supra note 2, 
at 1416-17; Schroeder, supra note 82, at 638; PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,465. Propac 
states, for example, that "[t]he Medicare prospective payment system should have an unbi-
ased effect on technological advancement. Prospective payment levels should not inhibit the 
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of cost-reducing technologies and against cost-increasing ones.298 
Yet as suggested earlier, 299 a teclmology is not wasteful merely 
because it increases costs. Vvhether or not it is wasteful depends on 
the relationship between the increase in cost and the increase in 
benefit it produces, the relative costs and benefits of alternative tech-
nologies, and the perspective of the assessment. A technology is not 
necessary wasteful even from a societal perspective merely because 
it increases the cost per patient admission. 30° For example, under 
prospective payment, a hospital has no incentive to provide a tech-
nology that i1·1creases short run costs (i.e., costs per admission), even 
though it may significantly decrease the cost to patients, other prov-
iders, and society in the long run. 301 Thus, a hospital (other than 
one run by an HM0)302 has no incentive to provide a patient with a 
development or diffusion of new technologies and practices, nor should payment levels result 
in their inappropriate adoption." Jd. 
In a free market, a provider might increase the quality of its product, and its cost, and 
expect to recover the additional cost by charging a higher price. This is foreclosed by the set 
fee-per-admission aspect of prospective payment (unless the patient can be charged a pre-
mium above the third-party payment). The system can only respond to cost-increasing tech-
nologies by increasing the amount of payment for the relevant DRGs, by relaxing the rules 
for patients to qualify for outlier status, or by increasing DRG weights across-the-board to 
reflect technology cost increases-a so-called "update factor." 
To an extent, these adjustments are being made. For example, the Health Care Finance 
Administration (HCFA) adopted a 1.5% addition to the annual DRG update factor (known 
as the policy target adjustment factor) for 1986, stating: "Certain technological changes, espe-
cially those related to the adoption of new product (with accompanying labor and nonlabor 
inputs), increase the operating cost of treating illness but also improve health status commen-
surately. We believe the prospective payment rates should recognize new science and technol-
ogy factors, which are cost-increasing, but also enhance health status. This should provide 
positive incentives for continued technological and scientific excellence." HCFA, Medicare 
Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 
1986 Rates, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, 35,707 (1985). To place this 1.5% increase in perspective, 
the annual historical increase in health care costs attributable to the increased use of technol-
ogy or to the use of new technologies has been between 4% and 5%. See Anderson & Stein-
berg, supra note 13, at 182-83. 
298. See PROPAC 1985, supra note 1, at 24,465; HCFA, Medicare Program; Changes to 
the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1986 Rates; Proposed 
Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,443 (1985); OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 19. These 
incentives are also clear to providers. For example, one of the largest chains of for-profit 
hospitals in the country, Humana, reports that it is seeking technologies that "increase effi-
ciency, decrease costs, and are safe and efficacious." Hearing on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 
536 (testimony of Frank E. Samuel). 
299. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text. 
300. See PROPAC 1985, supra note I, at 24,465 (adjustment may be needed in prospec-
tive payment system to encourage adoption of technologies "more costly on a per admission 
basis but 'cost-effective' when considered from a broader health care system perspective over 
a longer period of time"). 
301. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13. at 184. 
302. See supra note 296. 
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more expensive but better quality prosthesis, even if it is more cost-
effective in the long run by having a longer useful life. 303 
The inherent bias of the prospective payment system leads to a 
more fundamental problem: it creates a conflict of interest between 
provider and patient by encouraging providers to withhold cast-in-
creasing technology from patients, thus placing the provider's own 
financial interests above the health interests of patients. 304 Since 
prospective payment under Medicare currently applies only to hos-
pital inpatient care and not to office care by physicians, 305 physi-
cians now have little direct financial incentive to side with the 
hospital, and therefore less of a conflict of interest with the pa-
303. See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 184. A similar case is the implantable 
infusion pump that administers chemotherapeutic agents automatically into patients with 
liver cancer. Although the cost-per-patient is $3,000, it may be more cost-effective than con-
ventional chemotherapy by avoiding the cost of repeated hospital admissions. See Hearing on 
H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 537 (testimony of Frank E. Samuel). Another consequence of 
prospective payment is to encourage providers to avoid admitting, or to transfer, more seri-
ously ill patients who are likely to require more care than others. One commentator describes 
as follows the analogous situation in Canada where physicians are paid a set fee per patient 
visit regardless of the care provided: "Being paid the same amount to do a vaccination as to 
treat a case of jaundice, the Canadian general practitioner vaccinates like crazy and refers 
jaundice to an internist, who refers the case to a gastroenterologist, who refers it to a liver 
specialist, who, having no one to refer it to, emigrates to the United States." Fisher, supra 
note 73, at 33 (1983). 
304. See, e.g., Moloney & Rogerssupro note 2, at 1418 (advocating rewarding providers 
for "technology restraint"). In an article in a hospital joum~l recommending that hospitals 
establish policies on technology in response to cost-containment pressures, for example, hos-
pitals are advised to "cost-out" a technology and to "assess its incremental effect on the 
profitability of services." Goodhart, Technological Acquisition Poses Thomy Dilemma to Hos-
pitals, 58 Hosr. 34, 38 (1984). The recommendations are silent on assessing the effect of 
technology on quality of care. 
It should be noted that, as pointed out by Capron and Brock, in this Symposium, the 
previous fee-for-service system also created a conflict of interest between patients and provid-
ers. Under the old system, however, it was in the provider's economic interest to provide 
more care than what might have been in a patient's interest, since the more care provided, the 
more the provider was paid. Under a prospective payment or capitated system, it is in the 
provider's economic interest to provide less care than might be in the patient's interest, in 
order to pocket the difference between the cost of the care furnished the patient and the 
amount of the prospective or capita ted payment. 
305. Outpatient care by hospitals is also covered under Part B, and therefore is also ex-
cluded from prospective payment coverage. See 42 U .S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(B) (scope of benefits 
under Medicare Part B includes "medical and other health services"); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395x(s)(2)(B) ("medical and other health services" defined to include outpatient services). 
Physicians continue to be reimbursed under Medicare on a "reasonable charge" basis, which 
is the lowest of several alternatives, including the physician's customary charge, the prevail-
ing charge in the locality, and the actual charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3); 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 405.501, 405.502. Physician reimbursement has been frozen at 1984 levels in order to 
control costs. See Emergency Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-107, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1985). 
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tient. 306 Nevertheless, hospitals are seeking ways to put pressure 
on physicians to be cost-conscious, such as monitoring physician 
practices to identify those prone to "overspend" on patients.307 
Furthermore, hospitals are devising more formal financial arrange-
ments with physicians to encourage them to act in the hospital's 
best interests. These include joint ventures, such as MeSH plans, 
the object of which is to have physicians share with hospitals the 
financial risks and benefits of providing hospital care to their 
patients. 308 
Consideration is also being given to extending prospective pay-
ment, or systems that create similar incentives/09 to physicians.310 
306. See Dunlop, supra note 73, at 44 (individual physicians, dealing with individual pa-
tients, caiJ.not be expected to consider costs of care). In addition to pressures directly stem-
ming from prospective payment systems, physicians and hospitals are prone to conflict in a 
number of areas. See Greer, supra note 39, at 137. In contrast to physicians who will opt for 
a closed staff at a hospital at which they have privileges to admit and tend to patients, for 
example, the hospital itself has an interest in maintaining "open staffs," thereby creating a 
larger number of physicians to form the hospital's patient-referral pool. See Spivey, The Rela-
tion Between Hospital Management and Medical Staff Under a Prospective-Payment System, 
310 NEw ENG. J. MEn. 984 (1984). Physicians and hospitals also compete with each other, 
such as by establishing outpatient care facilities. See id.; Reiman, Dealing with Conflicts of 
Tnterest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985). 
307. At present, the objective seems to be limited to confronting the doctor with his prof-
ligate behavior, and perhaps allowing him to be pressured by his peers into changing his 
practice habits, but Morreim speculates that hospitals may attempt to revoke admitting privi-
leges of those who are unrepentent or unable to reform. See Morreim, supra note 17, at 34. 
This could be a powerful threat to a physician, who owes an "economically essential alle-
giance to the hospital, without which he cannot adequately treat the most seriously ill pa-
tients." Id. at 32. Morreim notes that this tactic so far has not been tested in the courts. 
308. For a description of such arrangements, see id. at 34. Morreim attributes them to a 
desire to keep quality-of-care considerations within economic restraints, and suggests that the 
resulting conflict of interest between physicians and their patients can be avoided by requiring 
physicians to disclose to their patients the physician's financial interest in the provider. See id. 
For 2 critique of this approach, see infra note 334-37 and accompanying text. 
309. Physicians also have financial incentives to reduce patient care under capitation sys-
tems where the physician is paid a flat rate per patient for a set time period, such as one 
month or one year. This is the system under which health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) operate, and they can be expected to place physicians in the same conflicts of inter-
est with their patients as prospective payment, especially where the HMO is run by the physi-
cians so that they have a direct financial stake in it, or '.vhere the physician staff is 
remunerated in part in proportion to the income or profit of the organization. See Stern, Will 
the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract be Extended to Health 11-faintenance Organizations?, 
I! LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 12, 13 (1983): 
It is expected by the members that in the exercise of such judgment (as to which, if 
any, health care services are vital to the interest of the member at that time] by the 
physician/agent, the interest of the patient, rather than the costs to the HMO, is the 
paramount concern of the decision-maker. The plan, on the other hand, perceives 
that it has a concurrent duty to its overall membership [and possibly its investors] 
to preserve its resources by avoiding the provision of unnecessary and inappropriate 
services .... How can an interested director (of an HMO) who is also a provider 
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Unlike alternative methods of controlling the cost of physician care 
for Medicare patients, such as discounted service arrangements or 
government-imposed fee-for-service rates, 311 reimbursing physicians 
under a prospective payment system would create the same conflict-
of-interest between physician and patient as between hospital and 
patient under the present system.312 
The shortcoming of this result is all the more evident in light of 
the fiduciary duty traditionally imposed on physicians and hospitals 
in relations with their patients. 313 The fiduciary relationship tran-
adequately fulfill his or her dual obligation to both the company [and its investors] 
and to the HMO's enrollees he or she treats? 
310. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PAYMENT FOR PHYSICIAN SERV-
ICES: STRATEGIES FOR MEDICARE (1986). 
311. Physicians might refuse to accept Medicare patients if the government imposed flat 
fee-for-service rates, but increased competition between growing numbers of physicians 
should make corrective steps such as mandatory assignment unnecessary. 
312. Warner and Luce observe that the cost of care is irrelevant to physicians paid on a 
fee-for-s~rvice basis to treat well-insured patients, and a "curiosity" to salaried physicians 
who trea( the same type of patients, such as physicians on the staffs of a health maintenance 
organization. See K. WARNER & B. LucE, supra note 1, at 178-79: "Only if the physician 
works within the context of prepayment-that is, if he or she bears financial liability for the 
use of resources--does the professional concern with cost-effectiveness begin to approach the 
social concern." Jd. at 179. At that point, Warner and Luce observe, the physician is in a 
hopeless position: 
A physician's primary responsibility is to weigh all the costs and benefits of a 
procedure to the patient. If a particular test has a small probability of improving the 
diagnosis that could affect case management, the physician's responsibility to the 
patient is to compare that potential benefit with the cost to the patient-out-of-
pocket costs, time lost, pain, and so on .... From society's perspective, social costs 
may exceed social benefit; but asking the physician to adhere to the social standards 
of desirability requests him or her to deviate from the patient's best interests. In 
effect, the physician is placed in the untenable position of violating either the pa-
tient's or society's interests. 
Jd. (emphasis in original). 
313. Many cases have recognized the fiduciary relationship between physicians and their 
patients. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064; Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F.Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 
1965); State ex rei. McCloud v Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1978). Cases recognizing a 
fiduciary relationship between hospitals and their patients include Gopaul v. Herrick Memo-
rial Hasp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1005, 113 Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1974) and Grodjesk v. Jersey 
City Med. Center, 135 N.J. Super. 393, 413, 343 A.2d 489, 500 (1975). Hospitals are also 
held to have a fiduciary duty to the public to maintain competent staff; the issue arises in 
challenges by physicians to denials of staff privileges. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 
113,459 A.2d 680 (1983). In Nutty v. Jewish Hasp., 571 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ill. 1983), the 
only federal court that appears to have considered the issue stopped short of clearly recogniz-
ing a fiduciary relationship between a hospital and a patient-in Nutty, a patient complaining 
of malpractice on the part of hospital nursing staff and interns- on the ground that the 
physician-patient relationship differs from that of a nurse- or intern-patient relationship. 
Nutty, 571 F. Supp. at 1052-53. "While physicians clearly have a fiduciary relationship with 
their patients," the court stated, "the relationship between a hospital and a patient is more 
difficult to characterize." Jd. at 1052. Nevertheless, due to the "superiority of knowledge of 
the hospital staff, and the confidence and trust which patients must place in nurses and in-
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scends the ordinary duty to act reasonably toward another; it re-
quires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiary, and 
to avoid placing the fiduciary's interests above those of the benefici-
ary.314 Yet that is precisely the provider behavior that is en-
couraged by prospective payment systems. To draw an analogy 
with corporate directors, who owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders 
to maximize the value of shareholder equity in the corporation, it 
terns," id. at 1053, the court held that, as the result of assurances to the plaintiff by nurses 
and interns that his treatment was proper, the hospital was estopped from asserting that the 
statute of limitations had run on plaintiff's claim. !d. at 1054. Cf Tunkl v. Regents, 60 Cal. 
2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (voiding waiver of hospital liability for negli-
gence, inter alia, on basis of hospital's relationship to patient). Insurers have also been 
deemed by the courts to owe fiduciary duties to their policy-holders. See Silberg v. California 
Life Ins.' Co., 521 P.2d ll03, 1104, 113. Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (as fiduciary, insurer must act 
in "utmost good faith" and must afford the interests of the policy-holder "at least as much 
consideration as it gives to its own interest"); Stern, supra note 309, at 14. 
314. The fiduciary need not elevate the beneficiary's interests above all others, however. 
For example, despite owing a fiduciary duty to the patient, a physician may be liable if, in 
upholding the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship, he fails to disclose infor-
mation necessary to protect the health of third parties. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents, 551 P.2d 
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
Similar issues of fiduciary duty arise in the case of publicly held corporations, where the 
issue is whether the corporate directors may divert funds to philanthropic causes witho.ut 
violating their fiduciary duty to shareholders. Some courts have held the directors' action to 
be protected by the so-called "business judgment rule," on the ground that, although the 
value of shareholder equity thereby may have been reduced in the short term, the action was 
calculated to produce long-term maximization of equity value by enhancing the corporate 
image or the political and social climate in which the corporation does business. See e.g., 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173,237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 
13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed per curiam, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). Other courts 
have refused to permit diversion of corporate wealth under these circumstances. See, e.g., 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company; 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The issue is unsettled, 
with the America1l Law Institute ·and some state statutes adopting the view that philan-
thropic types of corporate activity do not violate fiduciary obligations of directors. See AMER-
ICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
REcoMMENDATIONS§ 2.01 (Tent. Draft No.2 1984); Pa. Bus. Corp. Law§ 408B, Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 15, § 1408B (Purdon Supp. 1984-85). This view may be justified insofar as disgrun-
tled shareholders can vote out a board of directors that takes action contrary to the share-
holders' interests, and insofar as the value of shares in states with pro-philanthropy statutes 
can be discounted appropriately, although this only benefits future investors. (I am indebted 
to Ronald Coffey for these observations.) 
One aspect of the law is clear, though: if a corporate fiduciary has a conflict of interest 
with shareholders, he is not protected by the business judgement rule and instead bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating that his action is inherently fair to shareholders. See, e.g., 
Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Iowa 1979); Karris v. Water 
Tower Trust & Sav. Bank, 389 N.E.2d 1359, 1369, 27 Ill. Dec. 951 (1979); Schreiber v. 
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978); Adelrnnan v. Conottie Corp., 213 S.E.2d 774, 779, 
215 Va. 782 (1975). For a general discussion of fiduciary law, see Anderson, Conflicts of 
!merest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Kaplan, 
Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976); 
Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949). 
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would be as if directors were compensated in proportion to the dim-
inution of the value of shareholders' equity that they achieved.315 
In line with the recent rise of the doctrine of informed consent, 
it might be argued that the fiduciary obligation of health care prov-
iders is merely a misguided relic of paternalism that should be dis-
carded under the new regime of patient autonomy. Patients are 
entitled to be treated as intelligent, choosing adults, rather than as 
incompetent~ for whom health care choices must be made by pro-
fessionals. A fiduciary relationship between patient and provider, it 
might be said, undermines the patient's independence and freedom 
of choice. 
TIPs argument fails for several reasons. First, a fiduciary obliga-
tion on health care providers requires them to act in thebest inter-
ests of the patient, not instead of or in derogation of the patient's 
wishes. Advocates of patient autonomy would no doubt insist that 
informed health care choices made by patients are in the patient's 
best interests. The provider's fiduciary duties would therefore re-
quire 'it to respect and facilitate this patient decisionmaking. Fur-
thermore, the fiduciary obligations on health care providers, like 
those on corporate and other fiduciaries, are not mere historical ar-
tifacts. These special duties are mandated by factors inherent in the 
circumstances that give rise to the fiduciary relationship. First, the 
fiduciary is necessarily invested with a substantial degree of discre-
tion,316 and must exercise it in a manner that precludes active su-
pervision by the beneficiary.317 Thus, corporate officers and 
directors must make day-to-day management decisions without 
consulting corporate shareholders. Similarly, due to the complex-
ity, variety and uncertainty of diseases and their treatment, it is not 
possible for patients and providers to agree in advance to all of the 
details of the treatments that will be provided. 318 The fiduciary ob-
315. In contrast to shareholders of a corporation who can vote out of office directors 
whose policies they reject, patients are often not in a position to replace their health care 
providers with others who might be more willing to provide better care. Even if patients 
possessed sufficient information to realize that they were being denied proper care, those in 
extremis would not have the time to shop around, and only the wealthy might be able to 
afford to pay extra to induce another provider to supply more care. In other respects, fur· 
thermore, patients are at a disadvantage in dealing with conflicts of interest on the part of 
hospitals and physicians compared to corporate shareholders; for example, patients lack an 
effective watchdog such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the elaborate sys-
tem of rules that govern corporate activity in the shareholders' interest. 
316. See Anderson, supra note 31 I, at 757 n.57; Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. 
TORONTO L.J. I (1975). 
317. See Anderson, supra note 311, at 757-61. 
3 I 8. The fiduciary relationship is the product of assent between the parties, here mani· 
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ligation on the provider mandates that he act in the patient's inter-
est in regard to the aspects of treatment that must be left up to 
provider discretion. 
Fiduciary obligations also derive from the inherent inability of 
the beneficiary to possess the knowledge and expertise of the fiduci-
ary. Physicians and other health care professionals have undergone 
years of specialized training to prepare them for the subtleties, com-
plexity and diversity of modern medicine. Their judgments cannot 
be duplicated by laymen; even if the provider and patient discussed 
every step of treatment, the patient would still be handicapped in 
guiding the behavior of the physician by a lack of knowledge and 
expertise.319 A reimbursement system that disturbs the traditional 
fested by the initiation of the provider-patient relationship. While the doctrine of informed 
consent requires the provider to obtain patient assent to the specifics of treatment to the 
greatest possible extent, some situations preclude the provider from obtaining patient consent 
to every element of the provider's actions; instead, the provider is obligated to describe the 
options only in relatively general terms. For example, it would be unusual for a surgeon to 
explain and obtain consent for every single step of an operation. 
319. See Greenberg, Demand, Supply, and information in Health Care and Other Indus-
tries, in INCENTIVES VERSUS CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 96 
(J. Meyer ed. 1985). This is a serious problem with efforts to control health care costs by 
relying on consumer behavior under market-like conditions. It might be suggested that, if 
patients feel that providers are encouraged to withhold patient benefits under prospective 
payment, patients can bargain with providers for greater benefits. But this presupposes that 
patients are in a position to observe and accurately evaluate provider behavior, which is not 
the case. Furthermore, third-party insurers, rather than patients, typically are in the bar-
gaining position. Yet as discussed earlier, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, their 
assessment of costs and benefits, hence their bargaining behavior, is based on a different per-
spective than the patient's. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the "price" agreed upon 
by third-party payors and providers will be the same that would be arrived at by providers 
and patients. 
One approach to giving patients a greater economic stake in their health care purchases in 
order to encourage more prudent buying is to increase their insurance premiums. See Sisk, 
Effects of Increased Competition in Health Care on the Use and InnoJ•ation of ·Medical Tech-
nology, 9 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 21, 22-23 (1984). Another suggestion for reducing the 
discrepancies between patient/provider and third-party payor/provider bargaining outcomes 
is to require patients to pay for a substantial portion of the cost of care before the third-party 
payments begin. See id. at 22-23. See generally A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 67; U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A PRIMER ON COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CONTAING 
HEALTH CARE COSTS (!982); OTA COMPET!T!ON, supra note 66; Feldstein, A New Ap-
proach to National Health Insurance, 23 PUBLIC INTEREST 93 (1971). 
Co-payment is already a feature of the Medicare system and of most insurance plans. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395e (1983); 50 Fed. Reg. 39,940 (1985). In fiscal year 1986, for example, 
Medicare beneficiaries will be required to pay an annual deductible of $492, and a daily coin-
surance amount for each day they are hospitalized beyond 60 days. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,940 
(1985). The coinsurance rates are $123 per day for each day of hospitalization between 61 and 
90 days, and $246 per day for each day between 91 and 100 days. Id. These rates have 
increased substantially in recent years. ln fiscal year 1976, for example, the deductible was 
only $104. 42 C.F.R. § 409.82(b) (1985). Nevertheless, they do not appear to have had a 
significant impact on health care costs, in part because Medicare beneficiaries often purchase 
1986] MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 855 
fiduciary relationship by introducing a conflict of interest between 
provider and patient must therefore be viewed with considerable 
misgivings. 320 
H. Pressures To Hold the Line At Waste 
1. Professional Ethics 
The extent, if any, to which providers submit to the pressures to 
deny patients nonwasteful, cost-increasing care depends on whether 
these pressures are outweighed by counterpressures to act strictly in 
patients' interests. One of the most important of these counterpres-
sures is the ethics of the medical profession, inculcated in physicians 
by their medical training. 321 The Principles of Medical Ethics of 
private insurance to cover their deductible and coinsurance payments. Further increases in 
these amounts might be more effective at inducing patients to control their own health care 
costs, but perhaps not without undermining the fundamental objectives of the Medicare pro-
gram, which include protecting patients against the costs of health care without impoverish-
ing them. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 1943, 1964. 
Even if patients were motivated to seek cheaper health care alternatives, it is questionable 
whether they possess sufficient bargaining power to affect prices significantly. In Tunkl v. 
Regents, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), the court refused to uphold a 
release from liability signed by a patient in part on the ground that the patient lacked equal 
bargaining power with the provider: "As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the 
economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possess a decisive advan-
tage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services." I d. at 
60 Cal. 2d at 99-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. 
Finally, one commentator notes that the growth of technology's role in medicine is due in 
part to the growth of a better-informed public with higher expectations. See Schroeder, supra 
note 16, at 19. This suggests that an increase in patient information, without countervailing 
cost pressures such as increased first-party financial responsibility, would actually increase 
health care costs. 
320. Some approaches to health care cost containment do not create a conflict of interest 
between providers and patients. CON laws which limit technology acquisition by providers, 
for example, do not reward providers for acquiring less technology than would benefit their 
patients. For a discussion of CON laws, see supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text. Cov-
erage decisions, whereby a third-party payor declares in advance of treatment that it will not 
reimburse providers for a particular technology, create a conflict only if the provider regards 
the technology as non-wasteful for a patient. In this case, the provider has a conflict between 
doing what it believes to be in the patient's interest and avoiding the risk of having to absorb 
the cost of the technology if the patient is unable to pay. The same is true of rate-setting 
systems in which payors limit the amounts they will reimburse providers for a particular 
technology, except that the risk to the provider is the risk of having to absorb only the margi-
nal difference between the set rate and the provider's normal price. While providers may not 
have a conflict of interest with patients under these approaches, this is not true of the agencies 
administering the CON law, the rate setters and the coverage decisionmakers, who may have 
to choose between nonwasteful technologies and fiscal imperatives. See, e.g., Blumenthal, 
supra note 129, at 603 (HCFA has a conflict of interest in assessing technologies because of its 
cost control mission). 
321. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,443; Mamana, Ethics and Technology: Crossroads in 
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the American Medical Association reflect the physician's primary 
duty to the patient: 
A physician has a duty to do all that he can for the benefit of his 
individual patients without assuming total responsibility for equi-
table disbursement of society's limited health resources. To ex-
pect a physician in the context of his medical practice to 
administer governmental priorities in the allocation of scarce 
health resources is to create a conflict with the physician's pri-
mary responsibility to his patients that would be socially 
undesireable. 322 
The Principles also state that the physician's duty to his patients 
takes precedence over cost concerns: 
While physicians should be conscious of costs and not provide or 
prescribe unnecessary services or ancillary facilities, social policy 
expects that concern for the care the patient receives will be the 
physician's first consideration. 323 
It is particularly noteworthy that the Principles direct physicians to 
avoid providing patients with "unnecessary" services. While this 
term is not defined, it is safe to assume, in light of the emphasis on 
the physician's responsibility to his patients, that it is consistent 
with the approach to wasteful technology discussed in Section 
III.324 
Decision Making, 35 TRUSTEE, Jan. 1982, at 33-38; Mulley, The Allocation of Resources for 
Medical Intensive Care, in 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING Ac-
CESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE A VAILABIL-
ITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 255, 301-02 (1983). Dolenc and Doherty regard the ethics of the 
medical profession as so compelling that they insist that "[s]urely physicians will not act 
against a patient's best interests." Dolenc & Doherty, supra note 261, at 25. They admit, 
however; that, as a result of cost control pressures, physicians may withhold technology from 
patients where the patients' interests are unclear, or where the benefits of the technology are 
marginal. See id. 
322. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2.03 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES). 
323. Id. at 2.08. 
324. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. The Statement of Patient Rights and 
Responsibilities of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is much more ambig-
uous, stating simply that "[i]ndividuals shall be accorded impartial access to treatment or 
accommodations that are available or medically indicated, regardless of ... sources of pay-
ment for care." JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, AMH/86: AC-
CREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS xi (1985). While this arguably prohibits a hospital 
from refusing to provide an indigent patient with a medically indicated technology that it 
furnishes to those who have insurance or other means of payment, the statement would seem 
to allow a hospital to deny all patients a technology that was medically indicated but that did 
not result in a net benefit to the hospital. 
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2. Legal Pressures 
Legal constraints constitute another major impetus for practi-
tioners and providers to furnish nonwasteful but cost-increasing 
technology and otherwise to minimize the adverse impact of the 
conflict of interest between providers and patients under prospective 
payment. The body of law that protects patients and other subjects 
in me9ical experimentation, 325 for instance, exemplifies legal reac-
tion to conflicts of interest between providers and patients. These 
laws are arguably necessary because of potential conflict of interest 
between what is best for the researcher's patient and what will best 
attain his research objective. 
No laws appear to have been enacted as yet specifically in re-
spohse to the conflict of interest created by prospective payment. 
While some states are beginning to enact laws prohibiting physi-
cians from engaging in certain activities that create conflicts of in-
terest, these efforts appear to be aimed at fraud and abuse in 
connection with state assistance programs rather than at denials of 
nonwasteful technology.326 Conceivably, criminal laws aimed spe-
cifically at the conflict of interest between providers and patients 
325. Federal laws protecting the rights of experimental subjects apply to experiments 
conducted at any health care facility receiving federal funds, and to any experiment for the 
purpose of obtaining FDA approval to market a drug or medical device. See 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 46.101-46.408 (1985); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.48 (1985). 
326. See Reiman, Editorial: Dealing With Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
749, 750 (1985). Specifically, Michigan law now prohibits referrals to facilities in which the 
practitioner has a financial interest, while a similar statute has been adopted in Pennsylvania 
but applies only to patients receiving medical assistance from the state. Id. California law 
requires disclosure of a financial interest in a free-standing diagnostic facility to which a 
patient is being referred, and the legislature is considering enacting a ban on such referrals. 
I d. These provisions resemble the general anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions of Medicare 
and Medicaid. See Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-
142, 91 Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
No reported cases appear to have been brought under these federal provisions against 
providers accused of denying nonwasteful technology to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries. 
This may be due to the fact that such denials have not occurred or are difficult to detect. But 
see Guillot v. Cherry, No. 79-4371-F, slip op., (E.D. La. 1979) (suit by 7-year-old Medicaid 
patient with leukemia against state for denying bone marrow transplant on grounds technol-
ogy was experimental alleged that state cannot override physician's prescribed treatment regi-
men; suit settled by state agreeing to pay for technology), cited in Necheles, supra note 230, at 
17. The federal provision that comes closest to reaching the conduct in question is the prohi-
bition against giving or receiving remuneration for referring a patient to a facility where 
Medicare or Medicaid services are provided or for ordering a Medjcare or Medicaid service. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1982). A court might hold that the statute had been violated if a 
referring physician were compensated by a provider for helping to hold costs down. However, 
if the physician were deemed an employee, such as a salaried physician on an HMO staff, the 
statutory exemption for payments to employees of the provider might apply. See id. 
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could be enacted, 327 but since they parallel the civil liabilities al-
ready imposed by malpractice law, 328 they may not be worth their 
transaction costs. 329 
a. Malpractice Actions. The fear of malpractice suits is proba-
bly the most effective pressure on providers to refrain from denying 
nonwasteful technology to patients. Under general standards of 
malpractice, a provider may be liable in tort if it fails to give the 
patient the care that should be furnished under generally accepted 
medical standards. 330 Moreover, malpractice law essentially takes a 
patient point of view: no reported cases have denied a plaintiff's 
claim for relief on the ground that, although generally accepted 
practice called for a technology to be provided to the patient, the 
interests of that patient were overridden by the interests of other 
patients or of society. Nor has any case upheld a denial of care on 
the ground that the patient's interests were overridden by the inter-
ests of providers or of payors. Historically, the law has also been 
unsympathetic to the defense to a claim of malpractice that gener-
ally accepted practice was not followed because it was too costly for 
the provider or payor,331 although the defense has yet to be ad-
327. For example, a federal or state law could prohibit providers from withholding tech-
nology from patients for reasons other than those in the patient's direct interest. 
328. For a discussion of the role of malpractice law in addressing denial of nonwasteful 
technology resulting from a conflict of interest under prospective payment, see infi"a notes 
330-32 and accompanying text. 
329. The major advantage criminal laws would offer over patient-initiated damage ac-
tions would be enforcement by government agencies, such as state health departments. These 
agencies can be expected to possess greater expertise and information than patients, and 
therefore to be in a better position to detect improper provider behavior. It is unclear 
whether they would be more likely to take a patient perspective than other "watchdog" enti-
ties-such as peer review organizations (PROs). See infra notes 375-84 and accompanying 
text. If the agency entrusted with enforcing an anti-conflict law is also the agency responsible 
for maintaining the fiscal integrity of a health care budget, such as a state health department 
or HCFA, it is not likely to consistently take a patient perspective on technology. Even if the 
agency does not have a formal budgetary or cost-control function, as an executive govern-
ment agency it may be responsive to pressure from cost-conscious government officials. To 
avoid a conflict of interest, a separate bureaucracy to oversee patient care might be created, 
but is likely to be expensive to run, inefficient and difficult to insulate from cost pressures. 
Nevertheless, if data show that patients are being denied nonwasteful technology, such a 
governmental entity may need 'to be established. 
330. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
TORTS 185-89 (5th ed. 1984). 
331. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941) (hos-
pital liable for injuries to plaintiff after discharging him prematurely due to his inability to 
pay); Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (1891) (jury instructed that physician owes indigent 
and wealthy patients same degree of care); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937) 
(complaint against physician who refused to continue treatment of patient who could not pay 
old bills). 
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dressed by the courts since the beginning of the current cost con-
tainment movement. Malpractice law therefore would be a strong 
incentive to a provider to afford patients technologies that had be-
come generally accepted, even if they increased provider costs. 
It might be argued that malpractice law is not the bulwark 
against the undesirable effects of cost containment described above, 
since the basic standard of care applied to providers in malpractice 
actioD;S is the standard of care generally accepted by the medical 
profession. What is to prevent the medical profession, as a result of 
cost containment pressures and the resulting changes in health care 
delivery practices, from recognizing the denial of beneficial technol-
ogies to patients as accepted practice? In other words, what is to 
prevent physicians from concluding that ordering a particular cost-
raising technology for their patients can no longer be justified be-
cause, although it provides a net benefit to patients and is the most 
cost-effective treatment available, its costs outweigh its benefits 
from a non-patient perspective? If this view became sufficiently 
widespread to be deemed the generally accepted attitude of the pro-
fession, which is certainly the objective of some cost containment 
enthusiasts, malpractice law would not ordinarily hold providers li-
able for denying the technology to patients. 
Erosion of generally accepted standards of practice must be pre-
vented in the first instance by the ethics of the medical profession. 
The profession will continue to provide patients with non-wasteful 
technology so long as physicians practice medicine in the best inter-
ests of their patients, and so long as they retain the power to do so. 
It is also possible, albeit unlikely, that if this notion of ethical prac-
tice changed within the profession, the courts nevertheless would 
hold providers to a patient-based standard of care on the theory 
that the customs of the profession do not establish an appropriate 
standard of care. 332 
332. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (malpractice claim for 
damages resulting from ophthamalogic practice consistent with generally accepted standard 
should not have been dismissed, since generally accepted practice may not be synonymous 
with reasonable care). See also The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 
(2nd Cir. 1932) ("Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence;:but 
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be· its usages. 
Courts must in the end say what is required"). This judicial approach may be subject to the 
charge of overreaching, however. 
In theory, the legislature can reverse the courts, as long as the standard of the patient's 
perspective is not deemed to be constitutionally mandated. The legislative effort is not always 
successful, however. One year after the Helling case, for example, the Washington State 
legislature passed a law apparently intended to protect health care practitioners from mal-
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One aspect of malpractice law that may exert a particularly 
powerful pressure on providers to furnish patients with nonwasteful 
technology is the principle of informed consent. Under this princi-
ple, providers are required to infonn patients of all material alterna-
tive technologies and their relative risks, and must obtain the 
patient's consent to the specific alternative that is provided. 333 
Two main issues arise in connection with informed consent 
under cost control systems such as prospective payment. First, is it 
required, or even appropriate, to infonn patients of the cost of alter-
nate technologies? Second, should providers inform patients of al-
ternate technologies that the provider does not regard as material 
because of their cost? 
As. to the first issue, it would seem that patients are entitled to 
be told the cost of a technology as one of the factors that may influ-
ence their choice of treatment. This is rather obvious when the pa-
tient is paying for the care; it is less obvious when care is paid for by 
a thJrd party, such as by Medicare. When third-party payors and 
providers are themselves at financial risk, cost information may be 
used contrary to the direct interests of the patient. Providers or 
payors may try to pressure patients into accepting less costly tech-
nology, even though the third party payment scheme in which the 
patient is entitled to participate by statute or by contract arguably 
was purchased by the patient or was enacted in part in order to 
insulate patients from such cost pressures. It is therefore imperative 
that, when cost information is furnished to patients as part of the 
infonned consent process, patients concurrently be informed of the 
extent of their financial obligation, if any, for the various technology 
alternatives. 
practice liability when they adhered to custom. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 4.24.290 (1986). 
However, the court in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979), ruled that the 
statute did nol absolve practitioners of malpractice liability on the basis that they adhered to 
custom. 
333. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 
1064 (1972) ("We now find, as a part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient, a 
similar duty of reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the 
dangers inherently and potentially involved."); Sard v: Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 
(1977) (duty to disclose requires a physician to reveal to his patient the nature of the ailment, 
the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success and any alternatives avail-
able). Another type of legal response to a provider refusing to furnish a nonwasteful technol-
ogy might be an action by the patient for breach of contract or for breach of fiduciary duty by 
the provider. See Stern, supra note 309, at 15 (discussing breach of contract). Breach of 
fiduciary duty of an HMO to patients-in essense an action in tort-has been suggested by 
Binford. See Binford, Malpractice and the Prepaid Health Care Organizatian, 3 WHITfiER L. 
REV. 337, 340 (1981). 
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The doctrine of informed consent can only be an effective pres-
sure on providers to provide patients with nonwasteful technology if 
it is construed further to require providers to inform patients of all 
material alternate technologies, including those for which the pro-
vider believes it would not be reimbursed or that should not be pro-
vided because of their cost. The provider would be liable if it failed 
to provide this information and the patient could show that he was 
injured as a result of not receiving the alternate technology.334 This 
would preclude in this country the British practice whereby, in line 
with cost control objectives, certain classes of patients such as the 
elderly, in need of certain expensive technologies such as kidney di-
alysis, are not told that the technology exists or that it would keep 
them alive. 335 
Morreim recommends that the conflict between patient and pro-
vider be mitigated by requiring the provider to disclose the exist-
ence of the conflict to the patient. She does not discuss what a 
patient should do when told: "You should be aware that financial 
pressures on me create a conflict of interest in which I may not 
always act in your best interests." Only a persistent, highly intelli-
gent and probably medically trained patient might be able to dis-
cover when the provider was in fact acting contrary to the patient's 
interest; the average patient is more likely merely to be unnerved 
and confused by the provider's disclosure. 
A better approach is to place the burden on the provider to iden-
tify and to disclose precisely when and in what way it is failing to 
act in the patient's interest. This would help relieve the patient of 
the need to detect such instances on his own. It would also serve 
several important practical functions. First, it would give those pa-
tients who could afford it the option of paying for the technology 
themselves. 336 Second, it would facilitate patient challenges to pro-
spective denials of treatment or of reimbursement by third-party 
334. See Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagno-
sis Related Groups, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, (Dec. 1984, at 251; cf Marsh, Health 
Care Cost Containment and the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 177-78 (1985). 
335. See H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING Hos-
PITAL CARE 100-04 (1984). The British do not recognize the doctrine of informed consent. 
See Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480 
(House of Lords); Grubb, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Law in England: Crisis? What 
Crisis?, I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 75, 98-111 (1985). 
336. Even if, in an excess of cost containment zeal, the government attempted to prevent 
beneficiaries of government programs from purchasing such technologies themselves (and 
this effort survived constitutional challenge), patients should still be entitled to be informed of 
the existence of these technologies so that they can purchase the technologies elsewhere if 
they so desire. 
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payors. 337 Third, disclosure would encourage providers to recog-
nize when they are proposing to deny patients nonwasteful technol-
ogies because of the conflict of interest in which they are placed by 
prospective payment. This in tum would aid in preventing inappro-
priate denial of technologies and in identifying patterns of practice 
that compromise quality-of-care so that they could be brought to 
public attention. 
b. Administrative Processes. A further type of legal constraint 
that may affect a Medicare provider's decision to withhold non-
wasteful technologies from beneficiaries is the administrative pro-
cess by which claims and coverage decisions can be disputed. ][n 
theory, a generous opportunity to contest the denial of technologies 
to patients rn1ght be afforded beneficiaries and other interested par-
ties. 338 As noted earlier, 339 under prospective payment the coverage 
system is no longer necessary as a measure to contain costs, except 
perhaps as a means of generating technology assessment data for 
providers. But the coverage system could be turned into a potent 
weapon with which patients could discourage providers from with-
holding nonwasteful technologies. 
Under this approach, a coverage determination would no longer 
be an indication that Medicare would or would not pay for a spe-
cific technology, since reimbursement would be governed by pay-
ments under the DRG system on the basis of the patient's diagnosis. 
][nstead, a coverage decision would be an affirmation that a particu-
lar technology was reasonable and necessary for a patient under cer-
tain circumstances, and could not lawfully be withheld by a 
Medicare provider. The provider would still be free to reduce care 
to patients to create a greater difference between the cost of the care 
it provided and the amount of the DRG payment that it received, 
but it could not deny a patient a technology that was the subject of 
337. In Heckler 1'. Ringer, the Supreme Court precluded a declaratory judgment action 
by the patient prior to receiving the technology and having a claim for reimbursement denied. 
104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984). See infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text. In light of this deci-
sion, it is important that patients be given the right to have a peer review organization or 
provider conduct a prospective review of a proposed denial of technology and for a negative 
result to trigger the Medicare appeals process, including, ultimately, judicial review. Pro-
vider disclosure to the patient of its intention to withhold a technology on grounds of cost is a 
crucial prerequisite to this right of review. 
338. Interested parties other than beneficiaries themselves might include next of kin, 
providers who disagreed with a claims denial by a contractor or by the Health Care Finance 
Administration, sponsors of technologies such as manufacturers, and interest groups such as 
patient advocacy and professional organizations. 
339. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text. 
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such an affirmative coverage decision by the government. 340 Prov-
iders caught between an affirmative coverage determination and a 
skimpy DRG could press for an increase in the payment for that 
particular DRG. In fact, HCFA and the Prospective Payment 
Commission could be required automatically to assess the adequacy 
of all DRG payments affected by an affirmative coverage 
decision. 341 
Coupled with a robust administrative and appeals procedure, 
such a coverage system could be a significant deterrent to denying 
non-wasteful technologies to patients. In a number of respects, how-
' · ever, -the procedural process afforded patients under the current sys-
tem is inadequate to achieve this result. 
In the first place, the statutory provisions governing which tech-
nologies beneficiaries are entitled to receive under Medicare are not 
clearly ~efined. The basic governing provision of law is section 
1862{a)(l) of the Social Security Act, which prohibits payment for 
items or services that are not "reasonable and necessary for the di-
agnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the function-
ing of a malformed body part."342 The key phrase, "reasonable and 
necessary," is not further defined in the statute, in the legislative 
history of the statute, 343 or in the copious Medicare regulations. 344 
340. Presumably, technologies with only marginal net benefit would not be required to be 
provided under such coverage determinations, since it would not be worth the effort to secure 
a coverage decision in their respect. 
341. Some patients who are entitled to specific technologies under a coverage policy 
might qualify as cost or day outliers, thereby earning the provider an additional payment 
beyond the normal DRG amount. 
342. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1984 & Supp. 1985). The law also limits payment for 
certain specified services, such as dental care, id. § 1395(a)(10). 
343. The key Senate report, S. Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1989 (1965), merely 
repeats the language of section 1395y(a). It then classifies the rental of a special hospital bed 
as an item that might be covered, depending on the circumstances, and describes personal 
comfort items and services such as massages and heat lamp treatments, and custodial care, as 
items or services that would not be covered. 
344. Letter from Peter Bouxsein, Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. II, 1985). The regulations merely 
restate the language of the statute. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.310(k)(e) (1985); Breeden v. Wein-
berger, 377 F. Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974) ("reasonable and necessary" not defined in 
regulations). A 1977 communication from HCFA to a fiscal intermediary interprets the stat-
utory phrase to mean that the item or service is generally accepted as safe and effective and 
not experimental, or is so proven by authoritative evidence. See HCFA, Part A interrilediary 
Letter 77-4/Part B intermediary Letter 77-5, MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 128, 
152 (1977). In addition, the term is interpreted to mean that the item or service is medically 
necessary in the particular case and is furnished in accordance with accepted standards of 
medical practice and in an appropriate setting. 
At one point in 1980, HCFA considered adopting a formal interpretation of the "reason-
able and necessary" language of the Social Security Act that would have permitted national 
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Nor has the phrase substantiaUy been interpreted by the courts. 345 
Therefore, even if there were adequate procedures by which patients 
could challenge technology decisions, the lack of clear statutory 
standards might preclude patients from successfully contesting the 
withholding of nonwasteful technologies. 
This could be remedied by defining the governing term "reason-
able and necessary" in section 1862(a) of the Social Security Act to 
mean, along the lines suggested in Section HI, items or services that 
are unsafe, ineffective, less safe or effective than alternate items or 
services, or not cost-effective from the patient's standpoint. This 
definition could be adopted by the Department of Health and 
Human Services as an interpretive rule or general statement of pol-
icy, or as a formal regulation. H could also be enacted by Congress 
as an amendment to the Act, ahhough an amendment does not 
seem necessary since this interpretation does noi conflict with provi-
sions of the Act and is arguably within the broad rulemaking au-
thority vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services.346 
Once adopted, this definition would apply to all coverage deter.Uli-
nations-including those at the contractor and peer reviev; organi= 
zation (PRO) levels-to all quality-of-care review programs, and to 
all reimbursement decisions.347 
JEven if the statutory standard were interpreted in this fashion, 
coverage determinations denying reimbursement for technologies to have been made on the 
basis of cost, economic, ethical and social considerations, developed through a series of ques-
tions such as: "How does the cost and effectiveness of this item or service compare with that 
of available alternatives?" and "are the projected (net) expenditures for this item or service 
warranted in view of alternative health care measures that might be undertaken with scarce 
resources?" This proposal was never issued for public comment. Letter from Peter Boux-
sein, Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Sept. II, 1985. 
345. The first and still key case is Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734 (M.D. La. 
1974), in which a Medicare beneficiary challenged a denial of a claim for hospital services. 
The claim presumably had been denied on the basis that the services could have been ren-
dered in a less expensive setting than a hospital. After noting that the term "reasonable and 
necessary" is nowhere defined, the court stated that, where there is no "direct conflicting 
evidence," the opinion of the attending physician "is to be given great weight," and that "the 
responsibility for determining what services the patient requires rests primarily with the treat-
ing physician." Id. at 737. Accord Hultz1nan v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (3rd 
Cir. 1974); Westgard v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (D.N.D. 1975); Kuebler v. 
Secretary of U.S. Dep't HHS, 579 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 405. 
347. The degree to which the definition controlled those activities would depend on 
whether it was issued as a binding statutory or regulatory provision or merely as a nonbind-
ing rule or policy. The latter might be easier for a cost-conscious administration to accept, 
although this presents some risk that contractors and peer review organizations (discussed 
infra at notes 375-84 and accompanying text) would substitute their own interpretations of 
waste. 
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however, the current procedures for challenging technology deci-
sions under Medicare limit the effectiveness of an affirmative cover-
age system. This presumably results from the original cost control 
thrust of the Medicare coverage system. 
The most effective affirmative coverage system would inform the 
patient in the hospital that the hospital is proposing to deny the 
patient a particular technology on grounds of cost and would then 
allow a Medicare beneficiary (or his doctor) immediately to chal-
lenge the hospital's proposal. Under current procedures, this chal-
lenge would be made, if it could be made at all, to the PRO, which 
is staffed in part by health professionals such as doctors and nurses, 
and which contracts with the Health Care Finance Administration 
(HCF A) to perform certain review functions, 348 including deter-
mining if a technology is reasonable and necessary. 349 It is not clear 
if a PRO would entertain such a challenge by a patient or his physi-
cian. HCFA regulations require a PRO to monitor patient dis-
charges to determine if they are premature, 350 and a patient may 
obtain immediate PRO review of a hospital's decision to discharge 
him before actually being forced to leave the facility. 351 But there is 
no formal procedure for obtaining immediate PRO review of a hos-
pital decision to deny a particular technology to a patient unless the 
hospital's position, if sustained, would entail the patient's 
discharge. 352 
Assuming the PRO reviewed and affirmed a prospective chal-
348. See 42 U.S.C. §§ l320c-1-l320c-3. Providers may not obtain Medicare reimburse-
ment unless they have entered into a written agreement of cooperation with a peer review 
organization to have this review performed. See 42 C.F.R. § 466.78. 
349. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCE 
ADMINISTRATION, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION MANUAL§ 2060.2 (Feb. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HCFA PRO MANUAL]. 
350. See id. § 3000. HCFA defines a premature discharge to occur "when a patient is 
discharged even though he should have remained in the hospital for further testing or treat-
ment, or was not medically stable at the time of discharge." I d. 
351. See id. at § 2080. Medicare has recently proclaimed that beneficiaries must be noti-
fied upon admission of their right to obtain PRO review of a discharge request by the hospi-
tal. See HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE FEDERAL INTERMEDIARY 
BULLETIN No. 86.18 (Feb. 18, 1986). 
352. The PRO itself can decide to review a proposed use of a technology for a particular 
patient in what is called a "pre-procedure review." See HCFA PRO MANUAL, supra note 
349, at § 2050.5. Reflecting the original cost control function of this review, it is limited to 
certain specified technologies, such as permanent cardiac pacemaker implantation, that are 
thought to be overused. See id. at § 2080. But there is no formal procedure whereby a pa-
tient or physician, rather than the PRO itself, can obtain a preprocedure review, and PRO's 
do not ordinarily provide an opportunity for such a review. Telephone interview with Bar-
bara DeCaeser, R.N., Professional Affairs Staff, University Hospitals, Cleveland, Ohio (Dec. 
20, 1985). 
orr 
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1enge to the withho!di1·1g of a technology, the beneficia:ry353 may re-
quest a reconsideration by the PRO. 354 If upon reconsideration, the 
PRO's decision is still adverse to the beneficiary, he can obtain an 
administrative review by an administrative law judge (ALJ)355 if the 
controversy involves an amount in excess of $200. 356 If the ALJ's 
decision is adverse, the beneficiary may obtain a review by an Ap-
peals Council. 357 
This would seem to be a generous, multilevel appeals proce-
dure. However, only limited relief for beneficiaries should be ex-
pected from PRO's or from the HCFA Appeals Council. The 
outcome of an appeal is lilcely to favor the provider's position, since 
both PRO's and HCF A are obligated in the main to control health 
care costs. 358 Given this mission, they are more likely to view the 
relationship between costs and benefits of a technology from the 
provider's rather than the patient's perspective, even if technically 
forbidden from doing so by a redefinition of "reasonable and neces-
sary" in the Medicare statute. Thus it becomes important for bene-
353. Under Medicare, the hospital itself is made a party to the beneficiary's appeal. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395pp. The hospital therefore would automatically have an opportunity to de-
fend its proposed denial of the technology in question. 
354. See 42 C.P.R. § 473.16. 
355. See 42 U.S. C. § 1320c-4. The administrative law judge (ALJ) has subpoena powers. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(d); 20 C.P.R. § 404.950. He is bound by regulations and published rul-
ings of the HCPA, but not by publications in HCFA manuals. See 42 C.P.R. § 401.108; 
telephone interview with Henry Goldberg, Office of the General Counsel, HCPA (Nov. 8, 
1985). Thus, HCPA coverage determinations, which are published in the manuals but are 
neither formal rulings nor regulations, are not binding on ALJ's. 
356. See 42 C.P.R. §§ 473.40, 405.701(c), 405.724; 20 C.P.R. § 404.967. The beneficiary 
should be able to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement by the cost of the disputed 
technology to the provider. If the beneficiary ultimately wins, the provider will have to pro-
vide the technology and absorb the cost within the amount it will be paid under the prospec-
tive payment system; unless the additional cost makes the patient a cost-outlier, see supra 
notes 263-64 and accompanying text, HCFA will not increase the amount it pays the pro-
vider for the beneficiary. Nevertheless, the fact that the provider will have to absorb the cost 
of the technology should qualify to establish an amount in controversy, so that the beneficiary 
should be able to appeal the PRO reconsideration if the cost of the technology to the pro-
vider, if it is ultimately ordered to provide it, would exceed $200. Similarly, the provider 
should be entitled to appeal a PRO's decision that the technology is reasonable and necessary, 
but only when the delay created by the appeal would not adversely affect the beneficiary's 
health status. 
357. See 42 C.P.R. §§ 473.40 405.701(c), 405.724; 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. The Appeals 
Council has jurisdiction to review an ALJ decision when there is an abuse of discretion by the 
ALJ, the ALJ has committed an error of law, the AU's decision is not supported by substan-
tial evidence, new evidence is submitted with the request for review, or the AU's decision 
raises broad issues of policy that may affect the general interest of the public. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 473.46; 20 C.P.R. § 404.970. 
358. See Blumenthal, supra note 129, at 603 (discussing bias of HCFA); see also infra 
notes 378-84 and accompanying text. 
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ficiaries to be able to obtain judicial review of an adverse decision of 
the Appeals Council, since the courts are likely to be more neutral 
with regard to the conflict between patient and fiscal interests. 
Under current Medicare law as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, however, judicial review of the proposed withholding of a 
technology from a beneficiary is precluded. Normally, review of an 
adverse decision by the Appeals Council may be had in a United 
States district court if the amount in controversy exceeds $2,000.359 
But in 1985 the Court ruled in Heckler v. Ringer that judicial review 
is only available when a claim for Medicare reimbursement is de-
nied, and that such a claim can only be presented after a technology 
has been provided to a beneficiary, thus preventing prospective 
challenges. 360 
Unless Congress or the Court overrules the Heckler case, judi-
cial review would only be available to a beneficiary if, when faced 
359. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4. The beneficiary's appeal procedure is more limited under 
Part B of Medicare, which covers physician and outpatient services and is not governed by 
prospective payment. See supra note 305. A beneficiary whose Part B claim is denied by a 
contractor is entitled to a hearing before a hearing officer (not an ALJ) if the amount in 
controversy is at least $100. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.820, 405.823. The hearing officer's deci-
sion is final. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.835. · 
360. See 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984). Plaintiffs challenged a ruling by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services that a surgical technology known as bilateral carotid body resection was 
not reasonable and necessary and therefore was not covered under Medicare. Id. at 2018. 
The procedure involves removal of the small carotid bodies in the neck, which its proponents 
claim will reduce symptoms of asthma, bronchitis and emphysema. /d. at 2018 n.3. The 
Secretary had originally issued a nonbinding guideline recommending noncoverage of the 
technology, but the guideline was ignored by many ALJ's who overturned contractor denials 
of claims. Jd. at 2018. The Secretary then replaced the guideline with a ruling, which is 
binding on ALJ's and on the Appeals Council. /d. at 2018. 
By a six to three majority, the Court held that sections 405(g) and (h) of the Social Secur-
ity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h), deprived the courts of subject matter jurisiction over the 
action. 104 S. Ct. at 2022. Section 405(g) states in pertinent part that an individual may 
obtain judicial review of "any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he 
was a party." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(h) states that "[n]o findings of fact or decision 
of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal or governmental agency except as 
herein provided," and that no action may be brought under § 1331 or 1346 of title 28 of the 
United States Code "to recover on any claim arising under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). 
The Court noted that there were two groups of plaintiffs-one that had had the operation 
and that sought to challenge the ruling before completing the Medicare appeals process, and 
an additional individual, Ringer, who had not had the operation and who contended that, 
since he could not alford to pay for it himself, the result of the ruling was that no. provider 
would furnish it to him. 104 S. Ct. at 2020-21, 2024. The Court held that, insofar as all 
plaintiffs were essentially seeking a prospective determination of their right to be reimbursed 
for the technology, their challenge was a "claim arising under" the Medicare Act and could 
not be brought until they had exhausted their administrative remedies. /d. at 2023. The 
Court also held that a mandamus action against the Secretary also would not lie because of 
plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. /d. at 2022-23. Ringer, who had 
not received the operation, was likewise barred from suit because, having no claim for reim-
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with a provider decision to withhold a technology under Medicare, 
the beneficiary proceeded to obtain the technology by offering to 
pay for it himself. (As a practical matter, unless the beneficiary 
offered to pay for the technology, his medical condition might not 
allow enough time for the beneficiary to contest the provider's posi-
tion before the technology or an alternate form of treatment or di-
agnosis had to be obtained). Once the beneficiary had paid for the 
technology himself, he might then seek to have Medicare reimburse 
him on the theory that the technology was covered and should have 
been provided by the hospital. 361 This would afford him the same 
bursement to submit, he had not had a claim denied and thus had not obtained a final deci-
sion of the Secretary after exhausting the Medicare appeals procedure. I d. at 2025. 
As Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated in dissenting to that 
portion of the opinion that barred Ringer from suit, the majority's holding with regard to 
Ringer makes it impossible for a beneficiary to challenge a coverage ruling (or a guideline, for 
that matter) until a claim for reimbursement for the procedure is denied and the appeals 
process is exhausted; the beneficiary must therefore be able to afford to pay for the technology 
to perfect such a challenge. Jd. at 2029-30. "[The majority's] one-eyed procedural analysis 
frustrates the remedial intent of Congress as plainly as it frustrates this litigant's plea for a 
remedy," Justice Stevens asserted, adding: "The cruel irony is that a statute designed to help 
the elderly in need of medical assistance is being construed to protect from administrative 
absolutism only those wealthy enough to be able to afford an operation and then seek reim-
bursement." ld. at 2030. 
361. Technically the beneficiary would be challenging a determination that he knew or 
ought to have known that the technology was not covered, and that he was therefore finan-
cially liable for the technology after he received it. See supra note 272. One problem that 
would arise is how to set the amount that Medicare will reimburse the beneficiary if the 
technology ultimately is found to be covered. The hospital's charge would not necessarily be 
the correct amount, since it might be unreasonably high. Prior to the adoption of the DRG 
prospective payment system, hospitals were paid on the basis of their reasonable costs as 
calculated by Medicare. This would presumably be an appropriate amount for the patient to 
have to pay the hospital, and thus the amount the patient should be reimbursed by Medicare 
if the technology was paid for out of the patient's pocket. 
This would necessitate establishing the reasonable cost in cases where beneficiaries suc-
cessfully challenged a provider's initial determination that the technology was not covered. It 
would also require that the hospital be limited in the amount it could charge the patient to 
the amount the patient would be reimbursed. Note that as an artifact of the former fee-for-
service system, if a PRO determines that a patient has received a non-covered technology 
along with a covered technology, Medicare will exclude from the DRG payment for that 
patient an amount corresponding to the non-covered technology. See HCFA PRO MANUAL, 
supra note 349, at § 2050.3. Thus there must be some method by which Medicare can calcu-
late the proper charge for a particular technology under the DRG payment system. 
This raises the further question of whether Medicare or the hospital ought to absorb the 
cost of the covered technology. The hospital would seem to be the more appropriate cost-
bearer, sin~e otherwise it would be paid both a DRG-based Medicare amount for the patient's 
care and an additional amount by the patient for a technology that, if ultimately determined 
to be covered, it should have provided to the patient in return for the DRG-based payment 
alone. An alternative to making the hospital refund the amount it collected from the patient 
would be for Medicare rather than the hospital to reimburse the patient so long as the hospi-
tal's initial denial of the technology was in good faith and was a reasonable interpretation of 
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appeals procedure as in the preprocedure context described above, 
with the added availability of judicial review.362 However, as Jus-
tice Stevens noted in his dissent in Heckler v. Ringer,363 only those 
patients wealthy enough to afford a technology would be able to 
take advantage of this retrospective appeals procedure, including 
availing themselves of the potentially critical protection of the 
courts. 
As an alternative to relying on individual patients to press for a 
coverage decision upon being told that a provider proposes to with-
hold a technology from them, patient groups and others might peti-
tion HCFA directly for a prospective coverage determination.364 If 
HCFA granted the request, it could issue a guideline or a formal 
ruling. The process of formulating a coverage guideline is not gov-
erned by any specific statutory or administrative procedures under 
its Medicare obligations. One method of determining the reasonableness of the hospital's 
actions·would be to monitor the frequency of beneficiary affirmative coverage challenges for 
that hospital. Excessive challenges could create a presumption of unreasonableness or bad 
faith on the part of the hospital that could subject it to sanctions, such as being disqualified 
from being reimbursed for serving Medicare patients. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 474.32-.58. 
362. If the beneficiary is able to obtain judicial review, it may not be too difficult .for him 
to prove that he is entitled to the technology. The burden of showing that a technology 
merits Medicare reimbursement is on the claimant. See, e.g., Psychiatric Hosps. of Florida, 
Inc. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 34,811 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 
1985). The burden is not a difficult one to meet, however. Under the current Medicare 
system, if the government denies a claim for reimbursement and the beneficiary (or provider) 
appeals, the claimant has the burden of coming forward with evidence why the claim should 
be allowed. If the claim is denied on the basis that the technology provided is not covered 
under Medicare, the few decided cases suggest that the claimant can meet this burden merely 
by showing that the technology was ordered by the attending physician. See, e.g., Breedon v. 
Weinberger, 377 F . .Supp. 734, 737 (M.D. La. 1974). 
The burden then appears to shift to the government to show that the technology is inap-
propriate notwithstanding the physician's order. Ultimately, the government will be sus-
tained if its decision is supported by substantial evidence, see id. at 738, but the courts have 
taken a hard look at the government's interpretation of what is "reasonable and necessary" 
for Medicare patients under 1862(a)(l)(A). See Kuebler v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep't HHS 
579 F. Supp. 1436, 1438 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Westgard v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 
(D.N.D. 1975). Cf Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3rd Cir. 1974) (rejecting 
government's interpretation of section 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)). The burden on the claimant 
could be relaxed even further by creating a presumption that technology is reasonable and 
necessary and placing the burden on the government to defeat the presumption in order to 
deny a claim for a specific technology. 
363. 104 S. Ct. at 2030-31. 
364. Section 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. § 553(e), mandates an 
opportunity for persons to petition a federal agency to initiate rulemaking proceedings. 
While section 553(a)(2) of the Act exempts "benefits" programs from the requirements of 
section 553, and Medicare has been held to be such a program, see, e.g., Humana of South 
Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1082-84 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the Department of 
Health and Human Services waived this exemption in 1971. See 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971); 
Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano, at 1084. 
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the Social Security Act, and has not been the subject of any re-
ported case. By virtue of their nonbinding nature, guidelines would 
most likely be regarded as interpretive rules or general statements of 
policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. 365 They would 
therefore be exempt from any procedural requirements under the 
act. 366 Neither notice nor an opportunity for public comment, 
much less a hearing or judicial review, would have to be pro-
vided. 367 Since H CF A routinely affords notice and an opportunity 
for comment to members of the public, the agency in fact extends 
greater procedural protections to those potentially adversely af-
fected by the guidelines than are required by law. 
Formal rulings would qualify as informal rules, and, under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, require public notice and an oppor-
tunity for comment prior to being issued, but no formal hearing.368 
Nor would a party adversely affected by a ruling be entitled to judi-
cial review, since none is provided in the Medicare statutes,369 and 
none is mandated under the Administrative Procedure Act for in-
formal rulemaking. 370 
In short, greater rights for participation by interested parties, 
including rights to a hearing, to review by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and to judicial review, may become necessary 
to augment other pressures to avoid denying nonwasteful technolo-
gies to beneficiaries.371 
A final method by which affirmative decisions on coverage 
might be made is in the course of establishing and recalibrating 
365. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). In Bond Hasps., Inc. v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 1268, 
1273 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 762 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court held that the Health Care 
Finance Administration's PROVIDER REVIEW MANUAL, which is similar to the MEDICARE 
COVERAGE IssuEs MANUAL in which coverage guidelines are published, is an interpretive 
rule under the Administrative Procedure Act and thus exempt from formal rulemaking re· 
quirements. See also American Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(agency action is general statement of policy where it is not a binding norm, is prospectively 
applied, and leaves decision makers free to exercise discretion). Cf Roberts v. Weinberger, 
No. C-74-49, (W.D. Tenn. 1975), reported in [I Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid 
Rptr. (CCH) ~ 27,396 (Medicare coverage guidelines excluding technologies from coverage 
may not be applied retroactively). 
366. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). 
367. See id. 
368 .. See id. at §§ 553(b),(c). The Social Security Act does not mandate a hearing before 
such rulings may be issued, and therefore no hearing is required under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See id. at § 553(c). 
369. See Heckler v. Ringer, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2021-22 (1984). 
370. See id. 
371. Cf Hearings on H.R. 5496, supra note 108, at 496 (testimony of Jack Christy, Amer-
ican Association of Retired Persons) (advocating hearing rights in government technology 
assessment proceedings). 
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DRG's under tlie prospective payment system. 372 In its first annual 
report, for example, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commis-
sion (PROPAC) noted that it was reviewing several new technolo-
gies, such as cochlear implants, to determine if they merited the 
creation of technology-specific DRGs-that is, DRGs providing 
Medicar~ reimbursement for using a particular technology.373 In 
the absence of technology-specific DRGs, providers might not have 
an adequate incentive to provide a new technology under existing 
DRG payment levels if the t~chnology substantially increased pro-
vider costs. A refusal to establish a technology-specific DRG for 
such a technology would then have the same discouraging effect on 
its avaihibility to beneficiaries as a negative coverage determina-
tion.3~4 It is therefore discouraging to note that Congress exempted 
the e;tire DRG process from administrative and judicial review.375 
3. c Peer Review Organizations 
Another potential source of pressure to provide nonwasteful 
technologies is the peer review organization (PRO). As discussed 
earlier, 376 these are organizations of health professionals and others 
under contract with Medicare to perform certain oversight func-
tions. One of these functions, mandated by statute, is to review the 
"completeness, adequacy, and quality of care provided."377 HCFA 
interprets this to require PROs to reduce unnecessary readmissions 
due to substandard care during a previous admission; assure that 
technologies avoid a "significant potential for causing serious pa-
tient complication;" and reduce avoidable deaths, unnecessary sur-
gery and avoidable complications.378 PROs are authorized to 
invoke a number of sanctions against providers who fail to provide 
adequate care to beneficiaries, including recommending to the Of-
372. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text. 
373. See PROPAC 1985, supra note I, at 50-51; see also OTA MEDICARE, supra note 2, 
at 27. 
374. On the other hand, if the new technology were cost-saving, providers may be reaping 
an unwarranted windfall under existing DRG payment levels. See PROPAC 1985, supra 
note I, at 43-44 (discussing percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty). 
375. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (Supp. I 1983) ("[t]here shall be no administrative or 
judicial review ... [of] the establishment of diagnosis-related groups, of the methodology for 
the classification of discharges within such groups, and of the appropriate weighting factors 
thereof .... " 
376. See supra notes 348-58 and accompanying text. 
377. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l)(F) (Supp. I 1983). 
378. See Health Care Finance Administration, Request for Proposal, RFP No. CFA-84-
015, Operation of Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations (1984), 2 MEDI-
CARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 12,872.03 (Feb. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as RFP No. 
HCFA-84-015]. 
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fice of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services that the provider be denied payment for a specific 
admission or procedure, be fined, or be excluded from serving Medi-
care patients. 379 
The PROs' watchdog responsibilities and sanctions potentially 
make it a powerful source of pressure on providers. However, qual-
ity control is not the PROs' only, and perhaps not its prime, objec-
tive.380 In addition, it~has a major cost containment role. The 
contract between the HCF A and the PRO must L1clude a specific 
target for reducing Medicare admissions; the PRO in Kentucky, for 
example, is obligated to achieve an 8.1% reduction in Medicare ad-
missions between 1983 and 1986.381 Ifthe PRO fails to achieve its 
target, it may lose its contract or risk nonrenewaP82 Moreover, the 
PRO Is responsible for validating the providers' DRG assignments 
and assuring the legitimacy of outlier claims. 383 The PRO's satis-
factory fulfillment of its contract depends not only on achieving spe-
cific contract targets, but on producing net dollar benefits to the 
government (savings resulting from PRO review minus the cost of 
the PRO contract to the government).384 
In short, the PRO is caught between the conflicting goals of in-
suring quality of care and reducing costs. The logical resolution of 
this conflict would be for the PRO to adopt the approach to tech-
nology waste advocated herein, recouping the cost of providing 
nonwasteful, cost-increasing technologies through savings from not 
providing wasteful technologies. Nevertheless, the PRO may well 
conclude that it can protect its contract better by concentrating on 
its cost control objectives than by achieving quality-of-care objec-
tives. 385 Administrative and judicial patient challenges to PRO de-
terminations should therefore be anticipated and facilitated. 
379. See 42 C.P.R. §§ 474.32-.41 (1985). 
380. See, e.g., Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations: Promises and Potential 
Pitfalls, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1136 (1985). 
381. See 2 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 12,872. 
382. See RFP No. HCFA-84-015, supra note 379. 
383. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 
12,872.05 (Aug. 6, 1984). 
384. See RFP No. HCFA-84-015, supra note 379. 
385. The solution might be to create two separate review entities, one with cost control 
targets and the other with quality-of-care objectives, in effect placing them in an adversarial 
position. This would require the creation of another administrative body to resolve disputes 
between the two PROs. 
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4. Competitive Pressures 
. A final source of pressure on~, providers to provide non wasteful 
technologies to patients is competition with other providers. This is 
a relatively new phenomenon; until recently, the health care system 
has not been highly. competitive. Now, however, there is an over-
supply of hospital beds and physicians, a scarcity of patients, and a 
growing militancy on the part of third-party payors to bring costs 
under control. This is leading providers to attempt to attract pa-
tients-either as individuals or as members of group health care 
plans-by a variety of competitive methods, including competition 
on the basis of price and services. 386 -
To some extent, providers are beginning to compete on the basis 
of the quality of their care. So far this seems to be limited to pro-
moting the types of services offered. Providers thus extol their new-
est technology acquisitions but do not emphasize other potential 
quality-of-care parameters, such as low malpractice claims fre-
quency, mortality rates and readmission frequencies. Nevertheless, 
these quality aspects of health care may receive greater attention as 
patients and third-party payors attempt to purchase the best care 
for the money. To the extent that these parameters would be nega-
tively affected by a practice of denying patients nonwasteful tech-
nologies, increased competition between providers might therefore 
become a potent source of pressure to maintain quality of care. 
One major limitation on its effectiveness, however, is the degree 
to which patients are given and can act upon accurate quality-of-
care information about providers. Currently, although patients 
may be receiving greater information on health care prices, there is 
virtually no information available to patients on the relative per-
formance of different hospitals, let alone on that of hospitals com-
pared to alternative delivery systems such as health maintenance 
organizations, or on that of different physicians. 387 Even if this in-
386. See, e.g., Punch, Publicity on Prices Has Little Impact, in HEALTH CARE MARKET-
ING 243 (P. Cooper ed. 1985) (hospital administrations believe consumers will start paying 
more attention to public disclosure of hospital charges). 
387. A number of efforts are now underway to increase the information available to 
health care consumers. On the federal level, recent Peer Review Organization (PRO) regula-
tions require the PRO to disclose nonconfidential information to "any person upon request." 
42 CFR § 476.120(a). Nonconfidential information includes information that either explic-
itly or implicitly identifies a hospital or institution, aggregate statistical data collected by the 
PRO, quality review study data, and routine reports submitted by the PRO to the Health 
Care Finance Administration (HCFA). Id. Confidential information is defined as "informa-
tion that explicitly or implicitly identifies an individual patient, practitioner or reviewer." 42 
CFR § 476.101. In addition, the PRO "may disclose to the public PRO interpretations and 
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formation were available to patients, it is questionable that they 
would use it to make informed choices in view of their lack of ex-
pertise and the time and effort that would be required. Third-party 
payors are in a better position both to obtain (and if necessary gen-
erate) this information and to use it to choose providers for their 
subscribers, but, as noted earlier,388 third-party payors do not have 
the sanie perspective on waste as patients, and therefore may make 
different health choices than subscribers who possessed and 
processed the necessary information. Pending improvements in 
both the quality and quantity of provider performance data avail-
able to patients, and in methods for assisting patients in making 
health care choices on the basis of those data, therefore, competi-
tion remains a promising but uncertain pressure on providers to 
maintain the quality of their care. 
generalizations on the quality of health care that identify a particular institution." 42 CFR 
§ 467.141. This includes information on the length of stay, surgical mortality rates, and the 
percentage of patients with post-operatic infections, for particular institutions. See Wolfe, As 
Hospital Ratings Go Public, Let's Rate Doctors, Too, Los Angeles Times, May 6, 1985. 
The significance of the PRO-disclosure requirements are based, in part, on two factors: 
the amount of information the PRO bas access to and the ability of some entity to translate 
the PRO's data into meaningful and accessible information for consumers. With regard to 
the former, the PRO bas access to all records on Medicare patients and other patients whose 
care they are authorized by contract to review, and to records on other non-Medicare patients 
if authorized by the institution or provider. See 42 CFR § 476.111. In addition, the PRO 
can access records or data held by intermediaries or carriers as necessary. See 42 CFR § 112. 
In regard to the latter, at least one consumer group, founded by Ralph Nader, has an-
nounced its intention to collect, process and disseminate PRO data to its subscribers. See 
Public Citizen Health Research Group, Health Letter, July-Aug. 1985, at 8. The Nader 
group also advocates that physician-specific data be released by PROs, which is currently 
prohibited by the regulations. See supra. It responds to objections by the American Medical 
Association that these data would be misleading due to factors such as variations in patient 
mix (some doctors see a sicker group of patients than other doctors) by arguing that statisti-
cal corrections can be made for such variables, and that even impeifect data are better than 
nothing. See PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED 
RULE OF ACQUISITION, PROTECTION AND DISCLOSURE OF UTILIZATION AND QUALITY 
CONTROL PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATION INFORMATION 4 (July 5, 1984). 
Bills have also been submitted to Congress to establish a health data clearinghouse. See 
H.R. 2882, S. 1367, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1985) (introduced by Ron Wyden, D. Ore., and 
Albert Gore, D. Tenn., respectively). The clearinghouse would be located within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, would collect information on and provide technical 
assistance to individuals or organizations engaged in gathering, processing and disseminating 
aggregate health care information, and would make this information public. See id. 
State activities are concentrated on collecting health care cost rather than care-quality 
data. As of May, 1985, eleven states had passed laws requiring cost information to be submit-
ted to state health agencies: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Wyoming. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, STATE 
DATA COLLECTION LEGISLATION, Pt. Ill at 22 (1985). 
388. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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I. Evidence on Waste Curtailment 
The data are not yet available to show if the financial pressures 
exerted by the prospective payment system are sufficient to over-
come the foregoing counterpressures in favor of providing non-
wasteful technologies to patients. The Medicare prospective pay-
ment system has not been in effect long enough to allow evaluation 
of its effect on the overall quality of patient care, much less on the 
development, acquisition and use of technology. 389 It is known that 
during the first year of prospective payment, the average hospital 
length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries declined, at least in part 
due to the new system. 390 Moreover, the number of Medicare hos-
pital admissions declined by over 4% from the previous, pre-pro-
spective payment year. 391 While it has been reported that Medicare 
patients are being discharged prematurely and in poorer health than 
before prospective payment, 392 no systematic quality-of-care studies 
have been completed, and the Health Care Finance Administration 
denies that quality of patient care has decreased.393 Data demon-
strating no decline in quality-of-care under prospective payment, 
despite reductions in variables such as length of stay, might mean 
that providers are resisting pressures to cut beneficial care or merely 
that there is still waste in the present system. 394 In any event, in 
view of the lack of definitive data, the issue remains to be 
resolved. 395 
389. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM: STRATEGIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 35-
47 (1985). 
390. See id. at 37-39. 
391. See id. at 40. 
392. See id. at 39-40. 
393. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,439 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412) (proposed June 
10, 1985) ("We do not at the present time have objective data demonstrating that the quality 
of or access to care has declined. We have noted a significant decrease in average length-of-
stay, a slight decrease in admissions, and an increase in average case mix."). 
394. See Schroeder, supra note 16, at II. 
395. Some data on the impact of conflict of interest on patient care has emerged from 
prepaid health delivery systems such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which 
are vertically integrated providers that combine an insurance function with the delivery of 
care. See OTA COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 36. An HMO has the incentive to withhold 
nonwasteful technologies from its patients except insofar as this will require additional care, 
presumably from the same HMO provider, in the future. In one respect, the impact of the 
provider's conflict of interest on the quality of patient care may be more adverse in the case of 
an HMO than in the case of Medicare prospective payment: when a third-party payor like 
Medicare refuses to reimburse a provider for a technology, the quality of care to the patient in 
question may not directly be affected, since the patient may have received the technology 
before the claim for reimbursement is submitted. See supra note 275. 
In the case of an HMO (other than one reimbursing another provider, such as an out-of-
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V. CONCl.USJON 
Cost-containment initiatives intensify public and private efforts 
to identify and control wasteful technology. Although these efforts 
are prone to a host of technical and conceptual difficulties, some 
form of technology assessment is inevitable. Technology assess-
ment must adopt approaches that avoid these difficulties as much as 
possible, while methodological refinement continues. 
'fhe tvvo 1nost serious problems in teci'.uTJ.ology assessment are the 
choice of perspectiv~ and the valuation of intangible benefits. These 
problems arise most conspicuously in performing cost-benefit analy-
sis. Accordingly, cost-control efforts should be focused on technol-
ogies that are wasteful in ter.ms of being unsafe, ineffective or not 
cost-effective. Curtailing these sorts of wasteful technologies has 
town hospital, for care for one of its subscribers), on the other hand, the decision to refuse to 
pay for the technology precludes the patient from obtaining it-at least from that HMO. See 
Stern, Will the Tort of Bod Faith Breach of Contract be Extended to Health Jl,faintenance 
Organizations?, 1 I LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 12, 13 (1983). In other respects, however, 
HMO patient care may be less prone to suffer from the provider's conflict of interest than 
non-HMO care, since the HMO has an incentive to maximize patient welfare when doing so 
will prevent the need for future care by the HMO, while the non-HMO provider has an 
opposite incentive to encourage the patient to return as another prospectively-paid admission. 
In any event, HMO patients appear to have lower rates of hospitalization and surgery than 
non-HMO patients, but the same or higher rates of office or ambulatory visits. See OT A 
COMPETITION, supra note 67, at 37-39. As of 1982, however, the lower rates of care did not 
appear to result in lower quality-of-care, nor was there any clearcut evidence that HMOs 
denied their subscribers needed hospitalization or surgical treatment. See id. at 64-65. This 
may have been due to the need for HMOs to compete on a quality-of-care basis with non-
HMO providers. See OTA IMPLICATIONS, supra note 73, at 123. 
There is some indication that patients will sacrifice the quality of their own care when 
they are financially responsible for health care. For example, in a major study by the Rand 
Corporation on the effect of varying degrees of patient co-payment on frequency and quality 
of care, RAND CORPORATION~ THE EFFECT OF COiNSURANCE ON THE 1-lEALTH OF ADULTS 
(I 984), a direct correlation was found between the level of co-payment and consumption of 
services. The highest co-payment population consumed about 30% less care than the popula-
tion whose care was free (no co-payment or insurance premiums). Jd. at 25. Reduced con-
sumption did not affect five general health status measures (physical health, role functioning, 
mental health, social contacts and health perceptions) for the average person. Jd. at 26. Nor 
'\1/as there any effect on risk factors for cardiovasculai disease or cancer like smoking, weight 
and cholesterol. !d. at 25-26. But those subjects whose health care was free had significantly 
less myopia and hypertension. !d. at 26. Insofar as hypertension is a risk factor for death, 
the Rand investigators calculated that, in the population of 50-year-old men, there would be 
eleven fewer deaths per thousand if care were free rather than if a high co-payment were 
required. I d. at 27. In interpreting the significance of this study, it is important to note that 
there was an income-related ceiling on health care expenditures for poor subjects, and that 
the study excluded those over 60 and the disabled. Jd. at 27-28. Thus, the study may have 
underestimated the impact of co-payment on the most vulnerable populations: the elderly and 
the poor. 
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the additional advantage of allowing cost-containment objectives to 
be consistent with pati~pt interests. 
Cost-containment methods such as Medicare's prospective pay-
ment system, while presenting certain advantages over other meth-
ods of controlling technology waste, create incentives for providers 
and third-party payors to deny patients not only technologies that 
are wasteful but also technologies that provide net benefit to the 
patient but that increase provider costs. Insofar as the relationship 
between patient and provider is concerned, these incentives intro-
duce a conflict of interest between provider and patient, a situation 
that is especially troubling in view of the factors that have led the 
duties that the provider owes to the patient to be characterized as 
fiducial. At the same time, providers are under a variety of pres-
sures to act strictly in the patient's interest. Whether cost-control 
incentives or these counterpressures will be the stronger determi-
nant of provider behavior is not yet known. 
In any event, greater assurance is needed that Medicare's pro-
spective payment system will limit its control of wasteful technolo-
gies to those that are wasteful both from a patient and a cost-control 
perspective. This requires both greater clarity in the standards by 
which Medicare determines which technologies to reimburse for, 
and increased assurance that these standards are being adhered to. 
At the same time, the methodology for assessing technologies 
should continue to be improved so that more cost-effective methods 
of identifying wasteful technology can be developed. This will facil-
itate extending cost controls, if necessary, to more marginal 
technologies. 
This approach to waste is suggested as a first, but not necessarily 
last step in reconciling cost controls with technical assessment capa-
bilities and with social goals. If insufficient reductions in technol-
ogy costs result, the impetus will grow for more severe cost-control 
measures, including measures dependent on assessment techniques 
that are presently of questionable value. At that point, it may be 
necessary to come more starkly to grips with the basic question of 
how much health care is worth. 
